Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, October 7, 1960, 2 p.m.

201. Deptel 151.¹ I doubt that high GRC officials misunderstand our attitude toward and part we played in Korean uprising. At any rate we provided them with full explanation at time of trouble. These approaches included a conversation I had with President Chiang (Embassy despatch 603),² Steeve’s conversation with Ambassador Yeh (Deptel 613)³ which was no doubt reported to Foreign Minister and President, and written summaries of CA 9705⁴ passed to Foreign Ministry and Chiang Ching-Kuo. I believe it would be accurate to say GRC high leaders disagree with actions we took in Korea. They believe we intervened after uprisings started to encourage Rhee’s opponents. They believe ouster of Rhee has created political instability which may lead to loss of Korea to free world. Only last night Foreign Minister voiced informally his renewed apprehensions in Korean developments and said he wished to discuss subject with me after double tenth.

In short, rather than misunderstanding our position, GRC leaders disagree with it. I am convinced that further explanation and justification of our Korean position would be profitless. In my view, it would be particularly inadvisable to approach Prime Minister Chen Cheng with our justification. He is almost certainly aware of our position; he has no alternative but to support position adopted by his chief; and his political position, recently rendered insecure for reasons already reported, would be made more vulnerable if he supported our position. In my opinion, chances are negligible that he would speak for US. See Embassy despatch 671⁵ for our assessment of impact of Korean developments on Taiwan. I believe considerations we adduced in that despatch and in my official-informal letter of May 24 to E.W. Martin⁶ continue to have validity.

With regard to Lei Chen case, my staff and I agree his arrest and prosecution resulted from his leadership of movement to form an international opposition party. I have no doubt President Chiang ordered his arrest. I am informed by his Secretary General that Chiang took action after urgings of GRC security authorities. Probability is Chiang Chingkuo was active in obtaining action by his father. Lei Chen action bears out our prognostications that Chiang will not tolerate rise of strong well-organized political opposition. Chiang saw in Lei’s persistent organizing efforts a growing threat to his and KMT’s political supremacy. He therefore took action to nip Lei’s activities in bud and checkmate activities of Taiwanese politicians before they could take root. I am convinced that Chiang would take drastic action if he deemed it necessary to maintain politicial stability and his own supremacy. I think it a fair conclusion that he carefully considered problem of US reaction before nabbing Lei. I believe he is prepared to reject US intervention if it comes and take steps he thinks necessary, including use of force, to keep down threat to his regime and his mission—recovery of mainland.

It is to be regretted that Chiang felt compelled to take action against Lei and that prosecution of case has been handled so clumsily as to reflect discredit on GRC. Yet it would be risky on our part to rebuke Chiang for checkmating Lei. While I believed Chiang and his security agencies have been oversensitive to Lei and his activities, potentiality for resentment and trouble is always present because of irritant of Taiwanese-mainlander problem. KMT is fully aware of this problem and has handled it subtly and well except for two or three lapses during past decade. KMT has shown capability to keep lid on despite heavy burdens imposed by “return to mainland” policy which is not popular among Taiwanese. But this has been possible because KMT has always been able to neutralize political opposition. KMT also has more positive acts of credit which have helped it retain some measure of support. But fact remains that if an effective political opposition should ever be able to organize, it would pose a direct threat to KMT. Such a party would inevitably devolve into a Taiwanese organ which would direct its appeal to Taiwanese. If such an organization could come out as a political alternative to KMT and formulate its policies freely in honest elections, then the KMT would almost certainly be doomed. Of course, Chiang and KMT would not voluntarily abandon themselves to this fate.

Even if KMT were to submit to extinction and this could be arranged without struggle, results would probably be disastrous to US interests. Taiwanese politicians are mainly unprincipled opportunists with no experience in self-government. They have yet to show any capability to work together and prospects are that product of their government would be chaos. Moreover, Taiwanese politicians would almost certainly adopt an “independent Taiwan” policy and withdraw from the heavy military commitments imposed by Chiang in his mainland recovery policy.

We have now been supporting Chiang and supremacy of KMT for a decade and this through K. C. Wu and Sun Li-Jen episodes. We have known all along that a free political atmosphere is an unattainable goal if we want stable, militarily secure Taiwan to deter Communists and preserve our peripheral defenses. We have invested several billions in this effort and it has paid off relatively well. Without Taiwan, our military position in Pacific would be gravely impaired.

In my judgment, we really have no alternative in terms of our own security but to continue policy of past decade which is to work with Chiang and KMT. Neither world situation nor objective conditions here permit luxury of free organized political opposition.

Deptel makes much of parallel here to Korea. I believe there are important differences, apart from the mainlander-Taiwanese relationship stressed above. For one thing, Taiwan is much more prosperous and there is little economic ferment. Accelerated economic program will further contribute to stability. After service in both areas, I find governmental administration here is of much higher and experienced order. Police here are light, not heavy handed. KMT operates in a persuasive and relatively subtle way throughout Taiwan and is much more sophisticated than political organization Rhee was able to contrive in Korea. There has been lack of effective political opposition here, and, as stressed above, it is primary KMT preoccupation to keep opposition down to harmless, unorganized local levels (administrative as well as political devices are used to perpetuate this situation). Actually, local elections here have been fairly well conducted; election of April 24, 1960 is case in point since it was unmixed success to KMT. Only recently steps were taken to initiate election reforms and there is a conscious effort in train to broaden Taiwanese representation in Central Government. There is also slow but continuing progress in area of human rights and even press is able to indulge in fair degree of criticism. This is evidenced by existence of Lei Chen’s opposition magazine for over period of 2 years. I am hopeful accelerated economic program will lead to further expansion of freedom. As example, travel exit and entry procedures have been greatly liberalized. Another significant recent development was decision to place courts under control of Judicial Yuan. Another desirable step would be to limit jurisdiction of military courts-martial, but it is doubtful whether Chiang would favor this move in existing world and local situation.

Deptel refers to paragraph 2 of NSC 5723. We have interpreted the terms of this paragraph as envisaging a gradual approach toward representative government in line with provisions of paragraph 18 of courses of action of same paper. I submit that slow, steady progress is being made in implementation of that mandate. Patience is necessary. Moreover, overriding consideration is security and stability. In my judgment, opening of gates now to untrammelled political activity could easily lead to chaos and disaster. Overt support of such course of action on our part could provide Communists with heaven-sent opportunity they constantly seek to divide us from Chiang.

To sum up, I think our best course of action is partially to encourage gradual and piecemeal political reforms both in and out of KMT. We should carefully avoid actions that would set off mainlanders against Taiwanese or otherwise undermine stability of this anti-Communist bastion. I believe time is in our favor and patience is our best course of action.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/10–760. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in three sections. Received at 12:14 a.m. on October 8.
1. Telegram 151 to Taipei, September 30, stated that the Department was disturbed by reports indicating that the recent arrest of journalist Lei Chen had been “politically motivated”. It commented that “any GRC policy of freezing political status quo would conflict directly with long established U.S. policy objective of working toward responsible representative government capable of attracting growing support people Taiwan” and suggested that a presentation of the U.S. attitude on the events leading to Syngman Rhee’s downfall, which GRC leaders apparently misunderstod, might indirectly demonstrate “U.S. concern that GRC not make fatal mistakes of Rhee regime.” (Ibid., 795B.00/9–3060; see Supplement)
2. Despatch 603, May 4, reported a conversation on April 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–460)
3. Telegram 613 to Taipei, April 29, summarized a conversation on April 28. (Ibid., 795B.00/4–2960)
4. Not found.
5. Dated June 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6–860)
6. Not printed.