Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

• The Offshore Islands

1. It is my understanding that the President and the JCS are of the opinion that the Offshore Islands have no strategic Value.

2. The Islands have acquired psychological significance because of—

a. The conditional mantle of protection we have thrown over them;

b. The extent to which the GRC has become committed to retaining the Islands and the consequent impact of their loss on ChiNat morale; and

c. The reluctance of a number of our allies to have the issue of war or peace staked on these Islands.

3. Yesterday General Twining explained to the President the outlines of military thinking for the defense of the Islands against ChiCom attack or interdiction and blockade. Today, the Joint Chiefs further developed their general planning for Governor Herter, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Robertson, and myself. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] [See Tab A]¹

5. It is my judgment that if the present JCS plans are carried out in the event of ChiCom blockade or attack, it is very likely that we shall find ourselves engaged in a general war with Communist China. This will entail a grave risk of general war with the USSR.

6. I believe, therefore, that the President should now direct the Department of Defense urgently to examine the possibility of a local defense of the Offshore Islands against sustained interdiction or attack that would not involve nuclear strikes against the Chinese mainland.

7. The Department of Defense will almost certainly maintain that it cannot even consider local defense unless use of nuclear weapons in the immediate vicinity of the Islands is authorized. It may well report to the President that it is unable, even with this authorization, to plan or undertake effective local defense.

8. If this is the military judgment, I believe that we should reexamine our policy toward the Offshore Islands. We should not, in my opinion, maintain our present conditional commitment, or move to an unconditional commitment, to defend these Islands if the only military means available to us to carry out the commitment involves grave risk of general war with Communist China and in consequence with the USSR.

9. We may never be in a better position than at present to alter our policy. Most of the world now believes that we can defend the Offshore Islands whether or not they agree with our position. Our recent resolute action in the Near East has demonstrated that we are prepared to resort to force to defend vital interests. Hence, a change of policy would be interpreted not as a sign of weakness but as a calculated reassessment of national interest.

10. If we wait until the ChiComs have substantially increased their military strength in the vicinity of the Offshore Islands and particularly if we wait until they acquire nuclear weapons, we shall be faced with an even more dangerous choice. On the one hand, a change of policy would then be interpreted as weakness; on the other, the risk of general war if we had to defend the Islands would be greater.

11. I do not underestimate the difficulty of persuading Chiang Kaishek to accept a change of policy and the resultant necessity of withdrawing ChiNat troops from the Islands. We would certainly have to assure him of military support and cover for the evacuation.

12. What we do at this juncture must be based upon a careful evaluation of our own national security interests. In these terms, to risk general war for the Offshore Islands is, in my view, unacceptable.

Gerard C. Smith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1558. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads “I showed this to Gov. Herter. GCSmith.”
1. Not attached to the source text; see Document 19. The second pair of brackets is in the source text.