33. Memorandum for the Record0
Following the 376th meeting of the National Security Council today, at which the Director of Central Intelligence gave a briefing on the situation in the Taiwan Straits area, the following met with the President in his office:
- The Vice President of the United States
- Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
- Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense
- Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury
- Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
- Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
- Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State
- Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
- James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Mr. Gray read and explained the three policy questions relative to the GRC held off-shore islands, contained in the enclosure to the memorandum for the NSC, dated August 13, 1958 of “The Situation in the Taiwan Straits Area.”1
General Twining stated that the Joint Chiefs views on these questions were as follows:
- 1.
- The U.S. should support Chinese Nationalist forces, if necessary with U.S. forces, in resisting a Chinese Communist blockade of Quemoy and Matsu (hereafter referred to as the off-shore islands).
- 2.
- U.S. forces should be used, if required, to assist the Chinese Nationalists in defending against a major Chinese Communist assault on the off-shore islands. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 3.
- The U.S. should not state publicly its policy on 1 and 2 above, but should continue the so-called practice of “keeping them guessing”, partially [Page 53] because the Chinese Nationalists, if they know we are committed to the defense of the off-shore islands, may start something on their own.
The President observed that when, as in this case, we are being shoved into something that we do not think is correct because of someone else’s intransigence, this is when the American public and press say that the U.S. has a vacillating policy. The President said that there is no strategic value to the off-shore islands. Previously it was argued that they were stepping stones to the mainland, but they are certainly not stepping stones to Taiwan. Yet we find ourselves in a dilemma even though in 1953 at the Denver NSC meeting2 we decided against committing ourselves to the defense of the off-shore islands. Now we have let it develop so that Chiang says he cannot hold out in Taiwan if the off-shore islands are lost, and he has put 100,000 people on those islands. The decisions facing us are not what we need to do regarding the Chinese Communists or the Chinese Nationalists but how to deal with a very difficult psychological problem. The President said that Secretary Dulles now thinks we should make a public statement regarding the off-shore islands. When Public Law No. 4 was passed in 1955, it provided that the President would decide whether it was necessary or appropriate to defend the off-shore islands in order to defend Taiwan. Now the Chinese Nationalists have 100,000 men on those islands, and this puts a very difficult decision up to us.
Secretary Herter said that it looks as if Chiang would if necessary put everything he had into the defense of the off-shore islands. This would have a direct effect on the defense of Taiwan if Chiang sent in all his air and whatever army troops he could get there by junk or navy.
The President commented that the Chinese Nationalist Air Force would be hampered in defense of the off-shore islands by their distance from Taiwan.
The Vice President asked General Twining if Chinese Communists launched attacks against Quemoy and Matsu, would they also have to strike airfields on Taiwan. General Twining thought they would.
The President said that if this happened we would have to act but he did not think it was necessarily true that the Chinese Communists would have to attack Taiwan. Of course once the Chinese Communists came at our bases in Taiwan, this would pose a very difficult decision. This would show clear Chinese Communist intent, and might result in general war. If the Chinese Communists attack our Taiwan bases, he should think we would have to put everything we have on a general war alert.
[Page 54]Secretary Herter said that he understood that if we assisted in the defense of the off-shore islands, we would not only have to bomb nearby airfields but also go up as far as Shanghai deep into the Chinese Communist mainland. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs were presently working out the details of the type of operations we would undertake in this contingency.
The President observed that we should be very careful, if there were an overt act against the off-shore islands on the part of the Chinese Communists, that we do not take instantaneous action which would spread the hostilities. This would be of great concern to the Soviets because Communist China is their greatest ally. The President thought that U.S. reaction to such a Chinese Communist overt act should have fixed definite limits.
Secretary Herter said that the new Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Mr. Yeh had suggested that the U.S. might make a formal statement that a Chinese Communist attack on the off-shore islands would be a grave threat to peace in that area. Such a statement would be very general and not a specific commitment.
In answer to a question by Secretary Anderson as to the Chinese Communist reaction if the U.S. bombed 1 or 2 ChiCom airfields, General Twining said he did not think there would be any retaliatory attack on Taiwan.
Secretary Quarles said that the MAAG chief, who is back here in Washington, thinks that a Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands is very likely. He said that the Chinese Nationalists had only about 45 days’ to two months’ supplies on the islands unless they kept them resupplied. He also thought that Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands could not be stopped unless U.S. forces intervened.
The President questioned whether the Chinese Nationalists could not use fast vessels at night, heavily armed with anti-aircraft. He said that it would be hard for the Chinese Communists to do an accurate job of bombing, and he cited the difficulty we had in Africa trying to stop the German boats from crossing the Mediterranean. The President thought we might have to give the Chinese Nationalists better equipment to use. He thought that this was possibly a war of nerves and that the Chinese Communists may be seeing how far they can go if we do not react. He thought we might be creating the conditions of a major war simply by doing nothing.
Mr. Dulles cited the naval action by the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists which had taken place today.
The Vice President thought that Mr. Yeh’s approach seemed very wise. Rather than the use of a statement, however, the Vice President suggested that the President might make a response along that line to a question [Page 55] in a press conference. This would have the same impact but not be quite so dramatic.
Secretary Herter said there was a question as to whether this would be a firm enough statement to stop the Chinese Communists.
The President observed that it was a funny thing that the United Nations still recognized the Chinese Nationalists and, therefore, in theory the Chinese Communist attacks were overt aggression. He noted that the UN had recognized the status quo now for 8 or 9 years. Possibly we could make a storm about these Chinese Communist attacks in the current UN debate. The President said he did not agree with the logic of putting all the Chinese Nationalist strength on these two off-shore islands but “there you are”.
The Vice President noted that the Chinese Communists claim recognition on the basis that they control the mainland. He thought there was no more support of that position in International Law than the position of the Chinese Nationalists in control of the off-shore islands.
The President thought that it is possible that you could weaken yourselves trying to defend those islands.
Secretary Herter asked [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
The President said that if the Chinese Communists attack Taiwan, we have got to do what is necessary. Such action, however, would be all-out war and not limited war, but he did not think such an attack on Taiwan was probable.
Mr. Dulles asked a question as to what would happen if the Chinese Communists attacked the ships which provision the off-shore islands. Secretary McElroy said that the MAAG Chief thought that the Chinese Nationalists would try to reinforce their position on the off-shore islands. Secretary McElroy reiterated that this was part of the psychopathic attitude of the Chinese Nationalists toward these off-shore islands.
The President closed the meeting by saying that he did not believe that we could usefully do more regarding this matter at this time.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by James S. Lay, Jr. Attached to the memorandum of discussion at the August 14 NSC meeting. An abbreviated version headed “Summary of the Principal Points Made in the Discussion of the Taiwan Straits Situation at the Meeting in the President’s Office Following the NSC Meeting on August 14, 1958,” was sent by Lay with a covering memorandum dated August 15 to Gerard C. Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1558) Goodpaster’s record of the meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries; see Supplement.↩
- The memorandum was from Lay; the enclosure was unsigned and undated. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 File; see Supplement)↩
- Reference is to a meeting on September 12, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, p. 613.↩