Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

192. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 17, 1958, 12:15–12:23 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Chiang Kai-shek and the Offshore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

• Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, First Lord of the Admiralty
• His Excellency Sir HAROLD CACCIA, British Ambassador
• The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

Lord Mountbatten said the President had suggested he see the Secretary to describe his experience in dealing with President Chiang during World War II because of its possible relevance with respect to the present situation in the Taiwan Straits. He said he had dealt with President Chiang for over two years when, as Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, he had under his command five Chinese divisions. His first contact with Chiang occurred when he visited Chungking to meet the President and discuss with him the use of these Chinese troops in a campaign then being planned to recover Burma from the Japanese.¹ He arrived in Chungking to learn from General Somervell,² who had been sent from Washington to introduce him to General Stilwell³ and Chiang, that the President had just fired General Stilwell. Determined that he would not assume command of Chinese troops in this situation, he told General Somervell to inform Chiang that he would not employ a single Chinese soldier under his command in Burma unless General Stilwell were taken back. He advised General Somervell to give the President a graceful way out by suggesting that he could say that he had reviewed his action and out of clemency and magnanimity was taking General Stilwell back. The upshot was that the President wrestled with the problem all day and finally called General Stilwell in, embraced him, and announced that he wished him to remain as Commander.

The lesson of this incident, Lord Mountbatten stated, was that if one took a strong line with Chiang and at the same time gave him a face-saving means of retreat, he would back down. He considered it likely that in the present situation President Chiang could similarly be induced to pull out of the offshore islands if the United States took a hard line with him while at the same time giving him a graceful, face-saving means of acceding by providing additional amphibious lift and other modernization of forces. Actually, such a move would strengthen the position of the GRC and thus be in the President’s best interest.

The Secretary commented that he was going out to Taiwan merely to get the feel of the situation and to give President Chiang a better understanding of the problems which the United States faced in regard to it. He planned to see what might be done to improve the situation but he did not intend to try to carry out any specific course of action at this time.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1758. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. In October 1943.
2. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, then Commanding General, U.S. Army Service Forces.
3. Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, then Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, China–Burma–India Theater, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.