Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, October 2, 1958, 11 p.m.

534. For the Secretary.

1. President Chiang summoned me late today. He had just returned from south Taiwan where he had entertained General Pate¹ and Admirals Smoot and Kivette at lunch. Smoot told me on his return that President had been most pleasant and had confined discussion to military subjects.

2. I found President in highly tense and disturbed state of mind. With him were Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Secretary General Chang Chun. As is usual with President, he started conversation by asking if I had any information from Washington. Fortunately, I had received your 290,² so I proceeded to give him substance.

3. Speaking with unusual emphasis and force, President said he realized difficult circumstances confronting you and President Eisenhower. But his people and soldiers would not understand. They had been shaken when in your statement at Newport³ you had offered to resume negotiations with Communists. Now, after hearing report of your latest press conference, President had sent special emissary to Kinmen to calm forces. Emissary had reported today your remarks had caused bewilderment and dismay at front. Although US Government had said it would help defend off-shore islands if attacked, your suggestion that GRC troops be withdrawn has had most unsettling effect and is highly damaging to their morale.

4. President said he considered Communists had scored psychological victory when we agreed to resume talks. Talk of withdrawal of GRC forces would confirm Communists’ belief they proceeding correctly to obtain objectives. They would become more intransigent and demanding if they perceived US position to be weakening. If this sort of thing continued, it would pave way for Communists to seize islands. Remarks attributed to Under Secretary about “pathological attachment” to off-shore islands and their unessentiality to defense of Taiwan also were harmful. They could serve only to undermine morale and fighting spirit of defenders of Taiwan and free world. Such remarks hasten collapse of resistance; they invite Communists to invade Kinmen and of course make it certain Communists will not agree to cease hostilities.

5. President said his press conference of September 29 was designed to help US authorities. He had realized US difficulties with public opinion. He had had in mind President Eisenhower’s phrase “removal of thorn in side of peace”⁴ when he made his point that off-shores would not be used as springboard to attack mainlands. He had also made clear he would not ask that US ground forces be used in assisting defense of off-shore islands, for he knew US people would be unwilling to see this happen. He had risked his own prestige in making foregoing remarks. Your answer to his effort to be helpful was suggestions that off-shore islands be evacuated. This adds immensely to GRC difficulties. Morale factor cannot be over emphasized.

6. President then said ill-fated Marshall mission⁵ with its attempt to negotiate cease-fires, et cetera, is being recreated in minds of Chinese people. He feared some sorry spectacle might be re-enacted on Taiwan. Accordingly, it is incumbent on US Government if it does not want mainland tragedy re-enacted here, to assure Chinese people of US unfailing and steady support on a no-compromise basis. Otherwise government might not be able to keep situation under control for long. He then made plea for US Government to help keep up morale and not let it fall to ground. For his part, President would do his best to help you meet your problems with US public and allies. He only asked that you approach his problems in same spirit.

7. Referring to two points made in paragraph 5 above, President said these represented his “maximum concessions” to US position. He could not go further in accommodations to Communists in off-shore areas. If even a small number of troops were to be withdrawn from offshores it would be just as well to withdraw all. It would be tantamount in end to giving up Taiwan. He then said with great emphasis that nothing would get his troops out of Kinmen.⁶

8. Premier then spoke up saying your recent remarks and others of like import could only encourage Communists to step up war activities. He believed Matsu would certainly come under fire soon and Communists might be emboldened to launch major assaults on off-shores. GRC had no choice but to fight for every inch of territory. No further retreat could be tolerated lest morale collapse. Chen then said in making public statements officials would be well advised to direct them to mainland Chinese who are looking desperately for deliverance, as well as to Chinese on Taiwan and overseas. Any words that could comfort mainland Chinese would have great importance.

9. I said as strongly as I could that there had been no change in our policy of helping to repel forceful seizure of islands and I was convinced there would be none. Chiang’s rebuttal was that public and forces do not understand and therefore serious morale problem is created.

10. I grant that there is a morale problem, but I do not agree that it is likely to get out of control so long as we continue helping GRC militarily as we are doing now and so long as we do not pressure GRC to make concessions which they regard as touching their vital interests. I agree with Chiang that statements implying withdrawal from off-shores or suggesting their indefensibility or unessentiality will lead Communists to think we are weakening, and thus increase their intransigence and lead them to further adventures. Such statements also discourage mainlanders hoping for liberation and make it easier for Communists to maintain their controls. Respectfully suggest these points be taken into account in framing public utterances.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:33 p.m.
1. General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
2. Document 146.
3. Document 68.
4. Eisenhower used this phrase in his September 11 address; see footnote 1, Document 79.
5. For documentation concerning General of the Army George C. Marshall’s mission to China, December 1945–January 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 745–828, and 1946, vol. IX, and vol. X, pp. 1–723.
6. A record of the meeting prepared by Chiang’s secretary, James Shen, transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 172 from Taipei, October 6, states that Chiang “asked the Ambassador to convey to U.S. government that no external pressure, nor any weapons, including atomic bombs, could ever force the Chinese Government to evacuate a single soldier from the offshore islands. Chinese troops would keep on fighting on the offshore islands till the last drop of their blood.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–658; see Supplement)