141. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Lange Discussion: Formosa and Offshore Islands
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Halvard Lange—Norwegian Foreign Minister
- Paul Koht—Norwegian Ambassador
- William Kerrigan—EUR:BNA
Mr. Lange inquired whether the UN could play any useful role in reducing tension in the offshore island situation. This might be possible through the UN machinery, a small group of member nations, or the SYG. The Norwegian Government had made an attempt through the Chicom Ambassador in Oslo to determine whether any accommodation could be reached. No reply has been received, which may be encouraging. On the other hand, the Russians are not likely to be helpful, as he (Lange) found in a recent talk with Gromyko. At the same time, however, Sobolev1 told Norwegian Ambassador Nielsen that they saw the need to separate the problem of the offshore islands from Formosa. Mr. Lange observed that they had not yet reconciled the discrepancies in the two [Page 298] Russian positions. He mentioned that he was speaking in the UN on Tuesday (Sept. 30) and inquired whether it would be useful if he were to suggest, in guarded terms, that if the present Warsaw talks don’t achieve their purpose, the UN could be helpful in reaching some accommodation.
The Secretary responded that he saw no objection to a statement to that effect, couched in guarded terms. However, he would be grateful if no suggestion were made to carry the talks on at a higher level. We do not think such talks will work. We would be agreeable to any reasonable settlement that can be reached about the offshore islands, and do not consider them as anything but outpost positions, to be lightly held. The President has always regarded them in that light. In fact, we have made strenuous efforts to persuade the Formosa Chinese to keep the manning of the islands at a low level. Although we do not regard the offshore islands as of fundamental importance, we want very much to keep Formosa because of its great strategic importance. Additionally, the loss of Formosa would probably result in the loss of the Philippines, and would have serious results elsewhere in Asia.
Mr. Lange inquired whether the natives of Taiwan would share the feelings of the mainland (Nationalist) Chinese about the importance of the offshore islands. The Secretary responded that the Taiwanese are not organized politically and there is no way of making their wishes felt, but probably they would prefer to be independent of the mainland and mainland influences. In view of the lack of political organization and political maturity of the Taiwanese, we see no way of bringing them into the present Government at this time. Mr. Lange inquired whether UN Trusteeship to develop the Taiwanese in the direction of political maturity— after the death of Chiang—would be feasible.
The Secretary responded that the long term development of the Island seemed to be in that direction, and cited the growing percentage of Taiwanese in the Nationalist army, which development will gradually create an army more loyal to the Island than to the mainland.
Mr. Lange observed that even the mainlanders on Formosa appear to be giving up the idea of successful return to the mainland, to which the Secretary agreed, observing that even Chiang had given up hope of return, in the absence of a revolution on the mainland.
In response to Ambassador Koht’s question, the Secretary observed that Chiang attaches so much importance to these islands because they are the last remnant of mainland territory he holds, since we persuaded him to abandon the Tachens in 1955.
We are very anxious to get the troops out of these offshore islands; their mere presence there is regarded as in a sense provocative, although the Nationalists do very little harassing from the islands.
[Page 299]As to the solution of the problem (the offshore islands), the Secretary indicated that if the UN were to enter the picture, the situation could most usefully be handled by the SYG. He went on to say that he placed his greatest hope of a solution to the problem, not in the development of a formula, but in a de facto agreement that doesn’t require anyone to do anything or sign anything. In such a situation a third party, who can go from one side to the other and work out a practical position useful to both sides, is of great assistance. The Secretary pointed out that he was fearful of mentioning high level talks because while Ambassadors could talk for 2 or 3 years, it would be another thing entirely for Foreign Ministers, who would have to reach an agreement promptly. It was also undesirable to go into such talks at the higher level unless the earlier spade work indicated they had a good chance of success.