Office of the Historian

134. Memorandum of Conversation0

MC–14
New York, September 27, 1958, 12:50 p.m.

SECRETARY’S TRIP TO NEW YORK

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Greene
  • United Nations
    • Secretary General Hammarskjold

SUBJECT

  • Various

The Secretary explained that he wanted to continue his discussion with the Secretary General on the possibility of the United Nations in some way helping to act as a cushion in the present Far East crisis, so as to diminish the risk of general war.1

The Secretary described in detail why, although it could not be said publicly, the political and psychological significance of Quemoy far transcends its military significance to the survival of Chiang Kai-shek’s Government on Taiwan. He and the Secretary General agreed that Chiang Kai-shek is a dedicated and determined man and that this is as much a fact to be taken into account in the present situation as is geography. The Secretary said that if it were possible to work out a cease fire that would not cost Chiang Kai-shek his position and authority, that would be most agreeable to the United States; complete surrender of the offshore islands is in no event acceptable.

Discussing the possibility of compromise, the Secretary General thought that if the Chicoms’ position is only that they will never give up their claims to the offshore islands, there may be just enough room for compromise. If however, they are committed to the principle of using force to get them, there is no room at all. He wondered how firm they really are in their professions of intent to seize the islands.

The Secretary reviewed the present military and supply situations, which suggested to him the conclusion that the Chicoms are not yet committed to an all out effort to seize the islands; hence the situation may gradually die down without an outbreak of general war. Since neither [Page 287] the Chicoms nor the Chinats will abandon their claims to the islands, perhaps sanitization of the latter is the answer.

The Secretary thought the Soviets are no more anxious to have a general war break out than are we. But there still may be a need to find a third element to intervene in the present situation.

Discussing the possibilities of a “third factor” the Secretary and the Secretary General agreed that the United Nations, even in the person of the Secretary General, might be palatable to neither side. India is unacceptable; the Secretary General thought Finland would be acceptable, but probably would not risk it. By a process of elimination one comes back to the United Nations as almost the only hope. Here, the trick will be to find a form or formula that will skirt the conflicts of principle. The Secretary General described the formula under which the Chicoms accepted his intercession last time, and thought it might possibly work again; the heart of this formula is that, while the Chicoms cannot accept an outside intervention in an “internal” matter, they did accept such intervention in what was delineated as an “international” issue.

The Secretary General said he would think about the matter over the weekend and be back in touch with the Secretary.

The Secretary emphasized that we may be near a critical point and as far as the United States is concerned, if no written formula can be found, it is enough if hostilities just subside into a de facto truce.

The Secretary General also discussed in some detail the organizational problems in the United Nations during the General Assembly. These, in his view, would have to be resolved before he could feel available for a role in the affair. He seemed to think that if it could be worked out as a “crash” project that would require not more than a fortnight of his time, he could afford to be absent from headquarters between mid-October and mid-November but probably not before and certainly not after.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1123. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.↩
  2. The Secretary had raised the subject with the Secretary-General in a brief conversation the previous evening, recorded in a September 26 memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations)↩