Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

67. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)⁰

Washington, April 18, 1958.

Dear Chris: Colonel Berlin, the STANVAC representative in Indonesia, who is on a short visit to the United States, called on me yesterday evening. He has spent some thirty years in that area and is well acquainted with many of the key political and military leaders, both within and outside of the present government.

Colonel Berlin opened the conversation by stating that he had been asked by the anti-communist Chief of Army intelligence, speaking for Nasution, to convey the following to U.S. Government representatives in Washington:

1. A request that the U.S. offer to supply arms to the Indonesian Army before the Soviet-promised 16 MiGs and 8 bombers arrive.

2. A request that the U.S. make available twenty billets for Indonesian Army officers at the Fort Leavenworth School.

3. An invitation for a group of U.S. military personnel to come to Indonesia for six months or so, in order to make an extensive visit of military establishments, and to satisfy themselves that the Army is not communist. Successive groups were also invited.

Nasution personally confirmed the foregoing to Colonel Berlin.

During our conversation, Colonel Berlin expressed his opinion that Indonesia is rapidly going communist—that certain Cabinet Portfolios, which are the early beach heads of communist penetration, such as the Ministry of Information, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Trade Unions, are already held by known communists. He regretted that he had no ready solution to offer which was feasible, and which would be sure of stopping the deteriorating situation. He did, however, state that there are elements and individuals within the government who are aware of the danger and who are in a position to show some effectiveness in retrieving the situation. His assessment of certain key figures follows:

Djuanda, the Prime Minister, is anti-communist and believes that once the Central Government can control that part of Sumatra which it believes essential to its economy, it will cease fighting. Then, under the leadership of Hatta (who refuses to rejoin the government until the fighting is ended) the anti-communists will take steps to regain control.

Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Army, is anti-communist, and although loyal to Sukarno, is resentful of the latter’s interference in Army affairs. Nasution is politically ambitious and might be receptive to ideas which would further that ambition.

Barlian, Commander of South Sumatra, is strongly anti-communist and, while not declaring himself for the dissidents as hoped for, has refused to take up arms against them.

Sukarno appears to be completely in the pocket of the communists. Although his stature in the eyes of the intelligentia has definitely diminished, he still has a tremendous popular following and probably could not be successfully challenged by any single individual.

Queried as to what might be done, Colonel Berlin made these observations:

1. A military victory on the part of the dissidents might induce Barlian and, following his lead, other Army leaders in the outlying islands to swing over, actively.

2. The Atjeh tribes (N. Sumatra) might be induced to fight.

3. A gesture of support from the U.S. might encourage the anticommunist officers on Java to take action.

4. Nasution might be approached to employ the Army in exerting pressure to control Sukarno. The question of approach is delicate and the U.S. must be prepared to disavow sponsorship.

5. Acceptance of Nasution’s invitation might provide opportunities for the U.S. to exert a favorable influence over the Army.

Colonel Berlin repeatedly emphasized the danger of failing to act promptly to rally those forces in the GOI which may be in a position to do some good. It seems unlikely that the situation will develop in which the United States can take any sort of military action, although this is still a possibility. If the dissidents fail to win over additional supporters and fail to retain control over a considerable portion of Sumatra, the Central Government will be entrenched without serious jeopardy. The only force in the GOI which will prevent that government from becoming communist is in the Army. I agree with you that we should do everything that we can to encourage the anti-communist elements in the GOI to exert all the influence possible to prevent the communist domination of Indonesia.

Ambassador Jones apparently has a firm grasp of the situation and perhaps he could offer some suggestions as to how Nasution could be approached and how to build up the anti-communist forces in the Army and the GOI. If we could act on his suggestions quickly and at the same time not destroy our assets among the dissidents, the United States may be able to assist in preventing Indonesia from becoming communist dominated.

I realize that you have all this knowledge, but I would like to give what support I can to helping the dissidents and the anti-communist elements in Indonesia to save their country.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Arleigh

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–1858. Secret; Personal.