Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, July 27, 1959, 2 p.m.

174. Also for POLAD. Out of welter of confusion and conflicting interests accompanying revision of structure Indonesian Government and appointment of new Cabinet, two things emerge clearly. First is that Sukarno feels he has achieved or is on way to achieving balance of power factors which he considers essential to maintain his position. The second is that there is at last awareness that something must be done about deteriorating financial and economic situation and an apparent determination to do the necessary even if adoption of politically unpopular measures is required.

With regard to first, this is of course way in which Sukarno has always operated. Balancing one man off against another, one group against another, has been the key to his political strategy. As Department aware, this was what gave PKI its opportunity to stage a comeback when Sukarno some years ago saw black cloud of Masjumi looming on political horizon as direct threat to his own position. This is also reason Hatta and Sjahrir are on sidelines, reason Natsir and Sjafruddin are in Sumatra. For balancing one political force against another neutralizes both and leads not to decision and action but to indecision and inaction, with consequent failure to face up to and attack problems facing country.

Today Sukarno has succeeded in establishing somewhat precarious balance between Army and PKI, and he has aligned himself with army because at least for time being PKI poses greatest threat to his preeminence. Sukarno recognizes, of course, that ultimately this balance may be upset, that he is dealing with an ambitious man in Nasution but so far he does not fear him because presumably he still has power to destroy him and he needs him. Nasution has demonstrated capacity to temper ambition with restraint.

Reason previous Cabinet, so-called Karya Cabinet, was able to stay in office as long as it did, its more than two years of service breaking all records for Indonesia, was because it was able to preserve this balance. The government rested on a tripod of three men—Sukarno, Nasution, and Djuanda. This triumvirate has been continued in new Cabinet. For time being at least, each man is dependent upon the other. Djuanda does not count in the power struggle of course. He is simply a dedicated man trying to do a job for his country but therein lies his greatest strength because Sukarno knows he is no rival for power and is willing to trust him—to an extent he probably trusts no other man—to run government. Nasution likewise appears to have same feeling about Djuanda.

Visitors to Indonesia continue to ask me this question—what has brought about change in Sukarno? The situation has changed so that it is no longer to Sukarno’s interest to play game the way he played it before. If Sukarno sees threat coming from another direction, he will change his course again.

This raises question as to how long Sukarno–Nasution alliance can continue. Answer, in my view, is a simple one—just so long as Nasution controls army but still lacks power to unseat President. The moment Nasution acquires such power Sukarno will move against him unless Nasution moves first. This is an uneasy alliance between two strong men—each strong in a different way. Sukarno, the superb politician, the beloved of the masses, versus Nasution, the tough soldier, the brilliant commander. If they can continue to work together, much can be accomplished for the good of the country. Claws of PKI can be clipped, an open field can be given Djuanda to tackle financial-economic problems of nation, some measure of political and economic stability may conceivably result. If not, then solution a la Burma, Pakistan is not out of question, as, unfortunately, neither is also a lapse into chaos with resultant emergence of PKI as dominant force although this latter possibility, while ever present, is in my view much less likely than two years or year ago.

To prevent military solution at least until he himself wants one, and to assist in preserving balance within military, Sukarno is clearly playing off Suryadarma against Nasution; also loyalty of some strong subordinate commanders to Sukarno, e.g. Colonel Sarbini,¹ provides further check on Nasution. We have not seen last of antagonism between Nasution–Suryadarma although if I were betting I would put my money on Nasution.

The difficulty with military solution to Indonesian problem is that while this may be temporarily effective in advancing US objectives through curbing Communists there is no more assurance that a military regime will be able find its way through maze of economic and financial difficulties than its civilian predecessors could. And there is no present indication that military are likely to be any less tempted by fatal lure of corrupt practice than have civilians. And should military fail, what then?

Indonesian attitudes today in economic field provide remarkable parallel to political attitudes year and half ago. At that time Indonesian leadership was just beginning to be acutely aware of fact that Communism within country represented a real threat to continued freedom and independence of Indonesian people. Today same leadership has become aware of new danger—inflation—and they are beginning to see that economic instability can not only threaten a better life for their people but that it also presents a situation ready-made for Communist exploitation.

I have been anticipating a direct bid from Indonesian Government for more assistance to tide them over this crisis. If and when it comes, I think we should be responsive, always provided they are willing help themselves to extent they are able, even though this means taking some of the hard decisions I have been talking about.²

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/7–2759. Confidential. Also sent to CINCPAC. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to The Hague, Canberra, Manila, Tokyo, Bangkok, London, and Singapore.
1. Military Commander in East Java.
2. On July 29 John Gordon Mein briefed the OCB on developments in Indonesia. His analysis closely followed that presented by Jones in this telegram. He emphasized that the U.S. position in Indonesia had improved over the past year, but added that this development should not induce complacency. (Memorandum from Jeremiah J. O’Connor to Parsons, July 29; Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/7–2959) See Supplement.