150. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State0

68. My telegram 52.1 Prime Minister Menzies requested me call this morning. In presence Defense Minister Sir Philip McBride he spoke at [Page 272] length re Australian reactions toward United States policy of supplying arms to Indonesia. He stated latest available information indicates United States has now supplied landing craft and also proposes supply anti-submarine vessels.

Menzies said with considerable earnestness one problem which could defeat his government in coming election would be wave of Australian resentment against growing strength Indonesia because of United States arms policy and possibility Indonesia might in consequence take aggressive action against West New Guinea. This would pose government with dilemma whereby on one hand if open support were given to Dutch, government would be charged in United Nations and elsewhere with support colonialism, whereas if nothing were done and West New Guinea fell to Indonesia, government would be pilloried for jeopardizing Australian security.

Menzies thought in length [long?] term interest Australian security it most essential some deterrent be formulated against Indonesian ambitions. He thought United States only country which can provide such deterrent and hoped something could be worked out whereby United States would make it crystal-clear to Indonesians that if any arms furnished by United States were used for aggression against New Guinea United States would take appropriate action. He thought present Indonesian assurance this context meaningless as Indonesia could claim West New Guinea entirely domestic problem and not within contemplation its assurance or United Nations Charter.

Menzies drew parallel with Taiwan situation and pointed out United States had made it clear that any attack on Taiwan would be countered by United States. Likewise it could be said Australia’s security demanded it be made clear that attack on West New Guinea would be attack on Australia. He said considerable portion of cabinet inclined adopt this as official policy toward New Guinea but he prefers not do so at this time.

In comment upon Taiwan situation Menzies parenthetically said considerable body of Australian opinion including some great newspapers feel strongly Australia should recognize Red China. He felt New Zealand would do so within one or two years and thus raise Australian pressures but even then if still in power he would refuse. He would not [Page 273] wish have Communists successfully drive wedge between United States and Australia. This policy has been firmly adopted by government notwithstanding continuing accusations by opposition that government’s foreign policy is too subservient to United States.

Menzies said Casey would explain these matters to Secretary.2 He thought Australian public has apparently accepted small arms aid but United States action in making available potentially offensive-type equipment such as landing craft will not be understood and could have serious repercussions. He also mentioned Australia’s efforts to dissuade British from furnishing Indonesia aircraft and other equipment.

I told Prime Minister that insofar as I aware there is no indication whatsoever Indonesia plans or intends attack West New Guinea by force and while I was not informed re landing craft, any arms or equipment made available by United States were in fact for internal use only. Although I had not seen precise wording of undertaking given by Indonesian Government, it seemed clear that point re possible use these arms for aggressive purposes was very much in mind my government. It seemed to me his concern could be divided into short-term problem of domestic considerations and long-term problem of Australia’s security. Re latter particularly I felt certain nothing would be done to undermine or weaken security of Australia with which we were so closely allied. I said this problem is one which is heavily charged with emotion and as he knew, Dutch particularly often greatly exaggerated situation. Question of supply arms was delicate one of preventing Commies from moving into vacuum which would otherwise be created, and yet not supplying too much until situation further clarified and stabilized. Menzies said he understood this and our need work with Nasution but as previously indicated our policy giving rise difficult problems Australia.

As Menzies had to leave for party caucus being held adjoining room I said would pass his views to Secretary who would be most interested in receiving them.

Comment: We have additional indication cabinet greatly exercised over Indonesian situation and reports United States apparently unduly strengthening Indonesia military. I gained impression pressure being put on Menzies by Cabinet (Embtel 67)3 and that this interview was designed [Page 274] partly assuage colleagues who could not help have knowledge I was closeted with Menzies and McBride.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

It would be useful if Department could send me its comments and any views which I might pass along to Menzies who will be in Canberra most of next week.4

Sebald
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/8–2758. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
  2. In telegram 52, August 15, Sebald reported on a conversation with Casey regarding the West New Guinea problem. Casey said that his cabinet had discussed the issue three times in the past week to reach agreement on a position for discussions Casey will have in The Hague, London, and presumably Washington. Casey felt that immediate objective “should be work out some deterrent to Indonesians using force against West New Guinea. He feels first shot fired by Indonesians would cause chain reaction ultimate results of which cannot be foreseen. Casey also told Sebald that Australian public opinion has “been built up to point where West New Guinea has become symbol of Australian security and use of force by Indonesians would cause violent reaction here.”(Ibid., 656.56D13/8–1558)
  3. External Affairs Minister Casey was scheduled to visit the United States in early September, prior to the ANZUS Council meeting, which was to be held in Washington on October 1. See Document 153.
  4. Telegram 67, August 27, provided a summary of the Australian attitude regarding West New Guinea. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/8–2758) See Supplement.
  5. In telegram 2233 to London, August 28, the Department transmitted a message for Australian External Affairs Minister Casey, explaining the U.S. position regarding military sales toward Indonesia and the West New Guinea dispute and suggesting that he convey this information to Luns during their upcoming talks in the Netherlands August 29–30. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/8–2858) In telegram 64 to Canberra, August 29, the Department instructed Ambassador Sebald to make the same presentation to Prime Minister Menzies. (Ibid., 756D.56/8–2958) Young reported on his conversation with Casey in telegram 382 from The Hague, August 29; Sebald reported on his conversation with Menzies in telegram 78 from Canberra, September 3. (Ibid., 756D.56/8–2958 and 756D.56/9–358)