Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

475. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 6, 1960—8:42 p.m.

595. In view fluidity Lao situation prefer oral reply to Souvanna note.² Apart from reason set forth final paragraph Embtel 1067³ oral reply preferable so as to (a) retain maximum flexibility and (b) minimize impact on Thai, Vietnamese, and Lao who are against present RLG. You should therefore take following line.

1. As recommended Embtel 1067 you should thank Souvanna for his clarification and inform him that as matter of fact since his oral explanation to you on November 30 no arms or ammunition have in fact been brought into country. However in view press distortions in Laos and elsewhere as to timing and nature of aid supplied, you are under instructions to correct record where necessary by briefing local correspondents and that Department will make available same rectifications here on advice from you. (You may in your discretion give correspondents info in numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 of Embtel 1062⁴ but should inform Department at once so as to eliminate any danger of complication or discrepancy at this end.) You may also tell Souvanna that you have authority to give to press substance or full text of US note of November 28 if required to clarify US position.

2. You should inform Souvanna that we note that he has approved continuing aid to FAL in form of pay, food, medicines, gasoline, clothing, etc. We must request his assurances that he would not impose procedural obstacles in regard to foregoing and would cooperate fully in effecting pay to all FAL troops. In this context you should seek his agreement on use normal pay procedures, that is, documents to be sent to Vientiane and FAL paymasters to take pay to regions.

3. Souvanna should be told that possibility US influencing Phoumi is to large extent dependent upon assistance, including pay, given his troops. Souvanna himself has interest in seeing that all FAL troops are paid as otherwise no effective forces will remain to protect Laos from PL and Viet Minh. Furthermore in view common interest Souvanna and ourselves in preventing civil war it essential effect payment promptly as otherwise there is risk that those forces might take desperate action in order to obtain that which action of RLG is withholding from them.

4. You should inform Souvanna that his request that we not supply arms and ammunition to forces in most of regions 1, 2, 3, and 4 gives us serious concern in view current confusion as to who is attacking whom. There are currently numerous reports including some from PL sources of PL attacks upon FAL. Furthermore in action in Nam Ca Dinh area, which presumably precipitated Souvanna’s request, our info was that fighting started when Vientiane forces or PL professing to side with Vientiane forces attacked Phoumi troops on November 25 (15–20 miles south of truce line of Nam Ca Dinh). Furthermore at times Souvanna himself has denied validity of cease-fire in that area. Accordingly, in view continuing need of Laos for effective forces in being, US would regret see RLG follow policy of denying FAL means with which to defend itself.

5. You may add in your discretion that you and your Government do not consider anti-Communist factions in various regions as disloyal or non-patriotic but rather as people genuinely concerned by trend of events. Souvanna himself knows better than we can tell him how much disquiet exists not only in countryside but also even in Vientiane. This nothing which US has created or could have created but is evidently result of series of developments in which PL and elements friendly to PL have steadily expanded their influence and authority. Furthermore, if Souvanna’s mood permits, he could be reminded that it obvious Lao in other regions are concerned by evidence of duress on Assembly such as occurred December 2 and they cannot be sure there has not been similar duress during earlier crises. Very fact that Assembly has not thus far been permitted meet outside Vientiane is indication that there is concern Assembly would take actions unfavorable to PL and elements close to PL were it free to do so. We assume that this must concern Souvanna deeply because he must recognize that long desired national reconciliation can only be effected peacefully if Assembly is permitted to play its constitutional role. While US Government is sure responsibility for preventing exercise of this role rests with PL and sympathizers who led leftist mob, this too must trouble Souvanna as mob action constitutes evidence that will of Souvanna himself as well as that of Assembly can be thwarted at any moment agitators so desire.⁵

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, 751J.5–MSP/12–660. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Parsons and cleared with SEA and in substance with Merchant. Also sent priority to Bangkok and repeated to Canberra, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Reference is apparently to the Lao Foreign Ministry note of December 2 replying to the U.S. note of November 28. The December 2 note clarified the Lao note of November 22 requesting suspension of aid to rebels, and stated that while non-military aid could go to all regions of Laos, military aid must only be granted to troops remaining loyal to the legal government. (Telegram 1055 from Vientiane, December 5; ibid.)
3. Brown suggested in the last paragraph of telegram 1067, December 6, that if the United States disregarded Souvanna’s request, it should not send a written reply, but tell him orally that since November 30 no U.S. arms or munitions had been brought into Laos. (ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of telegram 1062, December 6, contained press guidance in response to charges in the Lao Presse that rebel troops attacking Nam Ca Dinh were advised and supplied by the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–660)
5. In telegram 594 to Vientiane, December 6, the Department of State sent further instructions to Brown, concluding: “FYI. Our obvious desire is to retain free hand but seek avoid Souvanna pinning us down. End FYI.” (ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)