471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
571. Following is assessment our problems and necessary courses action underlying recent instructions emanating from Washington.
Essential problem is to get a legal government of Laos which unlike present Souvanna Phouma government will resist Commie efforts to take over country by political subversion or by military action. No Government of Laos can do this without united army and leadership strongly backed by Western nations and supported by substantial US assistance. Conversely Western support and US assistance most difficult unless there is a properly oriented Lao Government to support.
We are at present moment faced with precarious situation in which Souvanna’s own declared objectives coincide with PL objectives of (1) creating Communist inclined RLG, (2) preventing political action to form westward leaning government, (3) ensuring success by use or threat of force.
Thus, Souvanna backed by PL is (1) seeking meeting in Luang Prabang to extract agreement of anti-Communist elements to inclusion NLHX in government and Communist leaning policies, (2) threatening military action against Luang Prabang and at least harassing action against Phoumi forces in South as means pressuring non- and anti-Communist acquiescence in his plans.
Our efforts to implement plan now in process of execution for King to call meeting of non-Communist leaders and National Assembly in Luang Prabang to constitutionally replace Souvanna government with westward leaning government can succeed only if combined Souvanna–PL threat or use of force can be substantially neutralized. This is why essential we continue supply Luang Prabang [Page 985] forces and Savannakhet forces; this is why essential try to maintain Phoumi forces in readiness to take appropriate military action, such as a diversion in South to take pressure off Luang Prabang.
On other hand, if Phoumi forces anticipate military action by Souvanna–PL forces in such manner as to make difficult denial charge he initiated civil war while Souvanna still heads legal government, we (1) might destroy prospect for constitutional political action at Luang Prabang to form westward leaning government, (2) risk having British, French and Australians accuse us of duplicity since we have requested them make démarches to Souvanna against any attack on Luang Prabang, (3) might court an appeal to the UN or ICC and a consequent restriction on further US assistance to non-Communist forces, and gravely change US world posture.
Success in our policy requires careful balancing of equally fluid political and military situations.
Thus, as this message is drafted Somsanith delegation and Phoumi [Phoui?] group have arrived in Savannakhet for discussions with Phoumi–Boun Oum group with view petitioning King to call meeting at Luang Prabang. Phoumi has himself asked King to call meeting and has promised to come himself provided NLHX excluded. Southep units have apparently switched allegiance to Luang Prabang coup group, while other two columns of forces sent toward Luang Prabang are some distance south of that city. Degree of concentration of PL in area of LP is unknown. Skirmishing between Phoumi and Vientiane forces is taking place South of Nam Ca Dinh river.
As situation appears from here at moment offsetting of Souvanna–PL military threat seems require (1) Phoumi action to gain favorable position on Nam Ca Dinh and be ready move toward Paksane if necessary to counter RLG/PL military threats, and (2) adequate supply to Luang Prabang forces even though this requires use CAT planes. As situation moves politically in our favor danger of significant military action from Souvanna–PL forces increases. Therefore anti-Communist forces must be ready to act quickly to forestall a military solution favoring RLG/PL.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Usher and cleared in draft by Merchant, Parsons, and SEA. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Canberra, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩