Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

465. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 22, 1960—11 p.m.

971. CINCPAC for Admiral Felt. Reference: Deptel 539.²

1. Joint assessment by Chief/PEO, ARMA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of all reports today on subject possible attack on Luang Prabang contained Embtel 970.³

2. Agree we should make renewed effort persuade King take role active leadership. Believe, however, we must squarely face fact this not strong hope and prepare our position if he remains silent.

3. Most effective method inducing King act would be for Gen Phoumi to go Luang Prabang and make joint approach with Phoui and Kou to King. I propose suggesting this to Phoumi and Phoui. If this not feasible, possible, but far less promising approach would be following message to Methven for Phoui and similar message from Gen Phoumi to King.

4. “Please tell Phoui urgently that in view increasing reports possible attempt Vientiane forces retake Luang Prabang in collaboration PL, which if it succeeded would open Luang Prabang to eventual PL domination and would amount to starting civil war, we believe it most important he urge King in interests saving Kingdom from Communist influence, now take speedy and resolute action to create govt which could gain widest support anti-Communist and non-Communist elements in Laos. You should explain to Phoui as background that such govt not only desirable from viewpoint Kingdom but important to provide improved basis US support defenders Luang Prabang and anti-Communist elements Kingdom.”

5. Meanwhile, in order give time final effort persuade King act, and exfiltration Deputies which I assume you will wish me continue to push and also from point of view cover legality referred to reftel, recommend Phoumi be advised for present take no action against Vientiane until there is demonstrable Vientiane action against Luang Prabang and that CAT aircraft be used within southern regions to free FAL aircraft for use in actual supply Luang Prabang.

6. From military point of view CH/PEO, ARMA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also fear Phoumi might get his nose bloody in attack Vientiane unless he first fully coordinated with Kouprasith. We have no evidence yet his having done this.

7. Will see Souvanna tomorrow morning and refuse aircraft.⁴

8. Actions authorized, especially use CAT aircraft, will very shortly become known and will almost certainly result in formal demand by Souvanna we cease all aid Phoumi forces. Please advise position you wish me to take in this event.

9. So that I can be sure to be coordinated with you in what you will be saying in Washington and in SEATO, please also advise position I should take when questioned about our actions: (A) with Souvanna, (B) with Western allies, Indians and UN rep, (C) with press and others.

Please instruct re paras 3 and 4.⁵

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2260. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Supra.
3. Dated November 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2260; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In telegram 977 from Vientiane, November 23, Brown reported that he had received assurances from Souvanna that he would not attack Phoumi unless Phoumi attacked him and he denied any planned collaboration with the Pathet Lao. In view of these assurances, Brown was providing a plane to Souvanna for transmission of a letter to the King. (ibid., 751J.00/11–2360; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. In telegram 975 from Vientiane, November 23, Brown noted that he had received an instruction [less than 1 line of text not declassified] and he withdrew his request for guidance. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2360)