436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
445. CINCPAC POLAD. Pass Parsons. Reur 716 from Bangkok.2 Department agrees with summation set forth reftel that although situation tenuous, obviously lacking many attributes stability and cohesiveness [Page 926] that at least we have for first time in many weeks basis upon which take next forward steps. Most important asset which accrues to us is of course that as long as this holds together we operate within framework of legality.
We endorse idea of seeking early audience with King. Presume Holt’s 806 refers to tentative appointment Tuesday.3 In addition discussing with King situation Region One and again rehearsing obvious advantages allow preparations there progress under canopy of legality you should also point out to him that should current and tenuous relationships with Souvanna Phouma emerge as basis upon which we can continue to work, it does buy time. (FYI. As you are well aware Washington circles are not very sanguine of Souvanna ever really serving our objectives.) We should emphasize to King our continuing support Souvanna Phouma can only be effective if our agreements with him hold firm and he demonstrates by action that he is sincere. These of course include unimpeded flow pay and supplies to FAL upon whom burden must fall of protecting integrity of country and his enforcement his pre-conditions in negotiating with PL.
At this juncture may be well remind King while we were of opinion, and so expressed to His Majesty, only few days ago our doubts concerning Souvanna Phouma’s willingness or ability carry out these responsibilities effectively that we have continued search for formula in which we can work with Souvanna Phouma largely because King himself saw no alternative, was not willing use extraordinary means to relieve Souvanna Phouma of his responsibilities.
Will leave your discretion how fully you discuss following point with King but in our viewpoint next most urgent task to be performed is solution of Kong Le problem. No program has fighting chance success that does not have within it acceptance of fact Kong Le influence must be removed from scene in order emancipate administrative capital, allowing us work with Souvanna Phouma in an atmosphere freedom. (In this connection London’s 1920 repeated you 334 reflects a UK view which in our opinion is devoid realism and is reflection of completely erroneous assessment Kong Le. You may further be interested that French here Washington at least have now accepted our view Kong Le definitely collaborating with PL.) Because of paramount importance to entire prospect success of adopting concrete plan for [Page 927] handling Kong Le there being sent you simultaneously a plan setting forth alternate courses of action. We would like country team’s evaluations and comments on this at earliest possible moment.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2260. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Steeves, cleared with SEA, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated priority to Bangkok and to CINCPAC.↩
- See footnote 2, supra.↩
- Telegram 806, October 21, concerned plans for Brown’s audience with King Savang on Tuesday, October 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2160)↩
- In this telegram, October 21, the Embassy in London characterized the British view of Kong Le as not “in cahoots with or under the thumb of Pathet Lao,” but as a supporter of Souvanna and a neutral Laos free of Pathet Lao domination. U.S. support for Phoumi and the CDNI could, in the British view, drive Kong Le into the Pathet Lao camp. (ibid., included in the microfiche supplement)↩