Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

227. Telegram From the Embasy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 3, 1959—3 p.m.

2086. Department pass DOD, ICA. Reference: PEO telegram 929–59 to CINCPAC information OASD/ISA pass to State.² For purpose of evaluating and making recommendations ANL requests for extraordinary military aid (reference telegram), country team developed estimate of present and early future situation in Laos with regard to internal security. Basic conclusion was that glaring exposure of ANL weaknesses, present movement of ANL and PL forces, some loss of public confidence in ANL and RLG, excitement of enemy interest, all precipitated by effort to integrate PL battalion, have heightened and made more immediate threat to internal security of Laos.

It is believed that enemy will endeavor to exploit ANL weakness during next few months, up to approximately one year which will be required to train ANL forces. Greatest danger will come it is believed from Communist efforts to establish de facto parallel government in many local areas throughout Laos, which, in classic pattern, can control elections or take over rest of country by force at some future date.

Estimate in detail follows:

A. Capabilities and possible courses of action of dissident elements.

1. While current crisis was triggered by successful escape of ex-PL BN from Plaine des Jarres, timing for integration ceremony which provoked incident was set by RLG. Past assessments have always granted PL capability bringing certain rural areas of Laos under their influence without applying force. By threat of force some areas are already under their nominal control. (A strip of Laos along North Vietnamese frontier of varying depth is heavily infiltrated, as are other sections of Laos. ANL request for extraordinary aid claims 40 local districts, Khongs, are without adequate readily available local army or police protection.)

2. Dissident elements are capable spreading network of strong points over whole of Laos with aim of establishing “rural power system” whose prototype in other countries has been prelude to Communist coup d’etat. Such action likely to be in form of series of countrywide uprisings with objective of immobilizing sizeable units of ANL and police. PL BN acquiring additional territorial holdings will be secondary to keeping entire country in state of uncertainty and turmoil.

3. If the unintegrated PL BN is ordered to remain on Lao soil, the dissident elements will have force supported by Viet Minh posing permanent threat to Lao security. If mass effort is launched against them by ANL, BN can cross frontier to Viet Minh sanctuary. This PL BN and others now reported in being, if supported by Viet Minh, are capable of maintaining frontier brush fires beyond present ability of ANL to quell.

4. NHLX can retain role of “martyrs”, protesting government repression and killing, but not retaliating with violence. Hope of control of country through legal elections would be their objective.

B. RLG capabilities and possible courses of action.

1. RLG is capable, through ANL and police, of taking limited repressive measures against NLHX, PL, and other dissident elements. Provided these determined non-resistance offers best chance long range success, these measures could be successful.

2. RLG capable of immediate disengagement from escaped PL BN, concentrating on intensified training effort to become an effective security force, on propaganda campaign against NLHX, and on stepped-up rural aid program.

3. The RLG, for considerations of “face”, can continue operations against PL BN with purpose of destroying or capturing it. Because of weather, terrain, and appallingly low effectiveness of ANL, chance of succes is almost nil.

Preoccupation with PL may cause further deterioration of internal security and seriously hamper US-French efforts revitalize ANL.

C. Comment:

1. Before 11 May, ANL was respected and in some areas feared by general population. PL integration plan backfired. Damage has been disclosure to friend and foe of glaring weaknesses of ANL. RLG has suffered serious setback but local and world wide focus of attention on situation may result in eventual benefit.

2. While unconfirmed reports of Communist intentions to initiate local disturbances in July have been discounted, it is difficult at this time to gauge NLHX intentions. Their future actions will doubtless be influenced by state of disorganization of the ANL and their estimate of time it will take RLG to correct their weakness. Threat or actual execution by RLG of policy of general repression of NLHX or introduction US training personnel may provide a “legal” basis for NLHX to openly challenge RLG and initiate brush fire actions.

Foregoing partial answer to London’s 6218 to Department.³ More details on ANL and weakness to follow.⁴

D. Department’s attention invited to country team concurrence PEO recommendations in reference telegram to CINCPAC regarding ANL requests for emergency aid, noting dissent by ARMA with respect increasing volunteer and auto-defense units.

Holt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/6–359. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Not found. Other PEO telegrams give indications of the magnitude of the Lao Government requests: 18 aircraft and 8 helicopters, an increase of 4,200 personnel formed into 42 Volunteer battalions, and 4,000 Auto-Defense personnel. Both troop augmentations were to be equipped to existing standards. (PEO 923–59 and 940–59, May 31 and June 3; ibid., 751J.5/5–3159; both included in the microfiche supplement)
3. In telegram 6218, May 28, the Embassy in London requested information on ANL military inadequacies for discussions with British officials. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/5–2859)
4. Telegram 135 from Vientiane to London, repeated to the Department of State as 2101, June 5, was prepared by the Army Attaché who concluded that the ANL was so understrength, badly-armed, poorly-led, and subject to chronic communications and supply problems that it could not fulfill its internal security functions without foreign military advisers. (ibid., 751J.5/6–559; included in the microfiche supplement)