193. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)1
Dear Mr. Sprague: The Department of State is in general agreement with the conclusions on the Military Assistance Program in Laos discussed in your letter of July 22, 1958.2
We concur in the assessment of the key importance of the Lao National Army as the most effective governmental instrument in the country and in the importance of improving its training. Without question, the establishment of a MAAG would be the ideal solution of the problem of improving the Army’s training. However the timing and means of eventually achieving this solution are directly dependent on the attitudes of a number of friendly powers whose continued cooperation is necessary for the achievement of our broader foreign policy objectives not only in Laos but throughout the world.
Thus, while we hope to be in a position to send regular officers into Laos for training purposes as soon as it is politically practicable to do so, we do not believe it would be in the interest of the United States to solve the immediate problem of increasing the efficiency of the Lao National Army at the expense of creating serious difficulties in our relations with Canada, France, India and perhaps Great Britain. At this time such a course would run the definite risk in Laos, Cambodia and, particularly, Viet-Nam of implying that we were now completely rejecting the Geneva Conference of 1954.
Our policy towards the International Commission for Control and Supervision of the Armistice in Laos has been to recognize the contribution made by that body towards the prevention of a resumption of hostilities while exercising our influence to prevent the Communists from exploiting it to extend their domination over Laos. This policy has included persuading and encouraging friendly powers, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, to take the lead in bringing about the termination of the Commission’s activities in Laos on July 19, 1958 [Page 476] despite the opposition of the Communist member. At the same time we have required and still require the cooperation of the same powers in finding a solution of the MAAG–TERM problem in Viet-Nam.
A marked increase in U.S. military activity in Laos following hard upon the termination of the International Commission’s activities would embarrass and offend the friendly powers whose cooperation we continue to require. The Department of State believes that the problem of improving the effectiveness of United States military assistance to Laos can be managed successfully in the light of political developments including the termination of the International Commission’s activities and the investiture of what it is hoped will be a strong anti-Communist government in Laos. In this regard the Department of State has recently concurred in the creation of five new positions in the Program Evaluation Office and has expressed its readiness to authorize temporary duty assignments of regular military personnel to Laos in individual cases in which the advantages to the United States outweigh the disadvantages. Two such temporary duty assignments to USIA were recently approved.
The French Military Mission in Laos recently accepted the employment of four American Mobile Training Teams and 72 Filipino contract technicians. The achievement of this new level of cooperation with the French Military Mission may represent a valuable contribution to improvement of the training of the Lao National Army. It also seems to indicate a somewhat greater possibility of French agreement to the eventual establishment of an American MAAG.
It does not appear that the Royal Lao Government will offer any serious opposition to the establishment of a MAAG responsible for both training and supply. However this aspect of the problem will require careful handling and some legal study in view of Prince Souvanna Phouma’s unilateral reaffirmation on May 31, 1958 of the Lao Government’s declaration at Geneva.3 The last paragraph of that declaration reads: “During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the final settlement of that country’s political problems the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.” Article 6 of the Agreement reads: “With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited. Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not [Page 477] exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.” Article 8 reads: “The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane. The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.” Souvanna Phouma made his May 31 statement to reassure the Polish member of the ICC after the latter had cited this declaration as a reason for the continued presence of the ICC in Laos.
Pending developments which may make the establishment of a regular MAAG practicable we are asking Ambassador Smith’s views on the possibility of assigning to the PEO active officers in civilian clothes for temporary duty which might be extended should no serious political difficulties arise as a result of such assignments. Meanwhile, our only choice for the immediate future appears to be to continue strengthening the PEO as heretofore.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 091.3 Laos. Secret. The Department of State copy of this letter indicates that if was drafted by Corcoran and was reviewed and slightly revised by James M. Wilson of the Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination in conjunction with the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs. Robertson sent the draft letter to Dillon under cover of a memorandum of August 19 with the recommendation that it be signed and sent. According to a note on the Department of State copy, the original of this letter was handcarried to Sprague on August 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/7–2958)↩
- Document 187.↩
- See Document 180.↩