95. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 25, 19601
SUBJECT
- Status of Indus Waters Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. W. A. B. Iliff, Vice President, IBRD
- Ambassador Bunker
- Ambassador Rountree
- NEA—Donald D. Kennedy
- SOA—Frederic P. Bartlett
- SOA—J. Wesley Adams
Mr. Iliff explained that the principal issues still separating the Governments of India and Pakistan in the conclusion of the Indus Waters treaty concerned uses of the waters of the Western Rivers and storage thereof by India.
In the matter of water usage the Pakistanis, Mr. Iliff said, had been agreeable to an annual use of .75 million acre feet (MAF). India had originally demanded 3 MAF, but had come down to 1.04 MAF. Mr. Iliff thought this difference negotiable.
On storage, Mr. Iliff stated, the Indians had originally pressed for 8 MAF; the Pakistanis had been willing to agree to 500,000 AF. Over the last weekend, he said, the Indian demand had been reduced to 3 MAF while the Pakistanis had moved up to 1.5 MAF. He thought that this willingness of the two parties to go some way toward meeting the position of the other indicated that the negotiations on this issue were also “over the hump” and that agreement on storage would be reached shortly.
Mr. Iliff mentioned that the Indians were anxious to provide for a review of the uses of the waters of the Western Rivers at the end of a twenty-year period, the purpose being to maximize use of the waters and to insure against wastage. As proposed by the Indians, the Pakistanis would exercise a veto over any proposed changes. Mr. Iliff added that it was doubtful that even with future revisions it would ever be possible to achieve 100 per cent usage; there would always be some water flowing to the Arabian sea.
Ambassador Rountree interjected to say that he and Ambassador Bunker were both of the opinion that relations between India and Pakistan will improve in the years ahead. Asked by Mr. Iliff if this opinion extended to the Kashmir problem, Ambassador Rountree said that he did not think Kashmir would be a problem within ten years.
[Page 208]Article X of the treaty, which relates to the legal position of the two parties on Kashmir, Mr. Iliff continued, is still a matter of some discussion. The IBRD, he said, had consulted Mr. John Foster, a lawyer, who had advanced the view that the treaty adequately safeguards the Pakistan position. The Pakistanis had asked the Bank to provide them with a copy of Mr. Foster’s opinion on this subject but the Bank had refused because: a) it did not wish to become involved in the issue, and b) it was of the opinion that if the Pakistanis wished a legal opinion on the subject that they should obtain one independently.
Regarding interim or transitional arrangements under the treaty, Mr. Iliff explained that the principal problem concerned the supply of water in the Sutlej below Ferozepore during the critical period of late September and early October when there sometimes was no flow from the upper Sutlej and none available in the Chenab for transfer into the lower Sutlej via link canals. This problem, he said, would be largely solved when the Mangla Dam was completed, so that its impounded waters could be released during this period to supply the lower Sutlej. During the interim period the problem could be solved, Mr. Iliff said, through use of waters impounded by the Bhakra Dam. The GOI, however, was adamant in opposing such use of those waters, stating that they were intended for other uses.
Mr. Iliff said that [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Bank [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was pressing the Indians to deliver 3,000 cusecs to the Ferozepore head works in September and 1,000 cusecs in October. Mr. Iliff explained that this water shortage was not a perennial problem, that it occurred only about once every three years on the average, and that during the last five years there had been no shortage.
Mr. Iliff stated that he expected to leave for London Wednesday night, April 27, where, during the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, he hoped to conclude major negotiations on the treaty. He stated that he now thought there was almost no chance for signature of the treaty on May 9, as the IBRD had hoped. He believed, however, that there was every chance of agreement by the end of May. Mr. Iliff added that Foreign Minister Qadir planned to come to London following the CENTO meeting.
Ambassador Bunker stated that it might be preferable to have the treaty signed in Rawalpindi. Prime Minister Nehru, he said, had personally told him that he would like to visit Rawalpindi, that he was looking for a reason for such a visit and that signing of the Indus treaty would provide a good reason. Ambassador Rountree commented that he thought this was an excellent idea and that it would be worth postponing signature of the treaty beyond the London meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in order to bring Mr. Nehru to Rawalpindi.
[Page 209]Mr. Iliff said he thought Ambassadors Rountree and Bunker might be interested in knowing that at a meeting last week in Cambridge, Massachusetts, IBRD President Black had been approached by Aziz Ahmed, the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington, who belabored him about the alleged unfair attitude of Mr. Iliff. He had complained that Mr. Iliff was shifting the terms of the negotiation from those contained in the 1954 agreement.
Mr. Iliff explained that the IBRD was trying to get a settlement, and not necessarily to stick rigidly to the terms of the earlier agreement. In actual fact, he said, the latest provisions conformed about 90% to the original provisions. As illustrations of altered provisions he mentioned that the first proposal had contained no provision for storage. Likewise, it was concerned only with replacement works in Pakistan, whereas the current settlement plan provided for $300 to $400 million of developmental work. The value of increase in agricultural production in Pakistan expected to result from this additional irrigation development, Mr. Iliff said, was estimated to run from $90 to $150 million annually based on an additional water supply of from 8 to 15 MAF.
Ambassador Bunker commented that the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi, Mr. Brohi, had commented to him with reference to the Bank’s proposal, that “there was nothing in it for Pakistan”.
Ambassador Rountree remarked that Finance Minister Shoaib had commented in a similar vein to President Eisenhower. The President, however, had told Mr. Shoaib that he understood that the plan provided for new development in Pakistan to which, after some discussion, Mr. Shoaib had reluctantly agreed.
Ambassador Rountree and Bunker both expressed to Mr. Iliff their admiration for the fine manner in which he had carried forward this difficult negotiation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91322/4–2560. Confidential. Drafted by Adams on April 28.↩