91. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2458. In view of Ayub’s recent statements and indications here and from Karachi that appointment A.K. Brohi, Pakistan High Commissioner Delhi, signifies new attempt by Pakistan to push for settlement Kashmir issue, Embassy has been reviewing possibilities for progress on this difficult and seemingly intractable issue. We have come to conclusion that time is not yet ripe for any Indian compromise likely to effect solution of Kashmir issue. Present momentum for solution of other outstanding Indo-Pakistan problems will have to gain strength and stand test of implementation before it is realistic to think of India being willing to approach solution of Kashmir issue on any basis except its own terms, i.e., probably “status quo” with minor adjustments. Patience is thus required to let dividends of present accords generate public opinion favorable to settlement, which in last analysis will be important factor in shaping Nehru’s actions. This assessment strongly endorsed by MacDonald, UK HICOM, and is also shared by Ronning, Canadian HICOM.
[Page 203]Sino-Indian dispute, improved stability of GOP and increasing stature of Ayub have caused Indians to re-think some of their prejudices and to become more rational about Pakistan. Indeed, in informed circles attitude is changing markedly in more realistic and helpful direction, although masses still respond to demagoguery of Kashmir Premier Bakshi, as demonstrated at recent Congress session. Official attitude is clearly more cooperative and there is strong evidence this is result of Nehru directive to settle as many specific issues as possible. Though there is tendency to give as much credit to US as to Pakistan for change in Pakistan diplomacy, Indian officials, press and politicians have all been impressed and have commented favorably on conciliatory, friendly and responsible attitude of Pakistan’s representatives in recent negotiations.
Key to prospects of progress on more difficult issues lies with Nehru. Though I have never been able to draw Nehru out on Kashmir and personally believe that he is not likely to take any initiative in devising solution, I do not regard situation hopeless, provided it is correctly handled. This will entail better Pakistan understanding of Nehru’s psychology and no intervention by US. It is my belief that Nehru is genuinely well-disposed toward Pakistan although he has distrusted Pakistan politicians of previous regimes with perhaps some reason, that he has often been unaware of provocative acts instigated by Indian side (border, propaganda, et cetera), that much of his seeming evasiveness is not so much an attitude of mind as inability to conceive politically practicable solutions and that Pakistan’s military alliance with US inhibits, for him, natural and cooperative relationships that might otherwise develop.
If Brohi makes his explorations here with discretion and tact it will serve as needed complement to Dayal’s effort, Karachi and may well contribute to development of ultimate solution of Kashmir issue. However I believe any head-on or publicized attack on this problem will only meet stone wall, or worse.
What seems to me as most likely avenue for furthering Indo-Pakistan accord is more personal contact between Nehru and Ayub. I believe that there is an awareness in GOI circles of need for Nehru to make some gesture leading to this end; but whether or not this comes to early fruition, an opportunity will be provided for personal exchanges at Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting.2 This may well be what will eventuate, especially in view Ayub’s Dacca statement as reported Delhi press January 22 that only basis for meeting of two leaders would be Nehru willingness seriously discuss Kashmir and because Nehru, with an eye on ChiCom situation, will lean over [Page 204] backwards to avoid giving any impression that India is abandoning non-alignment. Through such private explorations it may be possible to establish trust and confidence that would lead to candid examination of political and strategic realities and to efforts to develop face-saving formula for both sides, that will also avoid fanning flames of communalism. Until this is possible, India’s diplomatic posture on Kashmir will remain frozen, as means protecting Indian claims not only vis-à-vis Pakistan but also ChiComs. In regard to Pakistan’s case, as in ChiComs, Nehru not disposed, as some of his colleagues were and are, to drive out “aggression”, but neither will he “submit” i.e., give up India’s claims even if he were disposed to be reasonable while “foot on our chest”.
US can continue to play an important but indirect role, by adjusting its own policies and bilateral relationships with these countries, so as to promote cooperation and to avoid actions which at times operate to stimulate competition and estrangement. Specific but relatively minor example where such approach could usefully be applied in our judgment is proposal contained Department’s airgram CG–4263 for air demonstration “Quick Span” in CENTO countries. While such flexing of muscles may serve to give needed stimulus to morale of countries involved, side effects at this juncture appear to us unfortunate. At time when real beginning being made at Indo-Pakistan rapprochement and when ChiCom menace offers possibility of drawing together quarreling nations on her periphery, such exercise would only re-emphasize differences and lend itself in addition to adverse propaganda in wake Eisenhower peace mission, and at time when all actions are being judged here by whether they conducive to success of Summit. This does not mean Indians underestimate or underrate need for military strength as basis for gaining respect. This is amply demonstrated in Nehru’s current campaign to use ChiCom threat to spur development of India’s industrial and defense potential. But in Nehru’s view power subjected to restraint is more effective deterrent than power displayed.