445. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Philippine Mid-Term Elections

Background

On November 10, 1959, the Philippines held national elections. At stake were eight Senate seats (one-third of the total) plus all elective positions in the 54 provinces and 31 chartered cities of the country. Although President Garcia’s term of office has two more years to run, he had staked his prestige heavily by his personal involvement in several aspects of the campaign, so that the election was generally viewed both as a demonstration of the strength of the incumbent Nacionalista Party (NP) machine and as a test of Garcia’s own political power. Contests of particular significance in this regard were those for the eight NP-occupied Senate seats, those for the municipal governments in Manila, Cebu City, and Quezon City, and the gubernatorial race in Cebu Province. Three tickets were represented in the Senate races: the NP, which was also supported by the chauvinistic and neutralist splinter party of Senator Recto; the Liberals (LP), who are the “traditional” “other party” in Philippine politics; and the Grand Alliance (GA), a recently formed group of followers of the late President Magsaysay. In the local elections, only the NP and the LP were able to run candidates in most areas.

Traditionally, elections in the Philippines have been decided largely on the basis of effective party organization on the local level, plus access to funds and patronage. By those standards, the elections should have resulted in a landslide for Garcia’s NP, which had control [Page 942] of all but four provinces and which openly dispensed money and patronage on a lavish scale during the campaign to the chronically un-and under-employed poorer Filipinos. These assets were offset somewhat, however, by the widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Garcia Administration’s record of graft, corruption, and inaction, and the internecine strife within the Nacionalista Party between President Garcia and the powerful but aging NP party president, Senator Rodriguez.

Results of the Elections

With almost all returns in, the election results show the NP losing three of the eight contested Senate seats to the LP. Included among the Nacionalista winners were Senator Rodriguez, the NP Party President whom President Garcia hoped to unseat, Genero Magsaysay who obviously profited from his deceased brother’s name and his recent marriage to Rodriguez’ daughter, and Alejandro Almendras, another opponent of Garcia’s. Garcia’s righthand man, Juan Pajo, failed to reach the winners’ circle despite the President’s all-out support with ample funds and patronage. The biggest vote-getter of all the eight was one of the Liberal Party candidates, Ferdinand Marcos.

Liberal Party governors were elected in 19 of the 54 provinces; while two anti-Garcia Nationalists won the governorships in Cebu and Misamis Oriental. Liberal Party mayors were reportedly elected in 8 of the 28 elective chartered cities. Anti-Garcia Nationalists were victorious in six of those cities (including Manila and Cebu) and independent candidates won in two others. A nonpartisan citizens group in Quezon City, an important Manila suburb, was successful in electing six distinguished citizens to the city council. This successful experiment may lend encouragement to increased local political activity by nonpartisan, civic-minded groups.

Comment

There is no doubt that the great majority of the rural voters accepted the favors, jobs and money offered by the local representatives of the incumbent NP regime. Given the prevalently low standard of living in the Philippines, and the fact that the NP will be in power for two more years, this practical reaction to the democratic process could be anticipated. However, it is apparent that the voters, doubtless including many who accepted NP favors, cast their ballots for the NP man only when they felt he was not identified with Garcia.

Particularly significant, of course, are those contests in which the President’s personal prestige suffered: Pajo’s loss and Rodriguez’ victory in the Senate races; and the anti-GarciaNP victories in the mayoralty races in Manila and Cebu City and in the gubernatorial race in [Page 943] Cebu Province; and the city council developments in Quezon City. These results are likely to encourage a growing confidence and optimism among opposition elements. Both the 1957 election and this one show that while rural voters will generally follow local political leadership they will no longer accept blindly candidates who are notoriously objectionable either for personal reasons or from the standpoint of clean and effective government.

Another clear lesson from both 1957 and 1959 is that no matter how attractive, candidates cannot win nationally without the advantages of local political organization on a nationwide scale. On the other hand, the Liberal Party cannot unseat the NP if there is a third party appealing to the Magsaysay supporters. Responsible opposition leaders in both groups may be expected to press for a political realignment or coalition to bring all anti-Garcia forces together, now probably under the auspices of the Liberal Party. However, many of the able and influential leaders of the LP and the GA may find it difficult to accept the leadership of the present Liberal Party president, Philippine Vice-President Macapagal, since they blame him for destroying the LP-Progressive Party coalition which looked so promising earlier this year. On the basis of his strong personal showing this year, Senator Marcos may be in a position to compete for the LP leadership before 1961; this might provide a way for unification in spite of the inflexibility which Macapagal has shown up until now.

  1. Source: Department of State, SPA Files: Lot 64 D 391, P–20, 1959 and 1961 Elections. Secret. Drafted by Brand and sent to the Secretary through S/S.