Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

44. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, June 8, 1958—7 p.m.

3137. Reference Embtel 3136.² After Commonwealth Secretary Desai handed me Nehru’s reply to President I discussed contents with him and Pillai. I said letter appeared in substance to be a rejection of President’s proposal. I was frankly disappointed. Some things about it were puzzling and I should like to have their interpretation and views before reporting to Washington. I pointed out that in next to last paragraph, Nehru stated he did not think a visit by a special representative would be helpful but previously I had been at great pains to explain that such a representative was not an essential part of President’s proposal and I had gone into great detail as to possible techniques of negotiation which might be employed. I wondered whether he clearly understood this part of the proposal.

Pillai said he thought Nehru had understood my explanation, but their problem involved having any third part intermediary enter negotiations at this time. He went on to say “I think you should not read too much or too little into the letter.” Pillai said that had a proposal such as this been made two years ago, it would not have been entertained at all. Fact that Nehru and GOI had carried on very serious discussions and had considered this proposal very carefully from all angles represented long step forward in their thinking and “a personal victory for you.”

He described some of difficulties they had with our proposal. Leaving aside question of a special representative, which here recognized as not being an essential part of proposal, nevertheless fact that any intermediary was involved could not in their opinion be kept secret; it is practically impossible for Indians to keep a secret. There had been leak for example, about President’s first letter to Nehru³ and he (Pillai) had to take drastic measures to plug it. If leak occurred it would be politically very embarrassing for GOI.

There was also a feeling among the “generality” of people that it would be difficult for US to be completely impartial because of US arms aid to Pakistan, Pakistan membership in Baghdad Pact and SEATO, with which we were so closely connected, and US position in Security Council on Kashmir. Pillai was at pains to point out that this feeling did not apply to President Eisenhower or necessarily to others as individuals in USG but that there was still a feeling that it tended to color our administration’s viewpoint as a whole.

In reply to these observations, I said fact we proposed negotiations take place at expert level, and they could very well take place outside subcontinent, was strong guarantee that secrecy could be maintained. It was normal for negotiations be carried on about various matters at this level and if in spite of precautions there should be leak, an explanation that talks were in progress about some specific matter would appear to be perfectly normal explanation. Therefore the prospect of any embarrassment to either party seemed to me minimal.

As to question of impartiality, I felt recent developments in relations between India and US within last year or two must be a guarantee of our friendly feeling toward India, that role of intermediary would be technical one and rather like a catalyst if directed toward a progressive narrowing of areas of disagreement. As an expert, whose sole purpose was to bring about agreement between the parties, his whole training and instinct would predispose him toward objective view.

Pillai said he believed this to be so and thought probably Nehru would also, but there was among his colleagues a certain uneasiness. Statement which Secretary Dulles had made about US relations with Pakistan in commenting on Kennedy-Cooper resolution, which appeared in Delhi Press June 7, tended confirm this feeling.⁴

Pillai referred to Nehru’s feeling that because of attitude of Pakistan leaders, fruitful negotiations at this time would be improbable and some change in attitude on their part was needed. I replied that if this were true, then Pakistan leaders, being like rest of us human, fallible, and with certain amount of pride, would need be provided with ladder which to climb down from their present attitude or position. This was what our proposal was designed to do. There would need to be concessions on both sides. It was certainly not reasonable to expect Pakistan leaders to voluntarily adopt such a changed attitude without some prospect that it would bear fruit. I added I did not share view which Nehru had expressed that this change of attitude needed come before negotiations. On contrary I felt that prospect for successful negotiations would induce a changed viewpoint.

Pillai said this might be so and agreed some method needed be provided for both sides to come closer together. He then said “door is not closed, and I want call your attention to last sentence in third paragraph on page three penultimate paragraph which says ‘Ambassador Bunker is in touch with us and we shall gladly discuss with him any development that might arise or any avenue that might offer itself for exploration’.” He added “this is Prime Minister’s own wording and it is put there for a specific purpose.” He said what he meant in effect was as follows:

GOI wants to make progress toward solution of its difficulties with Pakistan. GOI believes, however, that best way to success at present is through regular diplomatic channels, i.e., through my talking with Nehru directly and with Ambassador Langley carrying on talks in Karachi. Pillai added that progress would take time and patience. He said that, for example, three years ago Nehru had suggested settlement of Kashmir issue approximately along cease-fire line with some adjustments. Pakistan had not accepted this but if, in connection say with any approach to settlement of canal waters, this proposal could be revived it might be possible make some concrete progress. He said GOI would prefer carry on negotiations by Ambassador method both because the negotiations were looked upon as long-range problem, and their confidential nature could be better protected. He said I should keep in touch personally with Nehru but not in a way which would indicate we were trying exert pressure. He repeated again that time and patience were necessary, that door was not closed, and that he was confident that by following this procedure progress could be made.

Desai, when talking to MacDonald when he handed him Nehru’s letter of reply to Macmillan⁵ made similar comment, saying both Ambassadors (Langley and I) could explore with respective governments questions in dispute between two countries seeking to analyze areas of disagreement and making comments or suggestions to each party with view to trying reduce area of disagreement. Desai added that these talks here could be carried on with him and Pillai, and as occasion required, with Prime Minister. I said I was surprised at nature of Nehru’s reply because he told me only last Monday he would make brief interim reply to the President and then reply later at length. I assumed this was the longer reply he had in mind and therefore matter must have been considered by Cabinet. Pillai said of course matter had been considered by most important members of Cabinet such as Pant, Morarji Desai, and Krishna Menon, but not by all members.

Comment: From my talks with Nehru and with Pillai and Desai, I believe Indians are apprehensive on following points:

(1) A belief that basic mental and emotional attitude of Pakistan leaders toward India will prevent fruitful negotiations taking place at this time. Recent bellicose statements by Pakistan leaders and border shootings have tended to confirm this feeling.

(2) They believe political instability in Pakistan and insecure character of government would make carrying out of commitments entered into problematical. GOI would prefer that negotiations be taken up after Pakistan elections when there would be clearer indications of stability of Pakistan government, its character and probable course of action, and the possibility for successful negotiations.

(3) There is still a lurking apprehension that because of our close relations with Pakistan, it would be difficult for USG to be completely impartial no matter how well intentioned.

(4) While they are at present reluctant to proceed with President Eisenhower’s suggestion, they definitely do not want to close door and would like to try the less formal approach of carrying on talks with Ambassadors in Karachi and New Delhi.

While I am disappointed at Nehru’s reply, I feel we should not be too discouraged at this point. I have all along expressed opinion that negotiations would be a long-range operation and that purely from point of view of GOI reaction an approach after Pakistan elections would have been most propitious time. I think I should continue to keep in touch with Nehru on these matters without giving impression we are trying to pressure him. Further progress on canal waters for example may provide another opportune opening to push matters a little further forward with Kashmir or other problems. I recognize we shall have difficulty explaining all this to Pakistanis but I believe they are aware of Nehru’s complex nature and reactions. We may have to go through some difficult times in Security Council and during Pakistan election campaign, but we should keep plugging away and not lose heart. It may take a year or two years or even more to reach desired solution but I think that patience, perseverance and the logic of events will ultimately bring us to success. We have some good allies in the GOI who can be cultivated and help us to reach desired goal. We should maintain flexible attitude and not be wedded to any one method negotiation. There may be more than one road by which to reach our objective.

Incidentally, Nehru now scheduled resume holiday June 11 when he departs for another 10 days to 2 weeks in Kulu Valley.⁶

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–858. Secret; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Karachi and London.
2. See footnote 1, supra.
3. Document 208.
4. On March 25, Senators John F. Kennedy (D.–Mass.) and John Sherman Cooper (R.–Ky.) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 74, which called on the United States “to join with other nations in providing support of the type, magnitude, and duration adequate to assist India to complete successfully its current program for economic development.” Dulles’ statement has not been identified.
5. A copy of Nehru’s letter to Macmillan, dated June 7, is in Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–758.

6. Bunker forwarded a full memorandum of this conversation to the Department on June 10, under cover of a letter to Bartlett. (Ibid., SOA Files: Lot 62 D 43, Package) In telegram 3164 from New Delhi, June 11, he offered some additional thoughts on Nehru’s letter. He suggested that the letter intended to leave the door open to further exploration of possibilities for negotiation through the channels it mentioned. (Ibid., Central Files, 690D.91/6–1158)

   During a meeting with the President at the White House on June 11, Dulles briefly referred to Nehru’s letter. In a memorandum of that conversation, the Secretary wrote: “I mentioned the ‘turn-down’ by Nehru of the President’s package plan.” (Ibid., SOA Files: Lot 62 D 43, Package)