Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

384. Letter From the Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Poullada) to the Special Assistant at the Embassy in Pakistan for Mutual Security Affairs (Linebaugh)¹

Washington, March 14, 1960.

Dear Dave: Your letter to Evan Wilson dated February 2,² a copy of which you so kindly sent me, raised some very interesting questions regarding our military and economic aid to Pakistan. I am, of course, deeply interested in these questions and I would like to make the following comments:

Regarding military aid—You will recall that the initiation of military aid to Pakistan in 1954 was somewhat precipitate. There were compelling political reasons for establishing a northern tier of defense against the danger of militant communist expansion into its periphery. It is now fairly clear that whereas we predicated our military aid on the communist threat, the Pakistanis were anxious to receive it principally in order to strengthen their position against India. Thus the program from its inception was based on somewhat divergent motivations by the parties to the contract. This is not to say that the program was necessarily a mistake. I believe careful judgments went into the decision and that certain disadvantages were foreseen. Certainly our diplomats in India raised the alarm by pointing out the probable negative reaction in that country. I do believe that neither the depth nor duration of Indian sentiment were foreseen accurately. The economic burden on Pakistan, not only from direct expenditures in support of its military budget but in wasteful competition with its partner in the sub-continent, was underestimated.

So much for the background. More recently public and governmental attitudes in the U.S. towards the nature of the communist threat have altered and there is much less fear now of physical communist aggression and much more awareness of its capabilities for economic and political subversion. Our attitudes toward India have also changed. There is much more acceptance now of the neutralist position than was the case in 1954. Particularly we have become keenly aware of the fact that unless Pakistan is to remain forever a pensioner of the U.S. it must achieve at least a substantial measure of economic sufficiency. We have also come to believe (along with General Ayub) that the Indian sub-continent cannot be adequately defended militarily nor can it progress economically and politically so long as India and Pakistan are at swords’ point.

These considerations can be summarized by saying that we have now come around to a position where our policy toward South Asia, in so far as Pakistan is concerned, has three principal objectives which to some extent derogate from each other. These are:

1. To strengthen South Asia by encouraging political and economic harmony between India and Pakistan.

2. To develop Pakistan’s economy towards self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible.

3. To maintain in Pakistan a modest but efficient military establishment which will give us adequate political leverage with Pakistan’s leaders. It is also of some importance to us as an instrument for maintaining political stability in the country and for limited deterrence of communist aggression.

As you know, about two years ago the Department began to give serious thought to implementing these objectives so as to achieve them with the least possible amount of friction. The first step was to try to get some hard facts on the economic implications of the Pakistan military aid program. It was realized that the fulfillment of the 1954 commitment would require some difficult policy decisions by the U.S. regarding the future of military aid to Pakistan. The DOD costing study revealed some rather alarming facts. Among other things it concluded that, maintaining the Pakistan military establishment could cost the U.S. as much as $440 million per year depending on the size and composition of forces to be supported. This, of course, presupposed a substantial build-up. However, based on doing nothing more than maintaining normal modernization of the 1954 commitment forces, the U.S. should have to supply between $124 to $134 million a year. In addition, the internal burden on the Pakistan budget would rise proportionately. These alarming figures were taken into account by the Working Group study with which you are familiar and which made certain recommendations on future U.S. military aid to Pakistan to the Under Secretary. These recommendations were later embodied in the NSC policy which provides that we continue military aid to Pakistan but limit it to “gradual limited modernization”. This compromise policy was formulated in an attempt to meet all three major objectives mentioned above to the greatest extent possible.

It was also realized that any additional major force modernization of Pakistan’s military forces would probably impede a rapprochement with India and would stimulate the arms race which had developed with that country. In the meantime, as you know, public and Congressional reaction to military aid to Pakistan had become very negative. It has become increasingly difficult to obtain funds not only for military hardware but also for the Defense Support which helps carry the burden generated by additional armaments. The policy which evolved, I believe, is a sound one and accords with the realities of the situation. The gradual modernization of the Pakistan forces is to continue by the natural process of replacing equipment as it becomes obsolete or wears out. This is a position which I believe can be staunchly defended before the Congress and the American people on the basis that it would be foolhardy to permit deterioration of our substantial investment. At the same time the modernization is of a gradual nature and will minimize the reaction in India. (Objective 1 above) It does not follow that, if Indo-Pak relations continue to improve, this type of modernization would cease as implied in your letter to Evan Wilson. I believe it oversimplifies the problem if we say “they can’t have modernization before rapprochement with India and they can’t have modernization afterwards because it won’t be needed”. It is not this kind of black and white situation. I also believe that if we can adhere to the present policy the possibility of concentrating our own and Pakistan’s resources in economic development (Objective 2) becomes more hopeful.

I admit that the question still remains whether this policy is politically tolerable to the present regime in Pakistan, but I believe that a very convincing case can be made for it and we can only hope that Pakistan in its own major self-interest will see the wisdom of it. Dealing as we are with a regime whose roots of power are in the military establishment, it is clear that we have to walk on a tightrope if we are to succeed in Objectives 1 and 2 without jeopardizing Objective 3. I believe our recent actions clearly demonstrate that Objective 3 still looms large in our policy implementation.

There still remains the question of providing Pakistan the arms to meet the possibility of external threat to its security. I believe we can all agree that India has no foreseeable intention of attacking Pakistan. The Pakistanis are now stressing the threat of Communist China and of possible Soviet aggression through Afghanistan. If, in our opinion, this poses a real and imminent threat we should no doubt have another look at our policy to determine its adequacy. I cannot sincerely convince myself that the Chinese Communists are going to launch any largescale invasion of Pakistan. Overflights of remote parts of Pakistan, and perhaps even small probing actions along undemarcated frontiers, may occur. But is seems to me that Pakistan’s forces are already sufficiently well equipped to handle these situations and in any case it seems very doubtful whether this type of incursion could justify a premature large-scale build-up of Pakistani forces. A similar evaluation could be made about Afghanistan. The Afghans themselves could hardly, at this time, launch an effective attack against Pakistan even should they wish to do so, which I doubt. The Soviets would move through Afghanistan only in the context of an all-out effort to reach warm water which undoubtedly would precipitate reaction on a global scale. It would seem to me that the Pakistanis could well afford to consider their territorial integrity protected from large-scale aggression by the umbrella of their various security pacts and by the forthright commitments they have already obtained from the U.S. Operating behind this shield they could then concentrate their energies and resources on the paramount tasks of achieving economic development and political stability. In a sense, this is what the U.S. did in its early history, developing its resources protected by two oceans and defended by the protective screen of the British fleet. Japan’s present spectacular economic recovery is also based on this idea of letting the U.S. carry its military burden directly.

I believe what I have already said may have thrown some light on the problem of economic aid that you raised in your letter. The question of determining at what stage a country can achieve self-generated economic growth is one which economists can debate at some length. We are only now coming around to this concept in dealing with India and Pakistan. My own feeling is that the self-generating stage is a relative term and that no one can say at any particular moment whether and when this stage has been reached. I think that there is a growing realization here that much more will have to be done in both India and Pakistan before we can even seriously begin to talk about tapering off assistance to these two countries.

As you know the so-called Mansfield Amendment to the Mutual Security Act requires a report to the Congress giving estimates on when grant aid could be terminated in various countries.³ Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of this report and you will note that Pakistan is one of the five countries singled out as presenting [a] serious problem in this respect. The report concludes that:

“In the light of our objectives, the situation in Pakistan affords no usable basis for projecting specific future reductions in Defense Support.”

“On the showing of the past several years, and on an analysis of the economic data at hand, Pakistan might need somewhat larger amounts of capital assistance from abroad in the future in order to make adequate economic progress.”

I hope the views expressed here will shed some light on the questions you raised. I would certainly like to have your further comments and suggestions. I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Evan Wilson who will probably want to add his comments in a separate communication.⁴

Sincerely yours,

Leon B. Poullada⁵

1. Source: Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 63 D 308, General. Secret; Official–Informal. A copy of this letter was sent to Evan Wilson of S/P.
2. Not found.
3. P.L. 86–363, approved September 28, 1959. (73 Stat. 719)
4. David Linebaugh replied in an April 14 letter to Poullada. He stated that he agreed with the principal thesis of Poullada’s letter: that there should be no large buildup of Pakistani forces. Linebaugh emphasized that the United States should not expect any reduction in force levels in Pakistan. “Any attempt on our part to obtain a reduction would be abortive and would be deeply resented by the Pakistanis because it would strike at a manifestation of sovereignty and independence which they share with almost every other government in the world, including their Indian neighbors.” (Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 63 D 308, Official-Informal Correspondence)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.