Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

382. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 5, 1960—8 p.m.

2071. Re Deptel 2041 repeated New Delhi 3231.² I informed President Ayub in Rawalpindi yesterday of decision provide Sidewinders. I stated MAAG prepared discuss details of programming, delivery, et cetera, and said DOD prepared send USAF team to Pakistan for preliminary orientation in maintenance and utilization.

I discussed with President sensitivity of matter vis-à-vis Pakistani-Indian and US-Indian relations. I said USG considered it advisable at early date inform GOI in general terms our decision provide Sidewinders, and reasons therefor. We thought frank explanation to GOI essential in order forestall possible adverse impact on current favorable trend Indo-Pakistani relations. This would be much better than having Indians learn independently of program. I stated we felt President might see merit in himself informing GOI, since this would be appreciated by GOI and might encourage Indo-Pakistani military cooperation, and possibly an exchange of information.

President said he could understand US would not wish Indians to learn of program except directly. He did not think they should be unduly excited, since GOP aware India was negotiating with UK for ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles. This was understandable since India faced a real danger in Communist China and it was natural that India should wish to improve its defenses. He hoped India also understood Pakistan’s problem, since it must be in position to strike back if hit. However, President said he would prefer not inform Indians himself but thought this could best be done by US. He urged that in informing India we not be apologetic. He emphasized: “Don’t make them feel that you owe an explanation to them for military assistance which you give your allies”. He also commented that any apparently apologetic approach would almost certainly result in Indian pressure for increased economic assistance in order to compensate them for military expenditures which they would claim were the result of US military aid to Pakistan.³

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/3–560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to New Delhi.
2. Document 379.
3. In telegram 2095 from Karachi, March 8, Rountree reported that Air Marshal Asghar Khan came to see him to convey a message from Ayub Khan. The President, Asghar Khan indicated, hoped that the United States did not intend, at least at that time, to inform India of the decision to provide the F–104 aircraft to Pakistan. Rountree replied that the United States would not inform India of the F–104s without first discussing the matter with pakistan. (Department of state, Central Files, 790D.5622/3–860)

   In telegram 679 to Kabul, March 12, the Department explained the decision to supply Pakistan with the F–104s. (Ibid., 790D.5612/3–1260)

   On March 14, Ambassador Edward T. Wailes informed the Shah of Iran in confidence that the United States was considering delivering a few F–104s to Pakistan. The Shah received the news “very calmly.” (Ibid., 790D.5622/3–1560)