378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
1789. FYI. USG has reviewed Ayub’s requests to President for F-104 aircraft [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Nike-Ajax [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Side winder missiles (Embtel 16822 and previous) in light policy adopted by NSC August 19593 and guidance contained OCB Pakistan Operations Plan, December 1959.4
Policy and guidance continues provide in essence that U.S. will continue extend military aid to Pakistan beyond fulfillment of 1954 commitment but will confine aid to “limited modernization” (i.e., re-placement of obsolete or worn-out equipment). U.S. should not accede to GOP requests for major force modernization.
Above policy was adopted as culmination exhaustive inter-agency study and recommendations approved by Under Secretary (including separate costing study by DOD) which examined in depth political, economic, financial and technical problems of future military aid to Pakistan.5
USG cannot now accede to Ayub requests (excepting Sidewinders) without contravening this policy of gradual limited modernization. Change of policy would require overriding considerations not now evident. This connection, while recognizing basis Ayub’s concern over pressures from North it seems unlikely Pakistan would be subjected in near future to overt military aggression on scale justifying revision U.S. military aid policy and program accelerated modernization Pakistan forces. In present circumstances best way for Pakistan to acquire additional increment political, economic and military strength to resist communist pressures is for commendable trend Indo-Pakistan rapprochement to continue. Resources both countries can then concentrate on internal development and face communist threat rather [Page 797] than oppose each other. Any substantial increase in U.S. military aid to Pakistan at this time more likely hinder than help present favorable trend.
In view above it will be necessary in near future inform Ayub that USG cannot at this time go beyond continuing support present level MAP forces plus gradual limited modernization. At same time Ayub would be informed favorable decisions to furnish Sidewinders and to equip B–57 bombers with radar bombsight (8 now programmed FY 60 MAP) in order impress on him U.S. sincere intention assist gradual modernization Pakistan forces. Decision as to timing and specific content proposed reply to Ayub will be subject later message. End FYI.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5622/1-1860. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Poullada on January 22; cleared in draft form with G, U/MSC, and OSD/ISA, and in final form with Goodpaster; and approved by G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 1682, January 18, Ambassador Rountree asked the Department to reconsider Ayub’s request for F-104 aircraft, which, he had learned from MAAG officials, had been rejected by the Department of Defense. Langley suggested that this matter be considered again, especially in view of Eisenhower’s promises to Ayub during their meeting in Karachi. (Ibid., 790D.5622/1-1860)↩
- Reference is to NSC 5909/1, Document 6.↩
- Dated December 2. (Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Pakistan)↩
- See Document 359.↩
- On February 9, Ambassador Ahmed called on Assistant Secretary Jones. After discussing several other matters, the Ambassador stated that he was under instructions from his government to inquire whether the furnishing of F–104 aircraft and Sidewinder missiles to Pakistan was being reconsidered by the U.S. Government as a result of President Ayub’s request to President Eisenhower. Jones assured him that as a result of Eisenhower’s conversation with Ayub the question [less than 1 line of text not declassified] was being restudied and that the Department hoped to give Ayub an answer very soon. (Memorandum of conversation by Poullada; Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/2–960)↩