Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, January 14, 1959—noon.

1644. Re Department telegrams 1607, 1608; Embassy telegram 1638.² Further to Embtel 1638 Knight had two-hour session with Foreign Minister Qadir and Arshad Husain. It soon became apparent this was first occasion on which Foreign Minister, used by President Ayub on many matters outside competence, concentrated not only on bilateral but also on Baghdad Pact and this to obvious embarrassment of Husain obliged to brief his Minister in presence of outsider.

DCM gave Foreign Minister text US redraft as well as informal text of presentation made to Husain earlier and now reduced to writing as informal “talking paper”. Husain gave Foreign Minister in parallel form texts of joint counter-draft, and US draft.³

After quickly going over these various papers Qadir pushed them aside and raised series of fundamental questions:

Precisely what was Baghdad Pact about?

What concrete advantage is bilateral supposed to procure either for US or Pakistan?

What was genesis of collective security concept which incidentally Foreign Minister supported in convincing manner as well as words.

There ensued lengthy tour d’horizon marked by review by DCM of development collective security idea and realization following World War II, by account by Arshad Husain of July 1958 BP meeting in London and of development of related declaration. There was also lengthy and somewhat exaggerated account by Husain of extent of commitments now in existence between full members of Pact. Latter account stemmed from Foreign Minister’s immediate concurrence with US premise it would not be expected to do more than what already agreed between full members in area.

The Foreign Minister’s preliminary reactions can be summarized as follows:

1. GOP had been wrong in asking in form of executive agreement for what manifestly exceeded provisions of underlying joint resolution.

2. He, however, saw no point in executing a new bilateral agreement which gave nothing concretely new either to USG or to GOP. His reluctance to go through with what he views as essentially a psychological operation is based on internal Pakistani political considerations. While Foreign Minister convincingly outspoken in his determination to see that Pakistan remains faithful to its treaty commitments he expressed much concern over public opinion which he views as deeply opposed to Pakistan “satelliteship” of US, while an uncommitted India receives comparable favors from US. Thus while Qadir would welcome a new bilateral agreement with US which he could defend publicly as procuring some new advantage to Pakistan and while he recognizes that reaffirmations can have value, he fears conclusion of US draft of bilateral would play into the hands of elements opposed to present Pakistan foreign policy. Foreign Minister fears effectiveness of charge Pakistan had turned its back on its “Moslem brothers” and foregone leadership of Moslem world without commensurate security guarantees from US.

Qadir frankly stated India and not Soviet Union is the enemy in eyes of average Pakistani. Knight made obvious comments in rebuttal of above points. Qadir in general expressed agreement but pointed out much thereof not readily saleable to the public.

3. Foreign Minister, however, recognized that Turkey and specially Iran may have different viewpoints and since all are joined in a collective venture he would as a good ally be guided in part by their views and worries.

4. Finally Foreign Minister while apologizing “as a neophyte in foreign affairs” for being critical of the current negotiation of an agreement “giving nothing new to either contracting party” recognized that non-completion thereof at this stage could easily be interpreted as victory for Soviet intimidation with obvious harmful consequences.

Concluding conversation, and after interdiction by [interruption] Arshad Husain that Turkey had already proposed immediate joint negotiations in Ankara, Foreign Minister Qadir said he would call in on January 14 Turkish and Iranian Ambassadors and soon thereafter give us more considered reactions and comments.

Comment: Knight was struck by frankness, originality and sincerity of Foreign Minister’s approach and reasoning. Latter is having difficulty in reconciling his professional lawyer’s desire for foolproof agreements with the more “flexible” drafting of diplomacy and said so several times.⁴

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/1–1459. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, Tehran, and London.

2. In telegram 1607, January 10, also sent to Ankara and Tehran, the Department transmitted the proposed text for the new bilateral agreements which were being negotiated pursuant to the London Declaration of July 1958 and requested that it be communicated immediately to the Foreign Minister. (Ibid., 780.5/1–1059)

   In telegram 1608, January 10, also sent to Ankara and Tehran, the Department offered guidance for the negotiation of the bilateral agreements. (Ibid., 780.5/1–1059)

   In telegram 1638, January 14, the Embassy reported that due to a delay in transmission it had just received telegrams 1607 and 1608. In the Ambassador’s absence, the Deputy Chief of Mission Knight had a preliminary conversation with Joint Secretary Arshad Husain and had an appointment with the Foreign Minister later that day. (Ibid., 780.5/1–1359)

3. None found.

4. In telegram 1677 from Karachi, January 16, the Embassy reported that Knight met again with Qadir that day to discuss the proposed bilateral agreement. “Qadir went on to say,” the telegram noted, “that were Pakistan alone in negotiating a bilateral with the US, he would without any hesitation refuse to sign proposed US redraft since text would give nothing new to Pakistan and because of internal policy reasons outlined in Embtel 1644. Pakistan, however, not alone and he was swayed by two major considerations: (A) Iran’s special anxiety for treaty link with US (Pakistan has SEATO and Turkey has NATO); (B) regardless of right and wrong in handling of bilateral to date, Foreign Minister realizes non-signature now would give world impression of disunity among powers associated with BP and give psychological victory of sorts to USSR.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/1–1659) Telegram 1668 from Karachi, January 17, transmitted the Pakistani draft to the Department. (Ibid., 790D.5/1–1759)

   Negotiations concerning the proposed bilateral agreement continued throughout January, February, and March 1959. The agreement was signed on March 5; see Document 346.