325. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
827. Paris pass USRO Thurston and West. Last night’s events, during which a semblance of democracy was replaced by a semblance of dictatorship, can be placed in two different but complementary perspectives.
From short range point of view, even most single-minded Pakistan admirers of democracy were somewhat appalled at what the four long months between now and the scheduled February 15 date for elections might hold in store for Pakistan in view of the flood of demagoguery which has swept the country since the election campaign started. Just to mention a few examples, we have seen incitement to war against India, incitement to revolt and bloody revolution, growing mob demonstrations in connection with one pretext or another, and finally a spectacular and headline catching episode in the form of the fighting in the E. Pakistan Assembly culminating in the wounding of the speaker and the killing of a deputy speaker.
The longer range perspective covers those fundamentals of Pakistan scene which have been reported at length by this mission and Consulates over long period: The disenchantment of Pakistanis with Pakistan resulting from economic disappointment; foreign policy frustrations [Page 671] in Muslim world as well as in sub-continent; foreign policy disappointments such as the impossible-to-explain large scale assistance given by Pakistanis’ American ally to India; the all pervasive graft and corruption, and stillborne republican institutions with a democratic terminology but no substance.
Faced with this situation and even though President Mirza has become increasingly associated in public mind with the above unsatisfactory and despised state of affairs, latter most likely has period of grace in front of him. While obviously the same demagogues and reactionary Muslim elements which have been exploiting dissatisfaction to their own ends, and who had succeeded to such extent that all “in sun” including Mirza had visibly lost ground to them, will continue oppose in every way the present “Duumvirs”, Mirza and Ayub, with whatever means remaining at their disposal. Public disgust with Pakistan is such however that we believe people as a whole will be ready to give fair trial to current experiment.
Some of future danger which can now be foreseen fall broadly into two categories:
(1) First ones are likely to arise from difficulties within dictatorial coalition. Indeed, common knowledge no true Duumvirate has lasted in history. While congenitally Mirza and Ayub are made to get along with each other better than most, it would be too much to expect from human nature to assume that today’s harmonious marriage is more than an episode in a historical sequence leading to supremacy of one or the other. Parenthetically, it might be observed that since neither rallies over-enthusiastic and overwhelming support of armed forces, possibility of another leader emerging, presumably another general, cannot be excluded. As things look now, if one had to pick between Mirza and Ayub as the ultimate top man, latter with his direct control over the army, which is the solid element and undoubtedly the controlling force in Pakistan today, would be the favorite by a narrow margin. However, whenever Mirza might reach this conclusion himself he could well then turn to one of Ayub’s subordinates to form new team preserving his political supremacy. Dangers of such Palace revolutions are obvious.
The second category of difficulties can be foreseen in somewhat more distant future and would grow out of failure on part of present leaders to put period of grace to good advantage: By taking effective steps against graft and corruption, making visible progress in field of agriculture, improving the nation’s tax system and finances, and adopting a reasonably democratic constitution. If Pakistan—east and west—can be given impression that real progress is being made towards such major objectives, the present regime could last a long while. If, on other hand, the public derives the impression that a new clique bent on self-enrichment has merely replaced the old one which [Page 672] had masqueraded in democratic guise, the groundwork for return of old clique will be laid. Indeed, if new regime cannot demonstrate real achievement in reasonable time, political opposition regardless of official bans and interdicts will form beneath the surface, pressure will grow and revolt and revolution of a bloodier type than that experienced last night would become probable.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–858. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi, Tehran, Ankara, Baghdad, London, Paris, Kabul, Lahore, and Dacca.↩