Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

258. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May 5, 1960—10 a.m.

3723. For Under Secretary Dillon and Assistant Secretary Jones. Defense Minister Menon called on me personally last night to say that GOI was engaged in substantial movement of troops to northern border and large program of road building in that area for their support. This was considered by GOI as matter of urgency. In view conditions in the area only way troops could be effectively supplied was by air.

Hence GOI wanted to buy 29 Fairchild C–119 Packets with spares at once. It was urgent to get them here before monsoon when road traffic would become difficult or impossible. GOI wants to buy a further 30 C–119s later for support road construction operation. These, Menon hoped, might be financed through Export-Import Bank or other credits. Menon said he was also interested in possibility buying one or two Lockheed Hercules C–130s which he understood might be available since they were being superseded by a later model. Menon said that only US and Soviet Union had this type of plane in operation.

Menon asked me to help him make these purchases urgently and at a good price. He even asked me to telephone Washington about it.

This provides a new and unique opportunity to assist GOI militarily in effort to strengthen defenses against Chinese Communists, to get US type equipment into Indian forces, and to establish closer working relationships with GOI armed services. It is also pertinent that many other aircraft suppliers anxious get GOI’s business. It is clearly in our interest do everything possible stiffen GOI posture vis-à-vis Chinese Communists. That GOI turns to us at this juncture is encouraging development which I believe we should exploit promptly and to maximum extent possible.

I am aware of fact that interest in these aircraft has been previously expressed by GOI air force officers, including Air Marshal Mukerjee and that we have so far not been anxious respond affirmatively at least in part because these aircraft have been earmarked for Air Force reserve program. However, this urgent approach by Menon against the background of developments on the Chinese Communist border seems to me to warrant most serious consideration this request.

As reported to Department, while I was in Washington I discussed possibility of selling certain types of weapons to GOI with the President and he indicated full sympathy for this idea.²

I therefore strongly recommend that we respond promptly and affirmatively to this request and offer to sell GOI the aircraft they require at prices appropriate to their age and for rupees, as we did in case of arms sales to French. (See Brown letter to Bartlett November 13, 1959 and Bartlett’s reply December 17, 1959.)³GOI may not accept sale for rupees since they might consider it to have too much flavor of military aid, but it would be well worth trying. If they did agree it would relieve GOI balance or payments of some of burden of their new requirements for defense against Chinese Communists, and be substantial first step in opening door to further military aid if required.

A further reason for acquiescing promptly in this request is that doing so would take much of the sting out of our recent decision to supply GOP with F–104s and with Sidewinders.⁴

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/5–560. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. The telegram is marked: “For delivery at 8:30 a.m.” It was received at 3:10 a.m.
2. See Document 256.
3. Neither found
4. In telegram 4359 to New Delhi, May 7, the Department of State noted that it had “consistently and strongly” supported the Indian request for additional C–119s. As a result, the U.S. Air Force had recently initiated an availability study. The telegram, which was repeated to Karachi, also instructed the Embassy there to tell the Pakistani Government on a strictly confidential basis of the decision to sell the aircraft to India. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/5–560)

   In telegram 3759 from New Delhi, May 9, the Chargé stated that he advised Defense Minister Menon that day that the United States was willing to sell India C–119s immediately if convinced that the Indian Air Force could utilize them fully and could furnish pilots to pick them up. Indian Air Force officials, who were present at the meeting, agreed to this procedure. (Ibid., 791.5622/5–960)

   In telegram 2766 from Karachi, May 17, Ambassador Rountree reported that he informed President Ayub that morning of the U.S. decision to sell the C–119s to India. He noted that while Ayub was “obviously not happy over decision, he interposed no objection.” (Ibid., 791.5622/5–1760)