165. Memorandum From the Operations Coordinator (O’Connor) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)1
For your information or action, there is quoted below an excerpt from the preliminary and informal notes of M/OP on the OCB meeting of April 20:
“Briefings by Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree
“At the invitation of the OCB, Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree discussed operating problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Byroade opened the discussion by citing the extensive Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. He noted Afghanistan offered many possibilities for Soviet penetration and said the USSR was making the most of these advantages. He said he did not believe Afghanistan was already lost to the West and that he believed US security interests in Afghanistan were worth a struggle. He then spoke of the Afghan-Pakistan Pushtunistan dispute. He observed this dispute has become extremely serious and has an important bearing on our position in Afghanistan. Another important problem was the extent of the Western commitment to assist Afghanistan in reaching the goals of the second five-year plan. Ambassador Byroade noted US operations in Afghanistan could be improved, particularly with regard to fulfilling those commitments already undertaken. He said it was important to build up Afghanistan’s confidence in Western interest and support. Ambassador Byroade, in opening his remarks, had used the term ‘an economic Korea’ in referring to the situation in Afghanistan. In closing, he said he felt the time had come for the US to decide to what lengths we were willing to go in meeting the Soviet challenge there.
“Ambassador Rountree spoke of the achievements of the Ayub regime in Pakistan. He noted the Pakistanis work with the US as partners and allies. In his discussion of the Pushtunistan problem, Ambassador Rountree said the Pakistani position appeared to be that, since a soft line toward Afghanistan appeared not to produce the desired results, the Pakistanis, by countering the virulent Afghan propaganda in kind, expected to force Afghanistan to let up agitating the Pushtunistan problem. Nonetheless, the Pakistanis assure us they [Page 346] are willing to stop their propaganda campaign if they are sure the Afghans would do likewise. Ambassador Rountree was not certain the US could play a useful role in the dispute at this juncture.
“In response to various questions by the Board, Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree spoke about the orientation of the Afghan army, the Pakistani interest in a CENTO command structure, the personal animosity between Ayub and Daud, the difficulties of establishing fruitful contacts between the Pakistanis and the Afghans, and Pakistani sensibilities to admitting the existence of a Pushtunistan problem in which the Afghans had any legitimate interest. There was also a brief discussion of US press coverage of Afghanistan, the US and Soviet road building programs, and the orientation and flow of Afghanistan’s trade. In response to a question from Mr. Saccio (ICA), Mr. Byroade said he believed the US could not assume too much more in the way of big projects in Afghanistan.
- Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Afghanistan. Secret. Drafted by Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.↩