Office of the Historian

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1

Kabul, December 13, 1958—9 p.m.

491. Ayub’s attitude towards Afghanistan revealed in Karachi telegram 1398 to Department2 repeated Kabul 105 profoundly discouraging. If this represents his considered and unalterable point of view, rationale on which US policy toward Afghanistan has been based is undermined. Key part of rationale has been, as we see it, to promote good relations between RGA and GOP thereby keeping Afghanistan as neutral as possible in order that it can fulfill its historic role as buffer protecting Indian sub-continent and Iran’s flank from Russians. Unless there is government in Karachi that takes what happens in Afghanistan seriously and seeks good relations, seems to us that inevitably Afghanistan will draw closer to the Soviet Union. Mirza found formula which kept Pushtunistan question more or less quiescent. Apparently that policy has been discarded. When country team drafted Embtel 465 December 7th3 (repeated Karachi 103) we felt [Page 254] Afghan fears exaggerated and that GOP interested in lessening tensions with RGA and also in keeping Afghanistan out of Soviet clutches. Ayub’s “stew in own juice” statement suggests an indifference to increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Question arises as to how a government apparently indifferent to growth of Communist influence in Afghanistan and creation of Communist states in India can justify continued membership in Baghdad Pact.

In conversations with senior Afghans we have repeatedly given assurance that US arms have been provided Pakistan to help build bulwark against Communism and that such arms will not be used against their neighbors. Afghans appeared believe us until shortly after Ayub coup. Now our assurances do not appear to be convincing.

Mills
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–1358. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Ankara, London, Peshawar, and Lahore.↩
  2. In telegram 1398, December 10, Ambassador Langley reported on a conversation he had the previous day with Ayub Khan. The telegram reads in part as follows: “India is in trouble, Ayub concluded, and that is not displeasing to him. At same time, he indicated his personal inclination as President to let Afghans stew in their own juice too, despite possibility Afghans turning more towards Soviet companionship inherent in such lack of interest by Pakistan.” (Ibid., 790D.00/12–1058)↩
  3. In telegram 465, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Mills and senior Embassy officers met with the Ambassadors and ranking officers of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey on December 5 and 7 to discuss Daud’s charge that the proposed bilateral military agreements between those countries and the United States were aggressive in intent. (Ibid., 780.5/12–758) Three separate bilateral military cooperation agreements between the United States and Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey were signed at Ankara on March 5, 1959. For texts, see 10 UST 314, 10 UST 317, and 10 UST 320.↩