Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

110. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 26, 1958, 2:30 p.m.¹

Washington, June 26, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Prime Minister Daud’s Visit with the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
• Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills
• Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett, SOA
• H.R.H. Sardar Mohammad Daud
• Ambassador Mohammad Hashin Maiwandwal
• Dr. Mohammad Yusuf
• Mr. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak

In reply to the President’s query regarding his visit to Washington, the Prime Minister stated that he had been very busy, but in a most pleasant way and was thoroughly enjoying the hospitality which had been extended to him by everyone whom he had met.

The President commented that Mr. Rountree had told him of some of the matters which the Prime Minister had discussed with American officials. He thought that in each of these matters we might in some way be helpful; certainly we wished to be helpful. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the President’s interest in these matters. He said that he had had the pleasure of discussing with United States officials some of Afghanistan’s problems and of explaining to them his country’s needs. He had made it clear that he would appreciate help, and also that he did not wish to put things forward which would cause us any undue trouble.

The President expressed a particular interest in the Helmand Valley project and said that he hoped that we could assist the Prime Minister in bringing it to complete efficiency. He was sure that we could provide technicians to help in realizing this. The President noted that Ambassador Mills would be returning to Kabul and would, of course, keep in touch with the Prime Minister and his colleagues. The Ambassador would be in a position to let us know how we might be of assistance in connection with specific projects.

The President stated he respected completely the middle position of the Government of Afghanistan and that it did not affect in any way the desire of the United States Government to help the Prime Minister and his Government in their efforts toward bettering the welfare of the Afghan people. While he respected Afghanistan’s neutral position, the President continued, he thought that His Royal Highness might wish to hear from the President himself that the Soviet Union was not in a position to start a world war without itself being completely destroyed. The United States wanted to assist in bringing about conditions which would make controlled disarmament possible, but the United States would not let itself be intimidated by any country. The United States wanted peace, the Secretary said, but we were a bit like the philosopher who remarked: “We are going to have peace even if we have to fight for it.” The United States will never attack anyone, but neither will we ever allow ourselves to get to a position where an aggressor might be able to gain by aggression.

The President recalled his speech of 1953 in which he had expressed the United States intention, if controlled disarmament were successfully implemented, to use in part the resulting reduction in military expenses to extend help to free countries which needed it.² He hoped that this assistance could be a very large percentage of our savings. For instance, under conditions of effective disarmament, we might be able to ask Congress for ten billion dollars rather than for the three or four billion dollars which we were asking Congress to appropriate under the Mutual Security Program for this year. Such expanded aid would not only help our friends, but would be to the advantage of the United States itself in increasing the market for American products abroad.

The President wondered whether the Prime Minister wished to make any remarks. The Prime Minister replied in the negative.

The Secretary noted that the Prime Minister and he would be returning to the State Department immediately after the meeting in the President’s office and would sign a cultural agreement between our two countries.³ This would be the second we had signed, the first being with Germany. The Secretary also noted that a proposed joint statement summarizing the talks between the Prime Minister and the President and other American officials had been prepared and suggested that the President and the Prime Minister might like to concur in it. This was done and it was decided to issue the statement for release at 10:00 a.m., June 27, upon the Prime Minister’s departure from Washington.⁴

The Prime Minister in conclusion stated that, speaking on behalf not only of himself but of the Afghan people, he wished to let the President know that he and the Afghan people thought of the President and of the American people only as friends of Afghanistan. The President expressed his deep gratification at the sentiment expressed by the Prime Minister.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.8911/6–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Bartlett. At 11 a.m., the President was briefed about the Daud visit by Dulles, Rountree, Mills, and Bartlett. A memorandum of that conversation, drafted by Rountree and Bartlett, is ibid.
2. Reference is presumably to Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, delivered before the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 21, 1953, pp. 847–851.
3. For text of this Agreement, effected by an exchange of notes, see 9 UST (pt. 2) 997.
4. For text of the joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1958, pp. 127–128.