107. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 24, 19581
SUBJECT
- Afghan-Soviet Relations
[Here follows the same list of participants as the memorandum of conversation, supra.]
The Prime Minister expressed the strong and traditional desire of all Afghans for independence and freedom. He stated that he wanted to dispel any doubts which his American friends might harbor that the acceptance by Afghanistan of aid from its neighbor to the north would prejudice in any way Afghanistan’s independence. Previous Afghan Governments had looked to the United States for badly needed aid and the response had been disappointing. Afghanistan has never accepted aid with any conditions attached. When he (Daud) became Prime Minister, Afghanistan found it necessary to seek aid from any source willing to give it. This need was heightened by “certain events not pleasant to us.”2 Afghanistan’s only aim in accepting aid from the USSR has been to develop Afghanistan’s economy and strengthen its defenses without in any way prejudicing its national traditions.
The Secretary stated that we understood the motives which led Afghanistan to accept Soviet assistance mentioning specifically the fact the Afghanistan is a land-locked country and its transit difficulties with Pakistan naturally led Afghanistan to seek a route for its commerce to the north. He pointed out that the United States has tried to be helpful, alluding specifically to the transit project. The Secretary mentioned the danger of too much economic dependence on the Soviet Bloc and the presence of Soviet technicians in Afghanistan. He mentioned that Soviet trade is used primarily for political purposes; citing Yugoslavia as an example of how the USSR withdrew its aid when the Yugoslavs did not follow political courses dictated by the Soviets.
He emphasized that the United States wanted a peaceful world. We have never used our economic or military power to dominate other nations. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the USSR. Our hope is that in time the USSR will cease to have expansionist ambitions. However, even if the Russian desire for expansion relaxes in [Page 228] other parts of the world, Afghanistan may still have problems with the USSR because of its geographic position and historical Russian ambitions which antedate the present Communist regime.
The Prime Minister replied that with all deference to the views of a powerful country such as the United States, nevertheless, the views of a small country might be of value. The strong feeling of nationalism and the desire for independence and freedom which characterize all nations in Asia make it inconceivable that they would accept an ideology inimical to their best interests. As concerns Afghanistan, it is “beyond imagination” that Communism could make any inroads in view of Afghan traditions, religion, and the very nature of the Afghan regime. As regards Soviet technicians, the Prime Minister related how he had expressed to Bulganin and Khrushchev the same beliefs and convictions which he now expressed. He wanted to assure his American friends that the Soviet technicians in Afghanistan have in no instance engaged in improper activities, nor would the Afghan Government tolerate any such activity by them.
The Secretary explained that his mention of the Communist danger in no sense implied any doubt of Afghanistan’s desire for freedom and independence. He had the greatest admiration and respect for the manner in which Afghanistan had preserved its independence. He was referring to a common danger which threatened the United States as well as Afghanistan. He was not questioning the Government of Afghanistan’s dedication to the preservation of its independence any more than he would question similar dedication by the United States Government of our own independence. No doubt the fact that Soviet technicians were acting correctly was due in part at least to Afghan vigilance.
The Prime Minister replied that he simply wanted to assure his American friends regarding Afghan reasons for accepting Soviet assistance.