101. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
736. During long visit with Pakistani Ambassador,2 who returned Kabul last week after absence nearly five weeks, Khattak informed me in strictest secrecy President Mirza told him if Afghan King shows any reluctance visit Karachi February 1 as planned to make it easy for King to postpone visit. Reasoning Mirza, according Khattak, is that as consequence great slump prestige free world due to realization USSR has ICBM as proved by Sputnik, now is not propitious time to influence Afghan Monarch.
[Page 219]Also Khattak informed me in strictest secrecy his contacts within royal family including some royal wives inform him these members family who formerly very pro-West now have fatalistic feeling re USSR. They argue that odds now if war came are Soviets would win it and because GOP allied with free world would feel justified in conquering it. They state much safer to be neutral while cultivating USSR by all manner gestures of friendship. Khattak states members royal family in question look forward to eventual union Afghanistan and Pakistan and feel that this now endangered by close Pakistan relation with West. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Khattak further stated certain Afghans close to Pakistanis formerly believed if Pakistan did not interfere [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], it would be possible at appropriate moment to organize rebellion in areas bordering Pakistan and force out King and Daud or force them grant liberal reforms. These Afghans no longer believe this possible; Soviet arms cached in strategic areas according to them and Daud could arm tribesmen (with whom he probably already has made arrangements and given promises) and easily put down such uprising. Afghans referred to, according Khattak, now believe only possibility changing Daud–Naim dictatorship would be by some such means as assassination.
Khattak stated when he was in Karachi three Afghans close to Pakistanis saw him. He urged them to do nothing violent as GOP currently committed to following peaceful approach to RGA. He indicated such Afghans would be there if needed in any contingency.
Khattak stated what he sees developing in Afghanistan is penetration by Soviets by peaceful means. He has of course talked of this before and it is apparent to all this is Soviet tactic. He said that perhaps in 10 years, although it could happen much earlier, one day Islah could calmly announce abdication of King and resignation of Cabinet with new government taken over by someone now unknown who would be Soviet stooge and would make satellite of Afghanistan.
I told Khattak this possibility certainly existed and of course was like formula used by Soviets in Eastern Europe except there Soviet Army was also present or on borders. We agreed that transit project daily assumes greater importance from strategic standpoint [3½ lines of source text not declassified].
I told Khattak that history seldom unfolds as anticipated and United States must do its best to hold beachhead of influence in Afghanistan using whatever opportunities we could discover. He fully agreed and gave no indication he considering any policies other than those we have been jointly following during last year and half.
Comment: Khattak has excellent sources but he tends to over dramatize. Representing country which would suffer most and first if Afghanistan were taken over one way or another by Soviets, possible [Page 220] dangers loom large in his mind. This is not to dismiss possibility that events could lead eventually to Soviet takeover. He has confidence that US will offset apparent Soviet lead in missiles and will demonstrate this in time dramatically.