Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

38. Instruction From the Department of State to Various Diplomatic Posts and Missions⁰

CA–4735

November 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Arms Policy for Africa

Reference is made to CA 8200 of April 6, 1960¹ and CA 9732 of May 23, 1960.²

The responses to the referenced circular instructions indicated that many posts in Africa felt that some sort of arms limitation agreement for Africa (or for West Africa only) might be feasible provided the initiative came from the Africans themselves.

At the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in June 1960, Secretary of State Grimes of Liberia stated that Africa needed to spend whatever resources it had on development and “cannot afford the luxury of an arms race.” He suggested that the African states should therefore do whatever they could to settle disputes by peaceful means and that adequate machinery be established for this purpose. The Addis Ababa conference took no action on this suggestion.

President Eisenhower in his General Assembly speech on October [September] 22³ stated that the UN should be prepared to help the African countries maintain their security without wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments. He added that he hoped “that the African states (would) use existing or establish new regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in this area.”

As a follow-up to this speech, USUN has been showing other delegations a draft resolution for illustrative purposes. Section I of the resolution “calls upon all states to refrain from generating disputes between the states of this area or from encouraging them to wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments.” Section II “expresses the hope that the new African states will consider carefully ways and means to maintain their security without dangerous and wasteful competition in armaments, which might include examination of the possibilities of the establishment of regional agreements or arrangements.”⁴

There has been little reaction so far to this aspect of the illustrative resolution. The French Delegation stated it has serious concern about it, as presently drafted, since it might preclude or be taken to be directed against defense arrangements among members of the French community. Ambassador Cooper of Liberia informed USUN he “objected” to Section II of the resolution and pointed out that this should apply to all states, not just to Africans. He indicated doubt that such a subject should be included in a resolution on Africa.⁵ An Ethiopian delegate also questioned the inclusion of the arms issue in the illustrative resolution. The Department has accordingly instructed USUN not to press for this part of the illustrative African resolution in view of the importance of not giving the impression of American pressure behind it.

Meanwhile, Ghana has announced its intention to submit a resolution embodying President Nkrumah’s suggestion for keeping Africa free of nuclear weapons and military bases. No resolution has yet been submitted to this effect during the disarmament discussions in the GA. The Upper Volta delegation has indicated that Africans are now working on a resolution which requests all states to abstain from nuclear or ballistic tests in Africa, from installing bases for experimentation, from stockpiling or transporting nuclear arms; and declaring Africa a neutral denuclearized zone. Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia have submitted a draft resolution banning the use anywhere of atomic weapons,⁶ which is unacceptable to the U.S. since there is no inspection provision and since its effect is to attack the Western nuclear deterrent without condemning or stemming Communist aggression through conventional armaments. These more recent proposals have tended to distract attention from the President’s original proposal.

The Department believes that some initial simple arms limitation arrangement might be desirable, at least as applied to West African nations. This might be brought about by the African states acting on their own, possibly through the Conference of Independent African States, without any UN action. The UN might, however, supply some supporting services; for example, a secretariat for any formal or informal organization which might be set up.

A general agreement might be reached among the states concerned to hold the level of their forces at approximately present levels or at levels raised sufficiently to cover internal security, or the requirements of national sovereignty or sensitivity. Such an arrangement, if it had the agreement of the African countries concerned, might be respected by the potential arms-supplying countries, including the former metropoles. The arrangement would involve only conventional arms since this would simplify the task of reaching an agreement.

The United States would hope that some sort of inspection system would be adopted which would be effective under the circumstances of the region, and which could at least begin to operate at the outset of the agreement. The United States does not favor the establishment of a precedent for wholly unverified arms limitation agreements.

The Department recognizes that it is neither possible nor desirable at this time to project an agreement or arrangement in detail. Moreover, an overt assumption of the initiative by the United States might defeat our purpose since it would give the impression of too great an American interest. It is therefore suggested that the matter not be discussed with the governments to which you are accredited. The Department would, however, appreciate the addressee Embassies’ views as to (1) whether any African government might be willing to take the initiative toward an arrangement like that suggested above; (2) whether anything useful might emerge from it; and (3) what would be the best way of inducing such an initiative.

The Department points out that there are certain cautions with respect to the above schemes which should be borne in mind. Among these are the following:

Proposals for an atom-free zone in Africa might give rise to difficulties in connection with U.S. bases in Morocco and Libya. Moreover, the United States would strongly oppose any attempt to apply this precedent to certain other regions of the world. In addition, related proposals re foreign bases in Africa might create difficulties for the UK and France. However, the implications of these matters have not yet been fully explored and the Department has them under consideration.

Should discussion of the scheme become involved in African emotionalism in regard to Algeria or French nuclear testing in the Sahara it might be counter-productive.

Draft declarations banning, on a universal basis, the use of atomic weapons, such as the Ethiopian proposal refered to above, should be avoided.

For Embassy Lagos Only

It has been suggested that Nigeria might be the most suitable country to provide African initiative for the exploration of this possibility. However, the behavior of the Nigerian delegation in the current General Assembly now causes some doubt in this regard.⁷

Nevertheless, the Department would appreciate the views of the Embassy Lagos as to whether, despite these indications, the above suggestions on an African arms limitation agreement might usefully be discussed with the Nigerian Government with a view to its taking the initiative in carrying forward consultations with other African countries. (See Kaduna’s G–4 of Nov. 3)⁸

For Embassies Paris, London and Lagos

The Department would also appreciate the comments of Embassies Paris⁹ and London as to what the reactions of the French and British governments would be to the above, and the comments of Embassies London¹⁰ and Lagos as to the possibility that a British approach to the Nigerian Government (if they agree) might be more effective than an American approach.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.56/11–2560. Confidential. Drafted by Edmund H. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration, Edmund A. Gullion, who approved it; and cleared with representatives of AF, S/P, RA, IO, S/S, and in draft with DOD/ISA. Sent to Abidjan, Bamako, Brazzaville, Conakry, Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lomé, London, Paris, and Yaoundé, and repeated to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Rabat, Tananarive, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN.
1. Not printed.
2. CA–9732 dealt “with other actions available to the United States in seeking to reduce the danger of an arms build-up in Africa, whether or not an internal arms control system is instituted.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770.56/5–2360)
3. See Document 34.
4. See Document 34.
5. Telegram 1255 from USUN, November 2, recounted Ambassador Barco’s conversation with the Liberian Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Ford Cooper. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/11–260)
6. For text of the draft resolution introduced on November 1, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1–3.
7. Nigeria had voted against U.S. positions regarding Chinese representation, the allocation of the Cuban complaint to the Political Committee, and the Ethiopian resolution against nuclear weapons. (Memorandum from Herz to Kellogg, November 7; Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, Arms for Africa)
8. Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/11–360)
9. In despatch 794 from Paris, December 8, the Embassy indicated it was “inclined to doubt whether any African initiatives would take a constructive turn at this time.” (Ibid., 770.56/12–860)
10. Despatch 1101 from London, December 7, concluded that although the British Government’s position would be similar to the Department’s “it would not be inclined to take strong action in supporting the Department’s proposals.” The Embassy also thought the British would be reluctant to approach the Nigerian Government. (Ibid., 770.56/12–760)