Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

277. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, December 6, 1960.

1635. For Secretary and Bohlen from Wadsworth. Subject: Congo.

1. Every indication here is that we are fast approaching a new crisis in Congo. Afro-Asians led by Krishna Menon and USSR will probably ask for new SC or GA debate as soon as SYG had circulated promised report. (Report just received is that USSR is asking for SCmtg.¹ We have nothing substantiate this.) Pressures from neutralists, pro-Communist Africans and USSR on SYG appear to be producing increasing weakness on his part. Unless strong counter-pressures are introduced, it seems to me UN will drift from bad to worse in Congo. I believe that only practical way to exert necessary counter-pressures on SYG and reverse trend is for Secy to make personal visit to SYG with strong démarche asking for reorganization UN Command and staff in Congo and development UN-Congolese cooperation. I believe UK (Ormsby-Gore) would be agreeable to joining in such démarche and that it would be additionally effective if this were case. First objective of such approach should be take advantage Hammarskjold’s intention replace Von Horn as Supreme Commander and ask for appointment outstanding officer to take over as senior UN official in Congo but we should also try to bring about major reorientation SYG’s policies.

2. Believe US and UK policies should be concerted to this purpose promptly and that approach be made to SYG just as soon as possible, i.e., this week if feasible.

3. Fol is suggested US–UK policy line for approach to SYG:

(a) We alarmed at drift in Congo which, if continued, likely result in UN failure and bankruptcy.

(b) We believe steps need to be taken both by UN and by Congolese to assure this does not happen and that cooperation replaces recrimination. US and UK willing to help assure this.

(c) On UN side we see necessity certain definite actions as fol:

(1) UN rep in Congo needs to be changed so that Kasavubu and Congolese moderates have confidence in it. Relations between Congolese and Dayal are such that Dayal cannot command cooperation from Congolese and we think he should be replaced. We understood Von Horn also about to be replaced. Von Horn replacement should be of such stature and ability that he can weld UNOC into effective command which will be more consistent than UNOC now is. This officer should be someone with combat experience and administrative capabilities. If immediate replacement of Dayal proves difficult, new CO should also become in effect chief UN official in Congo. We have in mind people like Gen Bull (Norway), etc. for this spot (see USUN 1634).²

(2) Think SYG should take this and other such actions without regard to reaction that can be expected from USSR, Ghana, Guinea and possibly UAR. Soviets are totally against UN effort in Congo and will be violent against any effective UN steps there. Ghana, Guinea and those of similar view will also not be satisfied by anything that does not support Lumumba. We consider it much more important to have UN succeed in Congo than to ameliorate their criticism.

(3) We also believe SYG should promptly settle differences with Belgians on civilian aid in Congo. There is no possibility UN having enough funds to replace all Belgian civil assistance in Congo. Nor is Congo viable without such help. Therefore modus vivendi must be arranged to assure that UN and Belgians are working in harmony or at least not at cross-purposes. We think SYG must work this problem out promptly. We are urging same thing on Belgians and are willing to help SYG to seek to eliminate such political and anti-UN influences which exist on Belgian side.

(4) In Congo UN must take more active initiative in trying to work with Kasavubu and moderate forces in Leopoldville with view to helping them really take hold of governmental machinery. GA’s seating of Kasavubu del established necessary political lead in this direction. UN should also reinstitute efforts to assist in training and organization CNA with view to bringing it under more effective leadership and control and welding it into unified force. Finally UN should be more active in areas, such as Stanleyville, where nationally directed control by Congo itself has broken down, to assure maintenance of law and order.

(d) On Congo side US and UK are willing to take steps to seek assure Congolese cooperate with UN as fol:

(1) We will strongly press Kasavubu, Bomboko, and Mobutu to reorganize govt in way which will make it more regular and effective. Specifically we will urge govt be formed to replace College of Commissioners and that Mobutu be brought into it in some constitutional fashion, preferably as Chief-of-Staff. We will urge them to establish govt in way which will give supremacy to civilian institutions. We will also urge them to say they intend submit it to Parliament as soon as possible, although we cannot say when this would actually be. We can only be successful in this, however, if we can show them this will bring UN cooperation. Therefore SYG’s attitude on personnel and willingness UN to extend cooperation is essential element.

(2) We will also tell Kasavubu and Mobutu we do not believe Congo unity and integrity can be preserved without UN assistance at this time and that they must develop close cooperation with UN. We will be willing to stress to them firm US and UK backing for UN and to say our continued support Congo authorities based on assumption they make every effort cooperate with UN.

(3) We prepared also exert such influence as we have with Tshombe to persuade him make arrangements with Kasavubu which will assure maintenance Congo unity and establishment national govt with effective authority throughout Congo. We also will intercede with Belgians on this, although contrary to general impression, they are not advocating Katanga separatism.

(4) Only if some such approach made early and with emphasis visit Secy would give it do I see possibility developing better situation between SYG and Congo in foreseeable future. In absence major approach, continued “neutralist” pressures on SYG, especially from India, likely keep him from developing any more firm direction than now exists.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–660. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. The time of transmission is not indicated; the telegram was received at 2:29 a.m.
1. For text of a Soviet statement of December 6 calling for a meeting of the Security Council and criticizing U.N. and U.S. policies, see U.N. doc. S/4573.
2. Telegram 1634 from USUN, December 6, indicated that discussions had been held with British and Norwegian representatives about the availability of General Odd Bull, Chief of Air Staff of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/12–660)