Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo⁰

November 30, 1960, 2:27 p.m.

1510. Embtel 1181 rptd USUN 262 Brussels 450.¹ Armed clash ONUC and CNA forces, while apparently not instigated by Mobutu, serves emphasize importance providing means for more harmonious relations between ONUC and GOC. This means as far as GOC concerned, establishing government ONUC can recognize and deal with. Department has given most careful consideration reftel but continues feel such cooperation will not be forthcoming in full until government with more claim legality can be set up. In this connection wish point out SYG agreement to caretaker government proposal (USUN tel 1188 repeated Leopoldville 142).² Line taken by SYG is that Lumumba legally ousted but still has to be recognized to some extent since he has semblance parliamentary sanction and has not been replaced by any government which is both legal and effective. Ileo cabinet qualifies on grounds legality but due Mobutu coup never functioned as a government, and while Commissioners more effective than any other government they are extra-constitutional. See USUN tel 1096 rptd Leopoldville 1026.³ Therefore Department feels ONUC would cooperate much more with a Kasavubu-appointed caretaker cabinet. This would appear be particularly true now that Kasavubu has been recognized by UN New York and his delegation seated. Department feels that while Linner and other UN civilians may be willing work with Commissioners and other “men in the chair” to get economic programs going, what needed more is across board cooperation all levels with real exchange views and attempt reach agreed solution larger issues. Recent show force by CNA may have possible advantage in inducing ONUC take GOC somewhat seriously and be more agreeable to non-Lumumba government, particularly if legally appointed.

Regarding your point in reftel that time will be required “to get parliamentary support for new formula”, Department agrees but wishes stress that parliamentary support need not be a pre-condition for announcement new cabinet. As indicated Point 4 Deptel 1372, reptd USUN 898,⁴ announced intention should be seek eventual parliamentary approval, but we see no reason, since Parliament not now in session, why formation government need be delayed due lack parliamentary support at present time.

Department agrees that formation such government would not entirely remove pressure Ghana-Guinea-UAR but would make it considerably more difficult for them to work openly against and easier for US work for support GOC as whole without limiting our support to Kasavubu as the only part of GOC with solid legal basis. Department officers in New York for recent Congo debate have stressed view that question of legality important for Africans and one reason French Africans spoke for Kasavubu was that he was legally acceptable and not to support him would be to deny rule of law in Congo. Moreover caretaker cabinet government might serve to swing some fence-sitters into Kasavubu column.

Regarding composition of new government, Department certainly does not wish second guess you on best choice for PriMin, and would welcome any combination of moderates which could gain acceptance. At same time, we continue feel Ileo should chair Senate in view of Okito’s support for Lumumba, unless other anti-Lumumba Senate President would be possible. Also agree talent and accomplishments Commissioners should be utilized and feel best way might be include them in government as permanent under secretaries or in some cases as Ministers.

Department agrees that Mobutu would be key to agreement this plan, and that CNA support through him will be essential. We feel however he might best be approached on basis that installation cabinet would get him off spot of having to make repeated political decisions as de facto power despite his disinclination do so as self-professed non-political figure. Also could be pointed out that new cabinet would contain many of “his” commissioners and Mobutu himself could be Minister Defense or Chief Staff. While establishment new cabinet government could follow upon termination of Commissioner government December 31, we see substantial advantages in return to Cabinet government as soon as Kasavubu can complete necessary arrangements. Advantages are principally: (1) Further enhancement Kasavubu’s legal and constitutional position and personal prestige; (2) Strengthening of international support for Congo government by strengthening its legal basis, thus following up on gains made in UN acceptance of Kasavubu credentials; (3) Improvement in working relationship between UN and Congolese officials. We recognize however Mobutu may be unwilling step down until Commissioner period expires December 31 and Kasavubu will have to work out question of timing. Approach to Mobutu at early point would serve emphasize to him our view of need for early return to civilian government.

It should also be emphasized that resumption of cabinet government by no means precludes the calling of a Round-Table Conference which Kasavubu has announced he wishes to do, since we assume that such a conference would be called primarily discuss new constitutional arrangements. In any case might be considerable time before such a conference, if held, produced any results in terms of an agreed draft constitution and meanwhile the Congo would have made no further progress in setting up a generally acceptable government to function in interim.

Department feels that US can continue exert constructive influence in Congo particularly now with Kasavubu in view our support for him in New York. Embtels 824,⁵ 1017,⁶ 1040⁷ and 974⁸ demonstrate effectiveness your démarches GOC various subjects.

Department therefore suggests you make preliminary sounding this proposal with Kasavubu and if he appears receptive, discuss with him possibility he make further approach Mobutu. If, after complete presentation US views, it apparent Kasavubu or Mobutu will not accept basic idea, you should not press issue, but should leave matter on basis preliminary sounding to which we hope they will give full consideration.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Ferguson, Wallner, Cargo, and in draft by Penfield; and approved by Satterthwaite. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.
1. Document 263.
2. Document 251.
3. Document 249.
4. Document 262.
5. Document 229.
6. Dated October 20, telegram 1017 reported that, as a result of Timberlake’s démarches, the Congo was sending a delegation headed by Adoula to the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2060)
7. Dated October 25, telegram 1040 reported that Mobuto had decided to postpone his trip to the United Nations. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–2560) Telegram 1029 from Léopoldville, October 24, reported that Mobutu planned to go to New York in order to go over Dayal’s head and talk to Hammarskjöld; the Embassy urged him to reconsider. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–2460)
8. See footnote 3, Document 241.