Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

208. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld⁰

September 10, 1960, 1:30 p.m.

The Secretary telephoned Secretary General Hammarskjöld that we were with him 1000% and Hammarskjold said he was very grateful for this. The Secretary asked where we could be the most useful¹ and Hammarskjold said for the moment it was very difficult to say. Hammarskjold said the most curious thing of the day was the reported voluntary disarming of the Congolese. He said he had not yet had a full report on it but it was a fact. He also said there was a one-sided truce in Kasai. He said they were in the middle of the stream and found it very difficult to know how to play it. He felt they should go ahead with the discussions so they could get out in the clear. On this point he had had a talk with Slim and his view was that we should go ahead and that we could get a kind of stand-still agreement. Hammarskjold said if he could get in touch with the Secretary later he might have something to discuss with him. Hammarskjold said that he was going to mention in a restrained way the manner in which the other side was playing it. The Sec. said he didn’t want the impression to go out that there was any vacillation in the UN and Hammarskjold said that would be extremely dangerous. He said there was no weakening so far. The situation had never been tougher than yesterday. The Secretary referred to the Soviet statements that Hammarskjold had done the wrong thing on the radio stations and airports. Hammarskjold said that the whole issue might be put before a special session of the UNGA, and that he would not be afraid of that because he felt he would get 60 or 70 votes which would be enough.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by Mildred Asbjornson of the Secretary’s staff.
1. In a conversation with Wadsworth 10 minutes earlier, Herter had suggested having a resolution introduced censuring Hammarskjöld for the closure of the airports and radio stations by the U.N. force in the Congo (which the Yugoslav Representative at the Security Council meeting had criticized) in order to have a vote on the issue. When Wadsworth objected that he couldn’t visualize who would propose such a resolution, Herter suggested that the United States might do it. Both Wadsworth and Wilcox, who was also on the line, expressed doubts about this tactic, which they thought would be perceived as an effort to censure Hammarskjöld. (Ibid.)