161. Memorandum for the Files of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 27, 19601
SUBJECT
- Israeli Request for Hawk Missiles
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary Dillon
- Under Secretary Merchant
- Acting Assistant Secretary Hart
- Mr. Armin Meyer—Director, NE
The Secretary said he found it difficult to understand why we are refusing to allow the Israelis to buy Hawk missiles. He emphasized their purely defensive character. He had recently asked CNO Arlie Burke as to the importance of security considerations and the Admiral had said he did not consider the security factor a major problem. Noting that we had told the Israelis that Hawks were unavailable, he was concerned by what appeared to be dishonesty, since a more recent report indicates that our own production will be completed by the end of 1961 and presumably Hawks could then be produced for the Israelis. In sum, he said that unless better arguments could be presented than he had thus far heard he felt the Israelis should have the missiles.
Acting Assistant Secretary Hart noted that the Israelis were well ahead of the UAR in supersonic aircraft. He cited Ambassador Reinhardt’s July 17 letter2 which reports that Israel’s superiority in this respect is responsible for Nasser’s eagerness to obtain MIG 19’s from the Soviets to redress the balance. Mr. Hart also noted the effectiveness of the present Israeli air force, citing several aspects of its alertness as reported by our Air Attaché in Tel Aviv. He also pointed up the Defense Department’s concern that because so many Israelis have relatives behind the Iron Curtain the Defense Department has grave reservations about entrusting classified material to the Israelis.
After a general discussion of the question, the conclusion emerged that we would not provide the missiles to the Israelis. Under Secretary Dillon felt that introducing such spectacular weaponry in the area would have serious consequences in the form of an increased arms race, with the Russians backing Nasser. Under Secretary Merchant emphasized the political consequences, i.e., that Israel will have succeeded in efforts to link us closely to Israel’s security at the expense of our relations with the rest of the Arab world and to the benefit of the [Page 357] Soviets. The Secretary agreed that these were important considerations and also felt the argument concerning the high cost of missiles ($37 million to install and equip six batteries) was a persuasive argument.
The Secretary expressed concern as to what we might tell the Israelis as undoubtedly they realize that the argument of unavailability is only of temporary validity. Under Secretaries Dillon and Merchant felt it might be well to be frank and state our reasoning along the lines that it simply was not in our interest nor Israel’s to invite the consequences which would result from our introduction of missiles into the Near East area. Under Secretary Dillon did not believe our answer to the Israelis should leave the door open, but the Secretary felt other considerations might suggest a delay of several months before closing the door completely.