Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

379. National Security Council Report⁰

NSC 6015/1

Washington, October 5, 1960.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD TURKEY¹

General Considerations

1. Turkey is of great importance in the U. S. effort to build a position of strength in the Middle East. Throughout modern history the Turks have had an unwavering desire to be accepted by Western Europe (and more lately the United States) as a member of the Western community. Strategically located astride the Bosphorus–Dardanelles water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey has contiguous land frontiers with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria, and historically has been at odds with Russia. Since World War II, concern over Soviet pressure on the area has caused Turkey to maintain a staunch pro-Western, anti-Soviet foreign policy.

2. Turkey has maintained armed forces designed to cope with direct Soviet attack as a part of a concerted allied defense and has granted extensive use of military facilities to the United States. Air facilities in Turkey extend U. S. capabilities to mount effective air strikes in the event of hostilities with the USSR. Turkey is a link in the chain of U. S. military global communications. The United States has also been granted the use of naval facilities. Turkey freely granted the use of facilities at the Incirlik Air Base at Adana in 1958 for staging troops to Lebanon. In addition, the headquarters of the NATO Commander Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe and of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force are located at Izmir.

3. Turkey, since the end of World War I, has been experiencing an extensive social, economic and political revolution. Government leaders have sought to create a modern state, replacing Turkey’s traditional economic and social systems with Western practices. Single-party rule existed from 1924 to 1946, when Turkey inaugurated a multi-party system. In 1950, the administration changed hands peacefully following the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) over the incumbent Republican Peoples Party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu. The trend toward the development of democratic institutions and practices was halted in recent years, however, as Prime Minister Menderes increasingly suppressed opposition elements, especially the RPP. Growing indications that Menderes was preparing to use the army and the security forces to crush his opponents led a group of military officers, despite aloofness of the military from politics since the time of Ataturk, to carry out the May 1960 coup.

4. A major question confronting U. S. policy is whether the new regime will continue to cooperate closely with the United States and NATO. The provisional government of Turkey (PGOT) is likely to continue its fundamental cooperation with the United States but is likely to be more independent than the previous government in assessing its own interests. It announced that it would honor Turkey’s international obligations, specifically naming NATO and CENTO, and stated that it would relinquish power as soon as it could prepare the way for the election of a civilian government. The extent to which the military government lives up to these commitments will influence the U. S. policies required to obtain our objectives in Turkey. General Cemal Gursel has reaffirmed that substantive changes in foreign policy are not planned. In general, this seems to have been the case although there is evidence to indicate some differences in emphasis. There has so far, however, been no apparent change in Turkish tactics or purposes in the NATO councils nor, for that matter, in its participation in the UN and in CENTO.

5. Their centuries of experience under the Capitulations² have caused the Turkish people to be especially sensitive to any inference that foreigners in Turkey enjoy privileged status. In consequence, in connection with our efforts to cooperate with Turkey, special attention has been devoted by all U. S. agencies to the development and strengthening of programs designed to promote conduct and attitudes among U. S. personnel conducive to good will and mutual understanding. It may be noted that the present military leaders may well prove more independent and less readily amenable to U. S. influence on issues related to the American presence in Turkey. They may be less inclined toward informal agreements and they may look more closely at U. S. use of Turkish military facilities.

6. The coup was organized by a group of middle-level officers who enlisted the aid of a number of high-ranking officers. The Committee of National Union (CNU), as the officers who seized power called themselves, has amended the Constitution of 1924 to legalize itself and has assumed the powers of the former Grand National Assembly (GNA). The CNU is clearly the locus of power in the Provisional Government of Turkey. An initial cabinet, composed largely of able civilian technicians, was formed the day after the coup. Political activities have been banned for the present. Leaders of the former regime are in custody and are to be tried.

7. On its assumption of power, the CNU invited a group of prominent law professors to write a new constitution and a new electoral law. At the same time, the CNU, which has emphasized its non-partisanship in domestic politics, declared its intention to hold national elections as soon as possible and to restore civil government. It now appears that these elections will not be held before the spring of 1961 at the earliest, not only because of the time required to draft and promulgate the new constitution and electoral law but also because of the increasing emphasis the regime places on its role in reforming Turkey’s military, economic and political institutions. There are also growing indications that the CNU realizes that the trials of the former government leaders must be completed prior to the holding of national elections.

8. While the military leaders apparently are sincere in their desire to restore civilian government, and seem clearly to want to prevent one-party rule, which might well be the result of an early election in view of the strength of the RPP and the near-disintegration of the DP, the CNU itself apparently has not fully decided on its future political role. It is, however, likely to attempt to encourage the growth of one or more lesser parties, and may even start a new political movement. Should the members of the CNU seek to perpetuate their power indefinitely by non-democratic means, widespread political instability could result because of the strong desire of the Turkish middle classes for representative political institutions. It is in the over-all U. S. interest for Turkey to have a form of government responsive to the will of the people as soon as practicable.

9. Since the coup, the USSR has sought to exploit the situation. Immediately following the coup, the Soviet Union made renewed offers of extensive economic assistance to help the provisional government strengthen Turkey’s weak economic position. Offers of a high-level exchange of visits were also made. To date the PGOT has not accepted these offers. It may accept limited Soviet economic aid.

10. Turkey has retained a position of influence among the non-Arab states in the Middle East. It has taken a leading role in the activities of CENTO, and has repeatedly urged the United States to adhere to the organization. It has also urged the United States to give greater military and economic support to CENTO members, at the same time attempting to impress on Iran and Pakistan the limitations on U. S. assistance in view of our world-wide responsibilities. Turkey, in collaboration with the United States, has used its historical position of influence in Afghanistan to urge the Afghans to settle their quarrels with Pakistan and to exercise caution in their dealings with the USSR. Turkey’s relations with Israel have remained correct.

11. Turkey, along with Greece and Yugoslavia, is a member of the Balkan Pact. The military government has privately restated Turkey’s belief that the maintenance of the Pact, even in its present dormant status, is in the interests of the Free World and does not favor any action by either Greece or Turkey which might lead to Tito’s denunciation of the Pact. Turkey is also influenced by its desire to maintain a toehold in the Balkans.

12. Turkey’s general attitude toward North Africa and the Middle East is influenced by the Ottoman Empire’s historical position in these areas. While the Turks argue that Nasser is too closely aligned with the USSR and insist that any increase in Nasser’s influence in the Middle East would increase Soviet influence in the area, there can be little doubt that behind their attitude lies the fact that the Turks have historically believed that a strong Pan-Arab state would be an intolerable threat to their southern flank. Turkey shares the U. S. position of favoring an Iraq free of domination from any quarter and has, therefore, been active in attempting to strengthen Iraq’s will to resist Soviet and UAR threats and blandishments. The new Turkish regime apparently hopes to improve its relations somewhat with the Arab states, probably by attempting to keep more aloof from inter-Arab quarrels, but no basic change in Turkish policy toward the Arabs is likely. Turkey has been a cooperative and useful member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), although the provisional government, ostensibly in accordance with its hope of improving its relations with the Arab states, has hesitated at this time to send a Turkish representative on a PCC mission to the Arab capitals.

13. Following the Cyprus agreements, Greco-Turkish relations have steadily improved and the two countries are cooperating in such areas as their approach to the EEC (European Economic Community). Nonetheless, historical disputes and suspicions remain between the two countries and can be expected to be a restraining influence on the improvement of their relations. The new government, like its predecessor, continues to support the London–Zurich Agreements as the best resolution of the Cyprus issue. Under the treaty structure created by those agreements, Turkey is a guarantor of the independence of the island together with Greece and the United Kingdom and maintains a token contingent on Cyprus as does Greece.

14. Despite serious problems, Turkey has made considerable progress in developing its economy over the past decade. Between 1950 and 1958 industrial production doubled and agricultural output increased by at least 60 percent. Although Gross National Product (in terms of constant prices) expanded at a very high rate during 1950–1953, since then the rate has been significantly lower. This growth in output has made possible some increases in Turkey’s relatively low living standards, even though the population growth has been nearly 3 percent per year.

15. However, a combination of financial mismanagement, an attempt to carry out over-extended and badly organized investment, and the maintenance of a heavy military establishment kept the economy under strain which became particularly severe in the years 1955–1958. The development of a crisis in 1958 forced the adoption of a comprehensive economic stabilization program undertaken by the Turkish Government with aid provided by OEEC³ nations, the EPU (the European Payments Union), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the United States. Although the Menderes Government tended to regard stabilization primarily as a series of austerity measures which were often annoyingly incompatible with its own politically-motivated free-spending plans, its performance in implementing stabilization measures from 1958 until the end of 1959 was satisfactory in many respects. The principal shortcomings in the Menderes Government’s performance stemmed from its continuing failure to recognize the significance of, and pressing need for, coordinated investment planning as well as its relaxation of budgetary discipline early in 1960.

16. The Menderes Government’s economic policies contributed to a decline in the confidence of creditors in the wisdom of new loans to Turkey. During the later years of the Menderes regime, the IBRD’s concern over the Government’s economic and financial policies and over Turkey’s prospects led to sharp differences between IBRD and Turkish officials.

17. On the basis of its actions thus far, the provisional government is showing a much more promising approach to Turkey’s economic problems and is taking advantage of U. S. and Western European advisers. Plans have been announced for sharply curtailing government spending, and pressures for the higher agricultural subsidies, which Menderes had planned, have been resisted. Steps have been taken to establish a government planning mechanism and to formulate an integrated development program. The government has agreed to work out a new stabilization program with OEEC and IMF in the fall of 1960.

18. The change in government presents the United States and the OEEC countries with an opportunity to encourage and assist the Turkish Government to make organizational changes, particularly in the investment planning field, which can make an important contribution to the solution of Turkey’s economic problems. The emphasis which the present military regime is placing on fiscal responsibility and on the proper planning of investment decisions and resources allocation should, if implemented by appropriate measures and continued by successor regimes, create a new climate and help to restore the confidence of investors in the prospects for future investment in Turkey. This climate would be further improved if these policies are continued and parliamentary government is resumed. This emphasis may also help to enable Turkey to satisfy Free World financial institutions, particularly the IBRD, that it meets their normal criteria. Resumption of IBRD longterm development loans to Turkey should in turn further enhance the confidence of other investors, both public and private.

19. Improvement in the economic climate in Turkey will also strengthen Turkey’s case for association with the EEC.⁴ Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U. S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet Bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes.

20. Turkey continues to depend for its foreign exchange earnings largely on exports of agricultural commodities which are subject to variation owing to the weather and world market conditions, and there is a heavy structure of external debt to be financed. Moreover, the pace of Turkey’s progress is limited by such basic obstacles to growth as the shortage of technical and administrative skills, the general level of education and long-established customs involving inefficient production techniques. Nevertheless, the economy does have resources which can be developed, and as progress toward stabilization continues, the government will have increasing opportunities to direct its attention more fully to the balanced development of these resources. Over the coming years, maintenance of an acceptable pace in economic development which preserves reasonable price stability should enable Turkey to make available more of its own resources for economic development and military expenditures, to obtain and productively utilize capital from private and international lending sources, and to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance, although an economy capable of generating the real and financial resources needed for the maintenance of present military forces and a sound development program without external assistance is not likely to be attained in the foreseeable future.

21. In order to promote balanced continuing growth, current conditions require a vigorous re-emphasis on the maintenance of price stability. On this basis economic growth would expand the resources base for the national budget and provide additional funds for defense. The Turkish Government can and should endeavor to improve the efficiency of state enterprises and to increase its revenues through suitable taxation measures, particularly by taxing the agricultural sector. In the Turkish development program, further industrial expansion would be desirable since Turkish agriculture cannot continue indefinitely to absorb more people and alternative employment opportunities must be created. In addition, selective development of industry capable of supplying some military as well as civilian needs may be desirable.

22. The PGOT has removed the former repressive measures against Turkish trade unions and permitted Turk-Is (The Turkish Federation of Labor) to affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The PGOT is currently preparing legislation on labor-management relations which is understood to include collective bargaining, the right to strike, a “fair wage” policy, and a social security system. It thus seems possible that labor will have a more influential role in Turkish political, economic, and social affairs than in the past.

23. The United States furnishes the Turkish Armed Forces included in Military Assistance Program objectives with virtually all of the military supplies and equipment which are not domestically produced. Therefore, the GOT incurs no or very little foreign exchange expenditure for its defense establishment. The GOT has, however, during the past few years tended to rely increasingly on the counterpart of U. S. aid to provide local currency support for the defense budget while devoting more of its own budgetary resources to economic and other items of expenditure. However, the United States considers that the local currency costs of the defense program should be viewed primarily as the responsibility of the GOT.

24. The Turkish Government has committed Turkish ground and air forces to NATO wartime tactical command, and its naval forces under national command are assigned NATO missions in time of war. The NATO-recommended force goals⁵ and U. S. strategic force objectives⁶ are designed primarily to defend Turkey so as to maintain its integrity in concert with NATO and CENTO. Forces capable of achieving the above missions should also be capable of providing some support to Iran. Turkey also maintains additional Army and Navy forces which are not encompassed within U. S. or NATO-approved force goals, although it is possible that a reorganization of the armed forces which is contemplated by Turkey may substantially reduce these forces.

25. Turkish Armed Forces are deeply patriotic, well-disciplined and physically tough. Although the effectiveness of the Turkish defense establishment has been greatly improved as a result of the U. S. Military Aid Program, much remains to be accomplished before the Turkish Armed Forces will be capable of fully carrying out U. S. or NATO-approved missions. Further, they are now entering a transitional phase during which the emphasis will switch from less sophisticated to more advanced weapons. Since the Armed Forces lack educated and technically-trained manpower, this change will place considerable strain on Turkey’s manpower resources. Accordingly, the U. S. Military Assistance Program has, and will continue to, put a great deal of emphasis on technical training while restricting the deliveries of military equipment to a level and a rate which the Turks are judged capable of absorbing. Turkey’s limited absorptive capacity, and the necessity to relate deliveries to this capacity, will retard progress toward meeting NATO-approved force goals.

26. The Five-Year (FY 1962–1966) MAP for Turkey, which has been developed as a basis for planning, projects a shortfall (costed at approximately $140 million) against NATO-approved force goals as of the 1963 target date of two Lacrosse, one Redstone and two Corporal/Sergeant battalions and eight destroyer/escort vessels. Measured against U. S. strategic force objectives, the shortfall during the 1962–1966 period (costed at approximately $225 million) will consist of two Lacrosse, two Sergeant, four Little John (or substitute) and one Redstone battalion; four patrol vessels, 14 minesweepers, four torpedo boats, two tactical fighter squadrons and a SAM substitute for a BOMARC squadron. These shortfalls represent those portions of the prescribed force goals which cannot be effectively supported by the Turkish Armed Forces due to manpower, technical and financial limitations.

27. There are, however, certain measures which, if taken by the GOT, would contribute to an amelioration of the manpower problem. One such course, which requires legislative enactment, would terminate the long-standing regulation precluding the induction of high school graduates into the Armed Forces at lower than commissioned officer rank. Another measure would be to lengthen the period of service for conscripts by an amount of time at least sufficient to compensate for the amount of time spent in literacy training. A third would involve the reduction or the elimination of units which are not included in U. S. or NATO-approved goals, thereby making personnel available for higher priority needs. However, real relief from the shortage of trained manpower will come only gradually and as a result of fundamental improvements in Turkey’s educational system. The military regime is restudying the utilization of manpower by the Armed Forces. Its first decision affected the officer corps. The government recently has retired a large proportion of general and field grade officers of the Armed Forces prior to their normal date of retirement. The PGOT states, and the United States also considers, that such action will result in an increase in the operational capability of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Objectives

28. Continuance of Turkey’s independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

29. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and CENTO, including continued access to military facilities required by the United States and its allies.

30. Continued maintenance of Turkish Armed Forces capable of contributing to the maintenance of Turkey’s territorial integrity in support of U. S., NATO and CENTO agreements and plans, and of maintaining internal security against subversion by Communist or other elements hostile to U. S. interests.

31. Achievement of a stable, democratic government representing the will of the people.

32. Vigorous economic growth within the framework of reasonable price stability which will permit the achievement of the above objectives for Turkey and will reduce, and eventually eliminate, Turkey’s need for external economic assistance.

Major Policy Guidance

General

33. Continue to encourage Turkish recognition of the fact that the United States regards the security of Turkey as an important part of the security of the Atlantic Community and intends to continue the development of an increasingly effective defense posture with Turkey within the available resources of the two countries.

34. Administer U. S. assistance and support in developing the long-term economic and military strength of Turkey so as to help Turkey assure its independence and counteract Communist attempts at penetration and subversion.

35. Urge the Turks to grant to the United States and its allies continued access to Turkish military and other facilities important to the Free World.

36. Encourage the holding of free elections and continuance in Turkey of a democratic form of government, impressing upon the Turks, wherever appropriate, the advantages of individual freedoms and democratic institutions and practices and the fact that these are desirable internally as well as in the interest of Turkey’s international influence and prestige.

37. Avoid over-identification with any political faction and involvement in Turkey’s internal politics, and so conduct our relations that we are able to do business not only with the administration in power but also with any successor government.

38. Encourage continued control over Communist elements in Turkey.

39. Continue to regard community relations as a particularly delicate aspect of our activities in Turkey.

40. Encourage the Turkish Government to improve Turkey’s educational system, with particular attention to the educational program of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Military

41. Continue military assistance consonant with Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program, recognizing that this limitation may not permit meeting NATO-approved goals.

42. In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision in those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey’s ability to absorb and the over-all ability of the NATO Alliance to support the military program.

43. Continue as necessary to press the Turkish Government to adopt those legislative and administrative changes needed to improve the efficiency and composition of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Economic

44. Promote orderly economic development in Turkey, aimed at building a stable economic base on which Turkey can pursue its further growth, maintain strong military forces, and reduce its dependence on grant foreign assistance.

a. Encourage Turkey to further its own economic development by:

(1) More effectively stabilizing its economy through pursuit of firm budgetary, monetary and credit policies.

(2) Improving the efficiency of state enterprises.

(3) Increasing revenues through appropriate tax measures, particularly taxation of agriculture.

(4) Developing a rational and coordinated investment program to utilize more effectively the resources available for development.

(5) Creating an improved political and economic climate to restore the confidence in Turkey’s economic prospects of foreign private investors, governments, and Free World financial institutions, and particularly the IBRD.

(6) Reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements.

b. Continue U. S. technical assistance programs, with particular emphasis on assisting Turkey to strengthen its investment planning mechanism, and to develop an over-all manpower program to meet its needs.

c. Encourage efforts by Free World financial institutions to bring about desirable economic and financial reforms, and support credits to Turkey by these institutions where consistent with relevant U. S. policies covering loans by these institutions.

d. Encourage the industrial countries of Western Europe to take maximum responsibility for promoting Turkey’s economic stabilization and development, urging these nations to provide a large share of financial assistance, and consulting and cooperating closely with them as appropriate.

e. Be prepared to provide U. S. loans consistent with relevant loan policies.

f. Encourage and support the GOT’s efforts to strengthen Turkey’s economic ties with the Free World, including association with the EEC in an arrangement which would be compatible with U. S. national trade policy and interests.

45. In the implementation of U. S. aid programs: (a) encourage the expansion of Turkey’s industrial establishment with suitable emphasis on those industries capable of supplying both the military and civilian sectors of the economy; (b) encourage the GOT to facilitate the development of the private sector of industry; and (c) encourage and support Turkish efforts to increase agricultural output.

46. Be prepared to negotiate surplus agricultural commodity sales under P. L. 480 as an aid in accomplishing U. S. objectives in Turkey.

47. Continue to provide defense support to sustain political stability, to promote economic development and to help maintain military forces to meet the objectives in paragraph 30. While continuing when necessary to utilize a portion of the Turkish currency generated by this assistance to support the Turkish defense budget, continue to regard the local currency costs of the Turkish defense program as primarily the responsibility of the GOT.

48. While bearing in mind Turkey’s need to maintain its investment outlays at a satisfactory level, encourage the GOT to accept an increase in the proportionate share of its contributions to the Turkish defense program.

49. Urge Turkey to continue to deny or limit exports of strategic commodities to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U. S. economic defense policy, and discourage Turkey from (a) accepting Sino-Soviet Bloc aid in certain particularly sensitive fields of a kind or on terms which would be damaging to their security, and (b) engaging in trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc at levels sufficient to create undue economic dependence on the Bloc, or on terms or under conditions seriously prejudicial to U. S. interest.

50. Encourage as appropriate mutual exchanges of American and Turkish government and trade union officials and others in the labor field. Continue to provide technical assistance and advice in the labor field in ICA programs, urging the GOT as appropriate to initiate suitable labor legislation, bearing in mind that U.S. or Western European legislation is not necessarily appropriate to the Turkish situation. Encourage the participation of Turkish trade unions in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the various international trade secretariats (ITS’s), not only for the technical aid this will bring to them, but also to provide an additional firm friend of U. S. labor in those organizations.

Turkish Relations with the Free World

51. Continue to demonstrate an awareness of Turkey’s contribution to Free World defense, regarding the Turks as full sovereign partners in NATO and the UN, while recognizing that Turkey forms a connecting link between the NATO defense effort and CENTO and that it occupies a special position of influence with certain Middle East countries which it willingly uses to advance Western interests.

52. Encourage Turkey to assist in the maintenance of a pro-Western outlook on Cyprus as a means of preserving present Free World interests on the island by such actions as are set forth in U. S. Policy Toward Cyprus (NSC 6003).⁷

53. Encourage the continuance of Turkey’s good relations with Greece, Israel and Iran, and improvement of relations with the Arab states, particularly those Arab states with which Turkey has traditional ties and a position of historical influence and with which it can serve as interpreter for the West.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6015. Secret. A title page, a 1962 memorandum of recission, a covering memorandum, and a financial appendix are not printed.
1. The current situation in Turkey is dealt with in considerable detail in this paper due to the recent political upheaval there. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. These extraterritorial privileges exempted foreigners from taxes and enabled them to trade freely, practice their religion, and live by their national laws without regard to the central Ottoman authority.
3. Organization for European Cooperation. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Turkey applied for associate membership in the Common Market on October 31, 1959.
5. Since 1957 the NATO-approved force levels for Turkey have been reduced by 4 Divisions and 17 Ships. Negotiations in connection with the approval of MC–70 resulted in this reduction. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Determined by the JCS and approved by the Secretary of Defense. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Printed in Part 1, Document 347.