Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

346. Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the National Security Council,⁰

Washington, February 4, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus (Supplement to NSC 5718; NSC Action No. 1763; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 9 and November 6, 1959; NIE 32.5–59; NSC 5915; Memo for All Holders of NSC 5915, dated January 11, 1960)¹

Mr. Dulles presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)² In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray asked whether Secretary Herter would care to comment on recent developments with respect to Cyprus.

Secretary Herter said he had within the last ten days had two letters from Selwyn Lloyd³ giving details on the British negotiations with Archbishop Makarios on the acreage the UK was to be allowed to retain for its bases and other installations on Cyprus. Apparently the UK had already made considerable concessions regarding sovereignty in the base areas, but Makarios was still not satisfied. The Turks and the Greeks had supported the UK in the London talks. Makarios had now gone back to Cyprus as a result of the breakdown of the London negotiations. The UK was insisting that Makarios must provide an answer to the problem of the base areas by February 7 if the independence of Cyprus is to be achieved on the scheduled date (March 19), because the British Parliament will require time to pass the necessary legislation. Secretary Herter said he had been disturbed to learn recently that the Greeks and Turks are now about to support Makarios in insisting on a further reduction in the base areas sought by the UK. He estimated that the February 7 deadline set by the UK would pass without an agreement. The UK had not asked the US for any assistance on this problem; indeed, we could not properly intervene in the matter except to say we hoped a settlement could be achieved. The President said a settlement might be reached if the Turks and the Greeks would continue to support the UK. Secretary Herter said Makarios stubbornly refused to understand the needs of the UK for large base areas. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The President asked how much acreage was in dispute. Secretary Herter said the UK wanted 120 square miles for its base areas, while Makarios offered 36 square miles. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of NSC 5915. He read Paragraphs 41 and 42 and asked Secretary Herter to comment on the split in Paragraph 42, from which the Department of State wished to delete a sentence providing that it should be pointed out to Greece and Turkey that transference of Greek and Turkish MAP equipment to the Cypriot armed forces would not be the basis for additional requirements for military equipment for the Greek and Turkish armed forces. Secretary Herter said the Department of State wished to leave the question of military assistance to Cyprus open, especially in Paragraph 43.⁴ He believed a caveat against giving military assistance to Cyprus would not be desirable; he was interested in keeping the situation flexible. Mr. Gray pointed out that the split in Paragraph 42 which he had just alluded to was different from the issue in Paragraph 43. Secretary Herter said Paragraph 42 was really concerned with how much military assistance overall we wished to provide to Greece and Turkey. The President said he was somewhat frightened at the idea of having two of our allies give arms to Cyprus when there was a possibility that those arms might be used against a third ally. He thought it would be undesirable to arm any forces in Cyprus except the gendarmerie. Mr. Scribner believed that Paragraph 42 depended on Paragraph 43. If it is the policy in Paragraph 43 not to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus, then assistance should not be provided indirectly through a provision in Paragraph 43 that Greece and Turkey can turn over MAP equipment to Cyprus. Mr. Gray said it seemed to him the essential issue was whether, if military assistance to Cyprus became essential to the achievement of US objectives, the question of giving such direct US assistance should be brought back to the Council for a Presidential decision or whether the responsible departments should be authorized to decide whether to give the aid. The President wondered whether we were not trying to solve a problem, the elements of which had not yet been clarified. We might be a bit premature in trying to establish a fixed policy at this time. Secretary Herter said he was willing to go on record in recognizing the undesirability of direct US military assistance to Cyprus, but he did not want to have the policy completely tie the hands of this government. The President felt that the question of whether Cyprus should be given direct US military assistance in the future should be referred back to the Council for a decision. He noted that for the present Britain retains sovereignty over Cyprus and added that when Cyprus had sought independence we had adopted a position of neutrality and had not been willing to take responsibility. He felt that the assumption on which the paper had been written, namely, that Cyprus would become independent, had not yet been realized. He would be inclined to give no direct US military assistance to Cyprus. Mr. Scribner said he would be pleased to have the question of whether to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus come back to the Council for decision provided the actions of this government had not in the meantime foreclosed the possibility of deciding against such assistance.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5915, as amended by the enclosure to the reference memorandum of January 11, 1960; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 5, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5915, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 17, paragraph 42: Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto, and substitute therefor the following:

“If Greece or Turkey use such transfers as the basis for requesting the U.S. to provide additional military equipment, any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.”

(2) Page 17, paragraph 43: Delete the alternatives and substitute the following:

“43. Do not provide direct U.S. military assistance to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives, consider in the National Security Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances then existing.”

Note: NSC 5915, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6003 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on February 4.
1. The January 11 memorandum transmitted to the NSC revised pages of NSC 5915. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Regarding the other documents, see footnote 1, Document 338.
2. Not printed.
3. Lloyd’s January 19 letter is printed as Document 344. In his letter of January 29, Lloyd repeated for Herter the text of a telegram to Averoff in which Lloyd reviewed the British position on bases and appealed for Greek help in breaking the impasse with Makarios. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
4. See Document 338.
5. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2184. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)