Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, October 4, 1958, 1 p.m.

914. Embtel 907.¹

1. Had lengthy conversation with King at Tatoi last night in which first half was devoted to review of Cyprus negotiations in recent weeks. Again I went over advantages for Greece in modified Macmillan plan and reasons why GOG should accept negotiations on basis of Spaak paper. I informed him of contents of Herter letter² and progress that had been made on defining powers of Turk representative. I argued once more that GOG should not overlook advantages of UK plan for Greece, expressing personal opinion that once communal assemblies and single assembly were established it would be impossible for UK to reverse these steps toward self-government and this would automatically mean end of any physical partition. Furthermore, conference with NATO observers would guarantee fair treatment and Spaak suggestions could be discussed. I said gap had been so narrowed for interim solution that we should all make supreme effort now to close it.

2. King, obviously influenced by our recent messages,³ replied he had returned to find distressing political situation in Greece as result of UK insistence on implementing its plan while discussions were in prog-ress. He thought internal situation in Greece was deteriorating daily and he did not know what outcome would be. Karamanlis wanted to resign, but this was no answer as new elections in the circumstances could be disastrous and must be avoided. Other alternative would be withdrawal from NATO which might assuage temporarily Greek feeling of humiliation by its allies, but this was no answer to problem. We knew his devotion to NATO and his strong feelings that Greece must remain member of alliance. his influence would certainly be exerted against any such decision. But he was constitutional monarch who had no desire to see dictatorship return to Greece. Therefore after reflection and consultation, he would ask me to send strong plea to highest US authorities to throw our great weight and influence behind what Averoff had proposed, i.e., (A) conference on basis of Spaak suggestions, or (or) agreement on plebiscite proposal to be followed by Greek acceptance of modified Macmillan plan. I said I was not hopeful but would convey his message.

3. Late last night, Foreign Minister convoked me to read Prime Minister’s reply to Herter letter. Karamanlis thanked Acting Secretary for letter, for our efforts and for promise of support for single chamber. Letter had received most careful study including last sentence. GOG was facing incredibly difficult situation but was doing its best to preserve its traditional policies. Taking into account internal dangers resulting from deep emotions generated in Greek people, Prime Minister suggested that if US wants to help find solution and as British have already appointed Turk representative, best way would be support new proposal for plebiscite. By this means, UK could maintain its plan, Turk could retain its representative and scene set for definitive solution.

4. Prime Minister pointed out in this case it goes without saying UK would retain bases and guarantees worked out for Turkish minority on island. Prime Minister asked I emphasize his belief that if only interim settlement is arranged, NATO would face renewed agitation and repetition of unhappy events now going on. GOG had been in constant contact with Makarios and his latest proclamation was written in strong terms. But now that both GOG and Makarios had abandoned Enosis, surely it was reasonable to propose plebiscite in which both Enosis and partition would be excluded. Prime Minister was personally of opinion if GOG went to conference and it failed, public opinion here would later demand larger concessions.

5. Averoff requested in addition to Prime Minister’s remarks that I convey personal message from him. He does not yet know what policy GOG will adopt or whether it will try once more in NATO. Because of his great difficulties, Averoff will remain loyal to Karamanlis. But if Karamanlis fails, Averoff believes Greece will be lost to West within six months. If Karamanlis goes, he does not know what will happen.

6. Deptel 1101⁴ just received. In view of King’s plea and Prime Minister’s reply set forth herein and in face of King’s always moderate views on Cyprus, I shall defer action until this message has been considered.⁵

Riddleberger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–458. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris for USRO.
1. See footnote 3, Document 274.
2. See Document 274.
3. Reference is to Eisenhower’s September 30 message to King PAUL (Document 270) and Herter’s October 2 message to Karamanlis.
4. Document 275.
5. Telegram 1114 to Athens, October 4, instructed Riddleberger to “take action as instructed Deptel 1101.” (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–458) In telegram 920 from Athens, October 5, Riddleberger reported on a “stormy” meeting with Karamanlis in which Karamanlis repeated his demand for a plebiscite in Cyprus and reiterated his threat to withdraw from NATO. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–558)