Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

116. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC

Geneva, May 24, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Palais des Nations, Geneva, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Secretary of State
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Stoessel
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • M. de Beaumarchais

SUBJECT

• Bilateral French-U.S. problems: Tactics at Geneva Conference

[Here follows discussion of the Air Transport Agreement.]

DeGaulle Aid Plan. The Secretary noted that M. Pinay had recently talked with Mr. Dillon and Mr. Anderson in Washington concerning the deGaulle suggestion for a multi-lateral aid program for underdeveloped countries.¹ As M. Pinay had been informed, we were hopeful of obtaining more detailed information concerning the French planning for such a program. Also, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Anderson had advised M. Pinay of our thinking concerning the International Development Agency. The Department is preparing a paper on this subject for the information of the French Government. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry, Couve said that he would prefer that such a paper be given to the Foreign Office in Paris by our Embassy. The French Delegation in Geneva would wish to keep current on all developments in this regard, but, especially since other ministries in addition to the Foreign Office are interested in the aid program, Couve thought this procedure was the most appropriate.

Couve observed that he believed deGaulle would not wish to have a technical or detailed discussion of the aid plan at a possible summit meeting. He would only wish to raise it on a general basis. The Secretary stressed the importance of knowing on what basis deGaulle might raise the matter.

Couve added that he thought deGaulle’s thinking on this problem is motivated by the fact that aid has been an instrument of the cold war. If the cold war is to be stopped, action must be taken in the field of aid, which the Soviets are using in their efforts to penetrate underdeveloped countries. Couve recalled that we have already had bitter experiences on this score in the Middle East, in Asia, and that now difficulties are beginning in Guinea.

Arms Shipments. The Secretary observed that Couve’s remarks raised another difficult question which concerned arms shipments. He recalled that the Soviets had suggested a year ago the possibility of an arms embargo for countries of the Middle East. This was not taken up at the time, and now we have the problem of competitive shipments of arms to African states. These countries do not need all of the arms they are receiving and the situation promises to become nightmarish.

Couve said he had often reflected on this matter; perhaps we had made a mistake in not arranging to embargo arms to the Middle East. If this had been done last year, perhaps the situation in Iraq would not have developed as it did. Mr. Merchant remarked that one of our problems at the time the Soviets raised the embargo proposal was that it was thought to include Turkey and Pakistan. Couve said that, of course, these countries should not have been affected by an embargo. An arrangement would have been necessary to exclude countries belonging to alliances from the embargo.

Couve went on to say that it might be well if an agreement could be reached to embargo arms shipments to Black Africa. He specified, however, that an embargo would not affect South Africa, nor could it cover areas, such as Kenya, Senegal, or the Belgian Congo, which have special relationships to their mother countries. It may be a good idea, however, to stop arms shipments to countries such as Guinea and the Sudan.

Nuclear Cooperation. The Secretary said that he wished to clear up any misapprehensions the French may have to the effect that the explosion of one atomic bomb would be all that is needed to permit intimate cooperation with France in the weapons field. The Secretary hoped that relations with France would develop satisfactorily and that it might become possible in due course to envisage the amendment of the present U.S. law, but he stressed that this was a difficult problem.

Couve assured the Secretary that the French were under no misapprehension concerning the restrictions of the U.S. law. He said that the French have studied the law carefully and understand the situation.

Nine Squadrons. In answer to the Secretary’s inquiry, Couve said that he had nothing new on this problem. However, he commented that the problems of atomic storage and cooperation in the nuclear field are linked to the development of tripartite talks covering global strategy, military planning and decision concerning the use of atomic weapons. Couve stressed that cooperation in the military field is basic. He thought that, if a summit meeting is held, direct contact between deGaulle and President Eisenhower on this subject would be very useful.

Use of Atomic Weapons in War; Possibilities of Disarmament. Couve continued the discussion of the problem of atomic weapons by saying that it is important to know how, if war is declared, a decision will be taken regarding the use of nuclear weapons. He thought the decision might have to be taken in a matter of minutes. The Secretary agreed that the time element was crucial, and added that, since we have developed small, tactical atomic weapons, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw the line with regard to separating nuclear weapons from conventional arms.

After a general discussion of the dangers of general nuclear war, the Secretary commented that, whereas the U.K. feels that it would bear the major brunt of a Soviet atomic attack, we believe that the Soviets will not engage in nuclear war unless they are convinced that they can put U.S. retaliatory power out of commission. This is very hard for them to do, since they would have to hit our overseas bases effectively as well as take care of missile-carrying ships at sea and the planes of SAC, which are constantly becoming more effective due to improvement in refueling techniques.

The Secretary said that, looking somewhat to the future, when intercontinental missiles are operational and hardened pads have been developed, the prospects are discouraging. This is why we earnestly hope that it will be feasible to resume disarmament talks. Couve agreed, saying that a radical solution must be found which will involve cessation of production of nuclear arms and the destruction of those already in existence.

The Secretary said he was in accord with this, although he noted the difficulties involved in detecting the existence of atomic warheads which have already been produced. Also, he said that, in the present situation, the only way in which the West can be protected from the huge masses of the Soviet and Chinese armies is to have atomic weapons. The threat of the solid mass of 175 Soviet divisions makes it essential that our forces, numerically inferior, have atomic arms.

Couve said he thought that, looking into the future, only the Soviet Union could hope to contain China. However, if it ever becomes possible to suppress atomic arms, then it would be necessary for the Western countries to make a greater effort in the conventional field. He thought that the European countries could certainly do so, and that the U.S. would be able to do likewise.

The Secretary said that Khrushchev may wish to discuss the problems involved in nuclear armament at a summit conference. Couve said he thought this might well be true, and that he could have good reason to do so.

Communications Cable. The Secretary told Couve that we still hope France will not deliver the communications cable to the USSR, and he mentioned that the Embassy had sent a note to the Foreign Office last week reviewing our position on this subject.² Couve said he had no new information on the problem, but that he would look into it. He recalled that the French had previously informed us that they were prepared to stop any further shipments of this cable after the initial shipment of 400 kilometers had been made. However, Couve said he understood the problem which would be caused by setting such a precedent.

IRBM’s in Germany. The Secretary referred to Gromyko’s evident preoccupation with the stationing of nuclear weapons and IRBM missiles in West Germany.³ He thought it might be possible to make use of the question of the IRBM’s at some stage in the negotiations as a trading point. The Secretary suggested that, if Couve talks with Gromyko, he might let it be known that he would be prepared to “act as an intermediary” in attempting to persuade the U.S. to refrain from stationing IRBM’s in West Germany. The Secretary said that he had discussed this problem with Secretary McElroy, who felt that we could afford to take such a step. Mr. Merchant noted that, in the past, it has been General Norstad’s judgment that there was not a military requirement for the stationing of IRBM’s in West Germany.

Couve said that this might appear to be more of a psychological concession than anything else, but he thought it might be important for the Soviets. He noted that we have proposed to extend the prohibition on ABC weapons in the Paris Accords⁴ to all of Germany, but that we have not said anything about prohibiting the retention by Germany of such weapons if acquired elsewhere. Couve thought that our refraining from stationing IRBM’s in West Germany might foreshadow a situation in which a future united Germany would not be permitted to possess strategic weapons, as opposed to tactical weapons, which Germany could have. This would be very important some ten or twenty years from now when U.S. troops are no longer on the continent and manned bombers will no longer be utilized. The Secretary commented that it was extremely difficult to draw a line between strategic and tactical weapons. He said he continued to hope, however, that within ten years some progress will have been made in general disarmament.

[Here follows discussion of tactics at the Geneva Meeting.]

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stoessel and approved by Herter on May 29. This meeting was held at the Villa Greta. Separate memoranda covering each subject discussed, numbered US/MC/60–65, were also prepared. Copies of the memoranda covering the first item, the Air Transport Agreement (US/MC/62), and the last item, the tactics at the Geneva Meeting (US/MC/63), are ibid. A summary of this conversation was sent to the Department of State in Secto 113 from Geneva, May 24. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2459)
1. See Document 115.
2. Text of the U.S. note delivered to the French Foreign Ministry on May 15 expressing opposition of the U.S. Government to the French Government’s decision to authorize the export of 450 kilometers of a communications cable to the Soviet Union was transmitted in telegram 4188 from Paris, May 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 461.509/5–1459)
3. An agreement for cooperation on uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes was signed at Bonn May 5, 1959, and entered into force July 27, 1959; for text, see 10 UST 1322.
4. Regarding the Paris Accords, or the Final Act of the Paris Nine- and Four-Power Conference, October 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, p. 1435.