Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

625. Notes on the Meeting of the Working Group on Cuba, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1960¹

Washington, December 22, 1960

[Here follows discussion of the refugee problem in Miami, some examples of anti-Castro propaganda, the lowered standard of living in Cuba, the Venezuelan attitude toward the Cuban situation, and the possible funding by the Rockefeller Foundation of a study on Cuba.]

6. Mr. Braddock’s Comments: Our Chargé, Dan Braddock, home on consultation from the Embassy in Habana spoke briefly. He termed the Castro regime entirely hopeless as far as any chance of our ever establishing a constructive relationship with it. He opined that time was running against us—even the opposition in Cuba has no chance for a successful move against the GOC. Its task in this regard will become increasingly difficult in the coming months. Mr. Braddock hoped that the Kennedy Administration would not feel it necessary to make a public showing of “an open mind” for very long, since in the case of Cuba this would immediately be turned undesirably and un-productively lost. He expressed the hope that the new administration could accept a very strong line on Cuba from the outset, could bring along a significant number of Latin American states and that the opposition to Castro would be able to pull itself together for necessary action. He commented that the GOC is building up its military might and totalitarian control very rapidly and that opposition leaders are being apprehended all the time. A move against the regime would have better chances of success within the next six months than at any time thereafter.

7. Questions and Answers: Taking advantage of Mr. Braddock’s presence, various members of the group put questions to him. His answers are reflected below.

a. Mr. Braddock confirmed that Cubans easily pick up the broadcasts from the Swan Island radio but that they are sometimes disappointed by its departures from the facts which they themselves know to be true. Greater respect for the facts would lend it greater weight.

b. Mr. Braddock estimated that there are something over three thousand U.S. citizens still in Cuba. Most of these are now becoming alarmed. Many of them have a protective coloration and are relatively imbedded in the local landscape. True state–side Americans living in Habana other than Embassy staff members probably total 100 or less.

c. There is a continuous influx of persons from the Iron Curtain countries. They arrive steadily by KLM airline. Many are already in Cuba, although no precise figures exist. Families have come with them in many cases.

d. Up to a 1000 or so people are now fighting in the Escambray mountains. They are divided into two or three different groups. The Cuban government seems very serious about routing them out and unfortunately it probably has the capacity to do so.

e. The Cuban-American Cultural Center in Habana is still operating. Conceivably it might survive. 1200 persons are studying English there.

f. Fidel Castro’s popularity is now sinking toward an irreducible minimum. Twenty to thirty percent of the population is probably with him today. This segment, however, includes young and combative types and makes a very effective minority.

g. Latin American diplomatic representatives in Cuba seem to agree to the necessity for cleaning up and getting rid of the present GOC. European representatives seem less impressed with this necessity. The West German Ambassador, or Chargé, even went so far recently when speaking with Acting Foreign Minister Olivares as to term Germany “neutral” in the present difficult situation between the U.S. and Cuba.

[Here follows a list of action assignments.]

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Working Group Notes. Confidential. Drafted by Devine on January 9, 1961. Participants at the meeting were identified only as members of the “10: 30 Working Group.”