Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

623. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1398

Havana, December 16, 1960.

REF

• Embdespatch 1268, December 5, 1960²

SUBJECT

• Examination of Advantages of Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba

The Country Team in the despatch under reference concluded that certain additional measures, including a rupture of diplomatic relations, should be undertaken by the United States to eliminate the Castro threat, with the active participation of our allies, if it can be obtained, and by ourselves preferably with their consent, if they cannot be persuaded to participate actively. It recommended that diplomatic relations should be severed at the moment most advantageous for our purposes, preferably as the result of inter-American action, and in any event not without prior consultation and coordination with friendly Latin American countries that might be disposed to take similar action.

This despatch examines more closely the policy advantages to the United States of a rupture of relations with Castro.

Alleged Advantages of Present U.S. Policy

It has been U.S. Government policy hitherto to maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Fidel Castro as long as possible and to leave any initiative for diplomatic rupture to the Cuban Government. This policy has been adhered to despite the progressive worsening of U.S. -Cuban relations, the termination of any profitable contact between the two governments and the conduct of such relations as do exist in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, enmity and recriminations inconsistent with the traditional concept and normal practice of diplomatic relations.

As understood by the Embassy this policy has been deemed to be in the U. S. interest because of the value of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Habana (1) for intelligence purposes, (2) for the protection of U.S. citizens and their property interests, (3) as a moral support for Cubans in opposition to the Cuban Government, (4) for communication with the Cuban people, (5) as a witness and moderating influence upon the excesses of the Cuban Government, and (6) as an immediate contact with a new government following overthrow of Castro. The Embassy believes that it is time to reexamine these assumptions.

(1) The Embassy is valuable for intelligence purposes, political, economic and military, [1 line not declassified]. The U.S. Government would not receive nearly as much intelligence or as rapidly if diplomatic relations were broken and it had to rely on friendly governments, anti-Castro Cuban sources and covert American sources.

Overt collection of intelligence, however, is becoming increasingly difficult. Political reporting officers are restricted largely to the press and published materials supplemented by friendly diplomatic sources and limited opposition contacts. Economic officers are similarly restricted as major industry and commerce, and finance have been taken over by the Government. In the military field flight restrictions have been imposed on the Air Attaché aircraft and access is prohibited to sensitive military areas and establishments. Nonetheless substantial on-the-spot intelligence is continuously being accumulated and transmitted.

(2) The protection of U.S. citizens and their property interests have become a factor of diminishing importance. Most U.S. citizens who are not rooted in Cuba have left. Many of those who still remain intend to do so only so long as the Embassy remains. Nearly all U. S. property interests in Cuba have been confiscated, and the Embassy in Cuba can render little further real assistance to U.S. citizens except such as would be involved in an evacuation.

(3) The Castro Government’s anti-American propaganda, police-state methods, and control of mass media have very greatly reduced the Embassy’s communication with the Cuban people. Pro-Castro Cubans avoid the Embassy and its officials, and except for visa applicants, anti-Castro Cubans are circumspect in relations with Embassy officers.

The USIS is excluded from Cuban press, radio and television, has almost ceased film distribution and has substantially reduced distribution of publications. It does, however, distribute daily news bulletins, and binational centers in Santa Clara and Santiago are still open. The Visa Section still constitutes an important outlet for USIS materials.

(4) The Embassy does constitute a symbol of U.S. resistance to Castro and his communist sponsors, and of U.S. sympathy for Cuba and Cubans, as distinguished from their Government. As such it provides moral support for those anti-Castro Cubans who dare to remain in Cuba and openly or passively resist. The majority of anti-Castro Cubans seem to be preoccupied, however, with leaving Cuba as soon as possible or at least with getting into a position to leave at any moment.

(5) The Embassy’s effectiveness as a witness and moderating influence has not been conspicuous, having in mind the excesses perpetrated by the Castro Government against human and property rights of both Cubans and Americans.

(6) It is becoming increasingly evident that the Castro Government will not be overthrown suddenly or easily by an internal uprising. A combination of external and internal pressures will be required, inconsistent with the continued maintenance of relations and to which a rupture of relations can contribute.

Of the cited advantages of maintaining diplomatic relations, only one, namely intelligence, appears to be a substantial advantage at present. On the other hand, there are real advantages in a rupture of relations.

Advantages of Rupture of Relations

Great numbers of anti-Castro Cubans have fled from Cuba. Most are in the United States. It would be very difficult if not impossible to prevent them from making preparations in the United States to overthrow the Castro Government. It is alleged that they have training camps in Florida with U.S. connivance. It is also alleged that they are receiving financial assistance and arms from U.S. Government agencies. Whether or not these allegations are true, it is suggested that a situation has arisen which may prove embarrasing to the United States as long as diplomatic relations are maintained with the Castro Government.

It would seem that a rupture in diplomatic relations would assure the U. S. Government more scope and flexibility in dealing with the situation in which Cuba is fast becoming a Popular Socialist Republic with a violent anti-American bias in the Sino-Soviet system of states. An embargo on certain U.S. exports to Cuba has been imposed. It may be deemed advisable to impose an economic quarantine similar to that applied with respect to Communist China. To halt continued Soviet economic and military aid and to prevent an influx of communist “volunteers” intensive economic warfare including paramilitary measures might have to be considered. In the propaganda field, it would seem desirable to saturate Cuba from long-wave radio transmitters, operating from surrounding land and sea, with factual statements to counteract the massive propaganda of the Castro Government.

Such further actions of this nature as may be required in U.S. interests are hardly consistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations. In the absence of a rupture of relations their objective consideration is hampered and their effective application would be impaired.

Rupture is Envisaged under Inter-American Security Procedures

So far as consistent with the protection of vital U.S. interests, U.S. actions with respect to Cuba should be in accordance with inter-American resolutions with which all or at least the great majority of the other American states should be associated. Cuba under Castro has become a “fact or situation” envisaged by Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. Under Article 8 of the Treaty rupture of diplomatic relations is the first measure, following recall of chiefs of mission, upon which the Organ of Consultation may agree for dealing with such a situation. Breaking of consular relations is the next listed measure and under the circumstances should not be dissociated therefrom. Thus rupture of relations would be one of the first measures for consideration at any future Meeting of the Organ of Consultation on the Cuban situation.

It is believed most Latin American Embassies in Habana would recommend support of a U.S. initiative to break relations. Whether their governments would participate or at least approve could be verified by bilateral consultations. Four American states (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua) have no diplomatic relations with Cuba. The Paraguayan mission has been recently expelled. Several Chiefs of Mission, notably the Argentinian, Brazilian, Peruvian, Venezuelan and Panamanian have friction continually with the Cuban authorities as a result of delays in obtaining safe conducts for asylees, offensive remarks about their public officials, denial of franquicias, Cuban intervention in their internal affairs or other activities of Cuban officials.

Most Latin American Ambassadors here are incensed with the increasingly offensive, aggressive and interventionist posture of the Cuban Government. Moreover, they are increasingly concerned with the subservience of Castro to Moscow and the substantial military assistance to Cuba from Eastern Europe. They are looking for some U.S. initiative to help to resolve the Cuban problem. The Mexican Ambassador is apparently the only exception.

Rupture Would Close Visa Escape Valve

In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining diplomatic relations with the present Cuban Government, the Embassy’s visa operation should not be ignored. Presumably this facility will be maintained as long as we have diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Under present circumstances visas are being requested mainly for refugee purposes. Those obtaining U.S. visas because of fear or opposition are, with certain exceptions, permitted to depart without objection from the Castro Government which thereby is rid of elements of discontent. It is suggested that, apart from humanitarian considerations, it might be in the U.S. interest if as a consequence of the rupture of diplomatic relations this escape valve should be closed and the departure from Cuba of Cuban dissidents should no longer be facilitated. There may be an advantage to the United States and to the Cuban opposition for the latter to have a representative nucleus abroad for purposes of security, organization, planning and liaison, but such a nucleus already exists and will in any event be strengthened from time to time by Cubans who through asylum or other means are able to join it.

Rupture Would Eliminate Embassy Operational Problems

The examination of this question would not be complete without an inquiry into the effectiveness and difficulties of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Habana under present circumstances. American employees are from time to time subjected to harassment; detentions have taken place in violation of traditional immunities; diplomatic households have been broken into, searched and robbed under circumstances indicating official responsibility or connivance; phones are tapped, employees are trailed, public hostility is encouraged; and the Cuban authorities cannot be relied upon to provide protection or to seek out and punish offenders.

Cuban employees likewise are subject to harassment and pressures. The incidence of resignation of local employees, in most cases to enter the United States as immigrants, is high, and it is difficult to replace them with competent and trustworthy employees. Some few local employees are pro-Castro. The Embassy continually receives charges, which are difficult to substantiate, that some are informing on Embassy activities.

The Embassy’s classified files have been so reduced by removal or destruction that the conduct of business is adversely affected. The absence of files hampers political reporting, security checks and the intelligence activity of all Embassy agencies.

While diplomatic relations are maintained, the physical security of the Embassy and the personal security of the Embassy staff are continually threatened. There has been an average of about one security alert per month at the Embassy since the beginning of this year. The Embassy and its personnel are secure only so long as the Cuban Government deems it not to be in its interest to violate that security. The security of Embassy property and personnel is admittedly secondary to the U.S. interest in dealing effectively with the Cuban situation, but exposure to these risks should be justified on this ground and if not so justified constitutes an additional reason for ceasing to maintain diplomatic relations.

U.S. –Cuban relations have so worsened in recent months that the Embassy now has no profitable contact with the Cuban Foreign Ministry or other agencies of the Cuban Government. Most communications with the Cuban Government are with respect to facilities and services necessitated by the existence of the Embassy and the presence of its personnel in Cuba. Diplomatic communications of substance are exchanged in an atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and distrust. Notes are delivered for the record or for propaganda effect which would be served as well by a communication from a protecting power or by a Department statement or press release.

Conclusion

An initiative by the United States with a view to breaking relations with the Cuban Government would on balance appear to be in the U.S. interest. The basis for such action would be that the Cuban Government is no longer representative of the Cuban people or of Cuban national interests, but rather of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the international communist apparatus serving bloc policy, and maintains itself in power by force. Rupture of relations would mean less and slower intelligence on Cuba. The action would, however, further the U.S. objective of securing a change in the Cuban Government in that it would signalize to the Cuban people and the world our conclusion that the Castro regime is not a representative Cuban Government, put the U. S. Government in a better position to strengthen and encourage the Cuban opposition, open the way for more vigorous economic and propaganda measures inconsistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations, and remove the distractions for U.S. policy created by the attempt to operate a diplomatic mission in Cuba under existing circumstances. Such action is envisaged by inter-American collective security procedures and in the Embassy’s judgement would be supported by most Latin American missions in Habana and would be probably approved by most American states.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–1660. Secret. Drafted by Wellman and cleared in draft with (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.
2. Document 616.