621. Editorial Note
On December 8, the Special Group, or 5412 Committee, discussed plans for an attack on Cuba. According to a memorandum dated June 13, 1961, by the Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations headed by General Maxwell Taylor, at this meeting the person in charge of the paramilitary section for the project “described the new concept as one consisting of an amphibious landing on the Cuban coast of 600–750 men equipped with weapons of extraordinarily heavy fire power.” The memorandum summarized his description of the project:
“The landing would be preceded by preliminary air strikes launched from Nicaragua against military targets. Air strikes as well as supply flights would continue after the landing. The objective would be to seize, hold a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which hopefully would trigger a general uprising. This amphibious landing would not entirely eliminate the previous concept for infiltrating guerrilla teams. It was expected that some 60–80 men would be infiltrated prior to the amphibious landing.”
The person in charge of training the Cuban force in Guatemala described “the superior characteristics of the individuals, particularly as to motivation, intelligence, and leadership qualities.” He also gave his opinion that this force “would have no difficulty inflicting heavy casualties on a much larger force.” The Board of Inquiry concluded that there was no evidence that the Special Group “formally approved the plan at this time,” but the representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency were “encouraged to continue in its development.” Someone at the meeting also commented that “the existence of the U.S. -backed force of Cubans in training was well known throughout Latin America.” (Operation ZAPATA, page 7)