Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

617. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1280

Havana, December 6, 1960.

REF

• Embdesps 1268, December 5, 1960; 707, September 26, 1960; Dept. Instruction CA–2641, September 20, 1960²

SUBJECT

• Analysis of the Opposition Movement to the Castro Regime

General

During the past three months the popular support of the Castro regime has dropped markedly. There are no precise figures by which to measure public opinion. However, there appears to be a consensus that Castro’s dedicated support stands somewhere between 15 and 25 percent. The remaining 75 to 85 percent is divided between a firm opposition of about 35 percent and a wavering bloc of some 40 to 50 percent. The trend is for this undecided mass to become increasingly disillusioned with the regime and gradually to shift towards the ranks of the opposition.

Castro is offsetting the loss in popular support with increased indoctrination and strengthening of his military and para-military organizations. The element of coercion is another significant factor which he is employing. This has been subtly and effectively developed, based largely on fear of arrest and of loss of employment.

The decline in public support has recently brought with it the first significant outbreaks of armed opposition to the regime. These have been for the most part spontaneous, isolated actions with poor leadership and insufficient organization and material support. Castro has been able to give the appearance of dealing effectively with them and to gain psychological advantage, at least momentarily, from his successes.

There should be no illusions about what is required to undermine and defeat the Castro regime. The opposition among the population at large needs to increase in extent and intensity. There must be greater cohesiveness, organization and planning among the opposition groups. As the recent successes of the Government have demonstrated, the opposition before it launches a military undertaking must first count with sound leadership, adequate communications and ample material support. None of the basic conditions appears to have been achieved as yet. Until they are, there is little prospect for the overthrow of Castro. The longer it takes to establish them, the more difficult will be the task.

In the succeeding pages an effort is made first to set forth the factors explaining the decline in the popularity of Castro. A second section discusses the principal opposition groups which have been formed. A third section describes the “fronts” established by the armed opposition in terms of location, leadership, relative strength and orientation. In the concluding section an attempt is made to evaluate the opposition movement, and to indicate what is needed to convert it into an effective force capable of overthrowing the Castro regime.

Factors in Rise of Public Opposition to the Castro Regime

The decline in the unprecedented popularity of the Castro regime began as soon as he assumed power. The execution of close to 600 alleged “war criminals” during the first three months of his government earned the enmity of their families and raised the first big doubt in the minds of many Cubans regarding the nature of the regime. From the outset he also created deep resentment among members of the military establishment of Batista who were dismissed and stigmatized, making it difficult for them to find employment elsewhere. The same holds true of many officials in the civil government who have been dismissed in a succession of reductions in force and purges.

The political, economic and social policies followed by the government since then have progressively alienated the upper and middle classes and have now reached the mass of urban and rural workers.

The Upper Class. The upper class for the most part stood aloof from the revolutionary struggle against Batista. Engulfed in their profitable business ventures, comfortable living and pleasure-seeking, they generally ignored the pressures building up. They looked for stability and found it in Batista. They were instinctively distrustful of the crusading social and economic reforms of the Sierra Maestra, although not entirely unresponsive to the romanticism of the rebel movement. When it became evident that Batista was through, many members of this class, without much conviction, joined the pro-Castro tide. However, what little confidence and emotional attachment they may have had for the Revolution was quickly dissipated by Castro’s verbal assault on them as a class and the succeeding agrarian and urban reforms and nationalizations of business enterprises, which drastically reduced property holdings and sources of income. A considerable portion of this class, having interests abroad, have now left Cuba. Among those who remain only a few appear to be actively working with the opposition.

The Middle Class. The middle class is the sector which more than any other contributed morally and materially to the undermining of the Batista regime, enabling Castro to sweep into power. As a class it was emotionally and intellectually dedicated to the proposition that Batista had to be overthrown in order to return to a state of constitutional normalcy and to usher in a period of political, economic and social reform. A not inconsiderable portion also looked for a more independent Cuba politically, economically and culturally, particularly in its relations with the United States. But the class did not envisage the radical type of reforms which have been instituted or the deviation into the Soviet bloc. Because of this background the disillusionment of the middle class with the Castro regime has been more gradual and complex.

The factors have been multiple. Politically sophisticated, the middle class has watched with growing concern such things as the regime’s failure to fulfill promises on the holding of elections, the disregard for its own laws and legal procedures, the stimulation of racial and class hatreds, the increasingly evident totalitarian character of the regime, the Marxist orientation of the government’s economic and social policies, the alignment of Cuba internationally with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the vicious anti-American campaign. On a more personal plane they have been more directly affected by the assault on the press and other communication media, the nationalization or intervention of industries and businesses converting them into employees of the state, the seizure of their own or family property under the agrarian and urban reform laws, the purge at the University of Habana, the usurpation by pressure or naked force of professional associations grouping lawyers, doctors, accountants and publicity agents, etc., the growing scarcity of consumer goods and the interference with freedom of travel.

The reaction to all this has set in but is slow in crystalizing into action. The urban reform law, striking dramatically at the very heart of the concept of private property is accelerating the process. The slowness in the reaction is understandable given the deception and disillusionment which the class has suffered, the lack of any ready alternative to which to turn, and the inhibiting force of government coercion. Generally speaking, the reaction in the provinces has been sharper than in Habana, and in provincial urban and rural areas there appears to be a greater disposition to take up an active role in the opposition.

The elements of the middle class which have joined the organized opposition represent a relatively low percentage, but it is quickly growing. The bulk of the middle class is believed to have no further illusions about the nature of the regime and their eventual fate. A relatively small segment of the middle class, mostly holding official positions in government offices and the educational and judicial systems, either out of conviction or convenience can be expected to remain loyal to the regime.

Lately there has been an acceleration in the emigration of professionals, whom the Revolutionary Government can ill afford to lose. Various exit controls suggest the possibility that the Government may try to prevent essential personnel from departing. This can only serve to drive the middle class further into the opposition.

The Lower Classes. The amorphous mass representing the lower classes has characteristically been on the side of whoever was in power. This is no less true of their attitude toward Castro today than it was toward Machado and Batista in their eras. The “intellectual” issues of human rights, representative government, free enterprise, etc., have little bearing on their reactions. The communist issue is conceded to have some bearing but is not a decisive factor. Guided largely by their emotions and full-stomach psychology, they are captivated by all the fanfare of the revolution and are susceptible to the torrent of propaganda. The economic pinch has not reached the point to disabuse them of this enchantment. At present it is within this largely uneducated, unthinking, highly emotional mass that Castro draws his main support. But there are signs that dissatisfaction is making inroads even here.

The first indications of this trend came in rural areas. Among the factors contributing to it have been: (1) the lack of employment during the dead season, aggravated this year by the dislocation produced by agrarian reform; (2) the lowering of the daily wage paid to farm workers in government-operated cooperatives and intervened enterprises and the payment of a substantial portion of farm wages in script valid only at “peoples stores”; (3) government intervention in agricultural production, putting pressure on farmers to join cooperatives, telling them what to plant, where to sell and at what prices; (4) shortages of basic foods such as rice and black beans.

The trend has been slower in coming in urban areas, particularly Habana. For the most part it is still confined to those segments of the working class which in the past have enjoyed steady work and a relatively high standard of living. This “petite bourgeoisie” is chafing under a series of grievances. Their take-home pay has been reduced by a series of deductions. Their employer is now the impersonal state and unions no longer function freely, meaning that they have lost the ability to negotiate for higher wages, better working conditions and more time off. They see their freedom of movement restricted in terms of job transferability, and pressure to join militia units, attend indoctrination classes, etc. These are also the workers who aspire to ownership of a house, car, and electrical appliances and see these objectives frustrated. They are also accustomed to eat well and are annoyed by the growing shortages not only of imported foodstuffs but of some basic products produced locally such as chickens and eggs.

The discontent of the workers has flared into the open on two occasions: at union meetings of the (COA) bus workers and the electric plant workers. In both instances the government-controlled CTC leadership was able to control the situation without difficulty.

The mass of unskilled workers, the under-employed, and unemployed so far show little signs of outward restiveness. This group has never had much of anything and therefore is an easy prey to the blandishments of the government. Castro is using their ranks—particularly the youth—to recruit persons for his volunteer teachers, work battalions, and militia.

In summary the lower classes are beginning to present a picture of growing discontent among the groups feeling the economic pinch. As a whole, however, this sector, if not still under the spell of Castro and the promises of a better life, certainly gives little signs of openly protesting against the government. Economically they have not been goaded to the point where their grievances would be translated into action, such as demonstrations, strikes and riots.

The Roman Catholic Church. The Church has been somewhat slow and hesitant in taking a firm, public position against the communist-totalitarian orientation of the Revolutionary Government. This has been due in part to timidity of some of the bishops but also to a realistic assessment that given the degree of popularity which Castro has enjoyed and the relatively little political influence which the Church has traditionally been able to exercise, it is unwise for the Church to take an exposed stand by attacking the regime too vigorously. Certainly now the clergy as a whole is fully conscious of the nature of the government and is firmly opposed to it. One general pastoral letter pointing out the dangers of communism and admonishing the Revolutionary Government was issued in August 1960. The more courageous bishops have taken firm public stands in pastoral letters, statements, and editorials in religious publications. Some priests are very active in Church-oriented opposition groups, holding high positions in the directorates. Others perform important courier and protection functions. The Church hierarchy as a whole, however, continues to walk softly so far as attacking the regime is concerned.

The Armed Forces. The traditional armed forces are believed to harbor some opposition potential. The successive purges through which the Air Force and Navy have passed have left a great deal of resentment in those branches. The rise of the militia as the principal military force of the government at the expense of the Army and the National Police is also reported to have aroused dissatisfaction in these branches, particularly in the former. Certain opposition groups report having made inroads into the ranks of the Army.

The Principal Opposition Groups

One of the more discouraging aspects of the Cuban situation is the apparent disarray which characterizes the organized opposition. Confronted with the tremendous task of over-throwing Castro, they give the impression of still being incapable of subordinating personal interests and doctrinal differences to the broader objective of establishing a united front from which to carry on the fight against the Castro regime.

While the number of opposition groups may total several dozen, there appear to be five of sufficient importance to warrant consideration here.

Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD). The Frente is made up of five organizations with headquarters in Miami and presumably with coordinated cadres thoughout the island of Cuba. The component groups are Organización Auténtica (OA) led by Antonio (“Tony”) de Varona; Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionario (MRR)³ nominally led by Manuel Artime; Organizacion Triple A⁴ led by Aureliano Sanchez Arango; Movimiento Democrático Cristiano (MDC) led by José Ignacio Rasco; and Agrupacion Montecristi led by Justo Carillo.

The Frente represents a rather moderate, center position in the political spectrum. In essence it advocates a return to constitutional government based on the 1940 Constitution which was broken with the coup of Batista in 1952. Certain reforms are contemplated as provided in the Constitution but no changes of a radical nature. The Frente is clearly anti-communist.

The civilian head of the Frente is “Tony” de Varona. His military counterpart is said to be Col. Eduardo Martin Elena, a respected career Cuban army officer, reportedly untainted by connnections with the Batista government. The Frente is reported to have a good civilian and military organization within Cuba. When the bid of the Frente to unseat Castro comes, it is supposed to be this internal organization which is to spark the uprising which reportedly will be combined with the arrival of forces from abroad. The Frente is said to have the undeclared backing of the U.S. Government. It is also said that the United States brought pressure to bear on the groups comprising the Frente to gain acceptance by them of de Varona as the undisputed leader.

The Embassy is not able to judge how effectively the FRD command is operating. The impression received from Cubans and Americans returning from Miami is that the Frente is little more than a cockpit of jealousies, personal ambitions and frustrating inertia. Certainly there is little to be seen in Cuba in the way of coordinated and concerted action. A sustained program of sabotage and/or terrorism, for example, to keep the Castro regime off balance and softened up for an uprising and/or an invasion has not materialized. Its effort to supply Sinesio Walsh in the Escambray, if [in?] an FRD operation, was a failure in the public view. The campaign of petards and bombs in Habana appears to have been largely the work of Agrupación Católica Universitaria elements which are tied in with the MRR. This action has been annoying but hardly more than a pin prick for the government. There is no evidence of the Frente having an effective clandestine propaganda machine operating in Cuba. The fact that the Frente is foreign-based makes it an easy target for the Castro regime to brand as the vehicle of Yankee imperialism.

Recently members of the Frente in Cuba with whom the Embassy has contact have begun to express pessimism over the effectiveness of the organization. This attitude is fostered by the evident growth in military strength on the part of the government as contrasted with the reported failure of the Frente to send minimal military supplies to its forces in Cuba.

Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). This is a relatively new organization established by Castro’s first Minister of Public Works Manuel Ray.⁵ It is based in Cuba, with very little organization abroad at the present time. Ray operates clandestinely from Habana. His following is characterized by its youth. He originally drew his strength largely from “26 of July” elements who had broken with the Castro regime. The group reportedly is growing as various opposition elements join its ranks. Contacts within the group claim that some professional groups have joined and that they count with the support of elements of the Rebel Army who are disgruntled over the government buildup of the militia at the expense of the Army and the communist orientation of the government.

Only recently has Ray come out with a statement of principles and program defining the MRP position. The statement is circulating clandestinely but has not yet been given wide distribution in Cuba, nor apparently much publicity abroad. The MRP platform would in effect take the Revolution back to its original objectives. It contemplates a return to constitutional government after an 18-month period of provisional administration. It supports broad economic and social reforms. It frankly advocates government planning and supervision of the economy, but one in which private enterprise would play a considerable role. It would conserve many of the reform measures instituted by the Castro regime but would carry them out within a framework of representative government, respect for individual liberties, and the primacy of law. The MRP program has given rise to considerable skepticism as to its orientation. The most frequently heard criticism is that it is “fidelismo without Fidel Castro” and “fidelismo without international communism”. The MRP is avowedly anti-communist.

There is little evidence of any action program on the part of the Ray group so far. Most of the effort seems to be going into organization. To date their principal accomplishment has been arranging, with the assistance of the MRR, for the escape of a group of officers held prisoner in Morro Castle. These officers formed the staff of Major Huber Matos. The MRP has talked of assistance to the counterrevolutionaries in the Escambray and of opening a front in Oriente, but there is no positive evidence of their progressing on either project. More recently they have been instrumental in generating some sabotage in Camaguey and Habana.

The MRP has one psychological advantage: it is based in Cuba and its leadership is running the same risks as the rank and file. This has strong appeal to those who are disposed to carry the fight in Cuba. It also manifestly weakens one of the principal arguments which Castro can make against it: that it is a counterrevolutionary movement, organized, supported and directed by the United States.

Movimiento “30 de Noviembre”. This is also a relatively new movement, until recently headed by David Salvador, former Secretary General of the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC). Salvador went underground shortly after he was eased out of office following the battle with the communists in the 1959 CTC national congress. He remained active until he was captured by the government on November 4, 1960 as he was attempting to leave Cuba clandestinely for the United States.

The movement is said to be based on followers of Salvador within the ranks of labor and on certain elements in the University of Habana. The following is not thought to be very extensive although it is reported to be well organized and tough. From what little has been gathered about the orientation of the movement, it appears to be further to the left than the MRP. Salvador himself is a former member of the Cuban Communist Party, a maverick politically and probably more of an opportunist than anything else. He is no friend of the United States and is not to be trusted.

Salvador operated clandestinely from Habana. He appeared to have no working relationship with any other opposition group. The MRP reportedly cooperated with him but studiously avoided any kind of merger or organic working arrangement. It is not clear what the fate of the organization will be with the capture of Salvador. The Embassy has unconfirmed reports that the group will try to work its way into the MRP. The Ray organization probably would profit by broadening its base with the labor movement, but it is doubted that it will take in the remnants of Salvador group without very careful screening.

There is no indication that the Salvador group has carried on any kind of action program. One source claims that activities were to begin with the start of the sugar harvest, presumably directed at sabotaging sugar production through damaging of the mills.

Bloque de Organizaciones Anti-Communistas Cubano (BOAC). The bloc is composed of nine separate organizations rather loosely affiliated. Little is known about its leadership. One of the principal figures is said to be Gustavo Cuervo. The directors are for the most part in Miami.

The bloc represents conservative, propertied elements. It gives the impression of being motivated primarily by a desire to recuperate for the monied class the properties which have been taken from them. As such it is not believed to have any influence or support outside those interests.

The bloc gave the appearance of activity earlier this year. It laid claim to the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion. It planned a similar sabotage of the ammunition dump at Managua, but this plot was infiltrated and broken up as it was about to take place. The bloc was also active at one time with well-edited clandestine propaganda, but even this effort seems to have declined lately. In one of the recent waves of arrests one of the top leaders of the bloc in Cuba was seized.

Acción Cívica Anti-Communista (ACA). This is another opposition group of unknown strength, which claims to have united a number of small opposition groups under its leadership. These small groups, said to number about ten, include JACA and SAC (Salvar a Cuba). The backbone of ACA is understood to be a large body of former officers and enlisted men of the old Cuban Army who claim not to be tainted with the crimes or corruption of the Batista regime and want only an opportunity to revindicate their good name. Other sectors of Cuban business and professional life (students, Masons, etc.) are said to be included, but identities of personalities are not known. ACA acknowledges Col. Eduardo Martin Elena as its military chief abroad. It claims its greatest strength is in the province of Pinar del Rio. Its actual capabilities as yet have not been proven.

Counterrevolutionary Fronts

There is a great deal of talk in opposition circles concerning the imminent opening of new military fronts in Cuba but to date the only one that can be said to be operating is in the Escambray mountains in Las Villas Province. The delay in the organization of these fronts is generally attributed to the lack of equipment. Opposition sources claim they have more than enough manpower if only arms and ammunition were available.

For purposes of discussing this aspect of the opposition movement the treatment is presented on a province-by-province basis as given below:

Piñar del Rio. Two attempts at forming pockets of armed resistance in the Sierra de los Organos mountains have failed. Both were fly-by-night affairs which never stood any chance of success. As a result they were easily liquidated by the government. One was led by José Lara Crespo (a non-commissioned officer of the Batista army). He was captured and shot. The second was led by Austin Young, a U.S. citizen. He was captured and sentenced to prison.

Sources within the FRD and the BOAC claim that cadres have been organized in the province and are awaiting the arrival of arms and orders to initiate operations. Recently there have been many reports of arms landings in the province but none of these is confirmed.

Habana. The only action taking place in Habana is limited sabotage and terrorism. The terrain precludes guerrilla operations. Apart from placing petards and assassination attempts against militia, there is little evidence of other activity. Some electric and water facilities have been temporarily interrupted by bomb explosions but these have been minor in scope and impact.

FRD sources claim that the organization of cadres in small towns throughout the province has been about completed. These reportedly will surface when orders for a general uprising are received.

Matanzas. In August 1960 a front was opened in the hills north of the Central Highway between Madruga and Ceiba Mocha on the Habana-Matanzas border. The counterrevolutionary group was led by Gerardo Fundora Nuñez, a former labor leader at the rayon plant in Matanzas. He is said to have been linked with the Triple A organization within the Frente. The plan of operations was primarily to harass transport along the Central Highway. Their support came primarily from groups in Matanzas. The front appeared to be having modest success until the end of October when government forces captured Fundora and several of his men. Fundora and four of his assistants were shot on October 22. The status of the front since the loss of its leader is not clear, although sources connected with it claim it will continue in being. There is no indication that it is functioning at the present time.

Contacts within the Frente state that Fundora disobeyed orders in initiating operations. His task was to organize, accumulate supplies, and await instructions for a coordinated, island-wide move. His impetuous nature led him to jump the gun. His capture and execution and a subsequent wave of arrests in Matanzas and Habana would indicate that a heavy price has been paid by the opposition for his foolhardiness.

From two independent sources the Embassy has heard of plans to open a small front in the swampy area southwest of Amarillas on the Matanzas-Las Villas border. Reportedly there are some 150 men available for this operation. The tactical plan would be to conduct hit and run raids against transport and government installations.

Las Villas. This province, as none of the other five, has been the focal point of opposition to the government. The reasons generally given for this are the following:

(1) Resistance of the small farmers to Agrarian Reform. The pattern of land distribution in Las Villas, unlike that in the other provinces, is one of many small landholders who for the most part work their own property. The Agrarian Reform has hit these landholders particularly hard in terms of reduction of their holdings in disregard of the provisions of the law or interference in their freedom to produce and market what they raise.

(2) Opposition to communist control. From the very outset of the victory of Castro, Las Villas has been in the hands of communists placed there by “Che” Guevara following the fall of Batista. These leaders, both civil and military, have been arrogant and ruthless in the implementation of economic and social reforms.

The center of armed resistance is in the Escambray mountains. Reportedly some ex-Batista elements took refuge in the mountains shortly after the victory of Castro. However, the Escambray did not gain prominence as a center of opposition until the middle of this year when revolutionary elements defected and went into the hills.

The groups which formed in the Escambray appear to have done so independently and to have maintained their separateness, at least until recently. Hence, the pattern which emerges is a collection of bands operating on their own with no central coordination, no adequate system of supply and no satisfactory means of communication. Recent reports indicated that a degree of unity has been achieved around the figure of Captain Membibre (see below).

The group which received the greatest notoriety was that of Sinesio Walsh. The capture and execution of Walsh and his principal lieutenants in October of this year was a psychological blow, but several other bands continue in operation and the government so far at least has not been able to dislodge them. Among these are the following:

Joaquin “El Galleguito” Membibre—he was formerly a lieutenant in the Rebel Army in charge of the military post at Camajuani, Las Villas. He reports a strength of 300 men. He is not believed to be too well armed but there are indications that he recently has received some supplies. As the principal figure now in the Escambray, it is expected that he will obtain such provisions as it is possible to deliver.

Evelio Duque—he was a lieutenant in the Rebel Army and worked as an investigator for INRA in Las Villas. During the revolution against Batista he fought in the Escambray. He is reported to have some 400 men under his command, most of whom are not well armed. He is said to operate in an area called Kabagan. He is reliably reported to have the backing of OA elements.

Rizos (fnu)—he was a major in the Batista army. He reportedly commands some 400 men in an area called Pico Tuerto near Topes de Collantes. His group is said to have an assured source of supply and to possess the greatest discipline. He is said to be associated with Pedraza and maintains himself aloof from other groups.

Other group leaders whose names are mentioned but concerning whom very little is known are: Osvaldo Ramirez (former lieutenant in the Rebel Army), Rafael Aragon (a colono from Las Villas), Luis Vargas (former captain in the Rebel Army, associated with the BOAC), Juan Varela, Roberto Herrera (a revolutionary from Guinia de Miranda in the Escambray), Manolo Calzada, (fnu) Toledo, and (fnu) Lima.

In an effort to surround and eventually liquidate the Escambray counterrevolutionary forces the government has thrown a ring of an estimated 6, 000 men (largely militia) around the periphery. The government appears not to have sent its forces up into the hills to flush out the counterrevolutionaries. The present strategy seems to be to contain them and attempt to defeat them through strangulation and infiltration of their forces. So far the counterrevolutionaries appear to count with the support of the local peasantry. If this were not so, it would be virtually impossible for them to maintain themselves in the mountains.

There has been some talk of opening fronts in two other places in Las Villas. One is in the hills in the northeastern corner of the province near Mayajigua. The other is in the northwestern corner near Coralillo. Plans apparently have not progressed much beyond the talking stage. One source connected with the FRD has recently reported that detailed plans of the Mayajigua front have been submitted to the FRD in Miami and approved.

Camaguey. To the Embassy’s knowledge there has been no effort at armed resistance in this province. There is considerable talk of available manpower but no indication of imminent action. Recent sabotage of trains and electric installations indicate that the MRP is beginning to move in the field of sabotage, as they have been indicating that they would.

Oriente. This province is historically the cradle of revolutions in Cuba. This time, however, it appears to be lagging behind Las Villas both in the degree of public discontent and armed resistance. Two attempts at establishing opposition fronts have failed: Manuel Beaton’s in July of this year in the Sierra Maestra and Armentino Feria’s landing on the north coast between Moa and Baracoa. In both cases it appears that the efforts did not count with the important ingredient of support of the local populace.

In recent weeks there have been reports of defections of some Rebel Army personnel in Oriente who have taken to the hills. Fidel Castro acknowledged this to have been the case with the guard at Imias in his speech of October 15. Major “Nino” Diaz, one of the top figures in the “dissident” MRR, has been reliably reported to have returned clandestinely to Santiago from the United States in mid-October to take command of a front to be opened. The Embassy has received reports of landings on the south coast between Santiago and Guantanamo and on the north coast between Puerto Padre and Banes, but these have not been confirmed. It is unlikely that any armed action will be initiated in Oriente in the near future.

Conclusions

In reviewing the opposition movement as a whole the following tentative conclusions may be drawn on the basis of information available to the Embassy:

1. Discontent among the population is growing and will continue to increase as the economic situation deteriorates. This deterioration is not likely to affect the lower masses in a vital manner for several more months and possibly not until well into the third quarter of 1961.

2. The organized opposition gives the public image of division, confusion and weakness, a circumstance which is defeating its own purpose. It has not shown any capacity for sustained action against the government to date. It cannot hope to capitalize on the discontent until it is able to offer the Cuban people an attractive alternative in terms of leadership and program and demonstrate that it can maintain a campaign of sabotage and military action against the regime. The lack of a foreseeable alternative to Castro is causing many Cubans to think in terms of either fleeing the country or becoming resigned to a continuation of the Castro regime. If such an alternative were in sight, it would serve to encourage people to resist and take greater risk in direct action against the government.

3. The government is determined to suppress the opposition at any cost. It has accumulated a substantial quantity of military hardware from the Soviet bloc and is making great efforts to train the militia in their use. In the face of armed insurrection and/or invasion the government can count on a sufficient number of convinced adherents to put up a good fight. It is not likely that the Castro regime will fall without considerable bloodletting and destruction of property.

4. Time in the long run is believed to favor the government. It gives the government time in which to train, indoctrinate and equip its military forces and perfect its system of terror and control over the populace. Once consolidated a communist regime in Cuba, with the full backing of the Sino-Soviet bloc, will be difficult to unseat without direct, sizable intervention from the outside.

5. Time in the short run will favor the opposition if the economic situation continues to deteriorate to a degree where the masses will be hard hit and the opposition places itself in a position to capitalize on this fleeting advantage. Time is limited and the opposition should be made to realize this.

6. It is seriously doubted whether any foreign-based Cuban opposition movement can have much success without strong support from within the country. Similarly, an internal movement stands little chance unless it is backed by significant assistance from the outside. To accomplish the objective of overthrowing Castro a prompt, united and effective effort of Cubans here and abroad is indispensable.

7. Such an effort might consist of the following elements:

a. Announcement of the composition of a provisional government to direct the struggle against Castro and to assume provisional control following his defeat. For purposes of attracting public support in Cuba among the middle and lower classes this provisional government might be built around the original Cabinet which took over following the fall of Batista. Such important members as Prime Minister José Miro Cardona, Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte, Finance Minister Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Public Works Minister Manuel Ray, Social Welfare Minister Elena Mederos are already in the United States or in the active opposition in Cuba. Other well-regarded persons such as National Bank President Felipe Pazos, Banfaic President Justo Carillo, Supreme Court President Emilio Menendez, and Army Colonel Ramon Barquin could also be used. In addition representation from the Frente and other groups could and should be used to complete the list and give them a voice in the provisional government. The important thing is to convince the Cuban public that the new government is committed to “rescuing” the Revolution which so many Cubans sincerely desire and initially supported.

b. While it may be a hard pill to swallow for some opposition elements, the program which the opposition as a whole needs to present is one which will appeal to the majority of the Cuban people, i.e., restoration of the Cuban Revolution to its original premises. The program must include substantial economic and social reforms, to be carried out within a framework of representative government, respect for individual rights and the primacy of law. The program will probably have a strong nationalist flavor, but should be one free from communist ties.

c. Both from abroad and inside the country the opposition needs to establish an effective program of propaganda, not confined to radio alone but including reading material which could be issued within the country clandestinely or dropped from airplanes. Special emphasis should be placed on the Cuban government’s communist ties, militarization, popular regimentation, economic deterioration, the influence of foreigners in the Castro government, and factual reporting on national and international events.

d. An active program of sabotage and active and passive resistance should be initiated promptly not only to weaken the government and keep it off balance, but also able to demonstrate to the Cuban public that the opposition has capacity to act and to the public in other countries that Castro does not count with the support of the Cuban people as he claims.

e. One or more military fronts should be opened with a view to gaining control over sufficient territory to establish a provisional government in Cuba as a basis for obtaining recognition from other foreign countries. Such a front would also offer a haven to many persons who are willing to take up arms against the government but have no place to go at the present time. Las Villas Province with the Escambray mountains appears to offer the best possibilities for such a front at the present time. It is not believed that the Castro regime could long resist the pressure of an active military front combined with a campaign of island-wide sabotage and loss in public support.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–660. Drafted by Bowdler and concurred in by Gilmore, Wellman, (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. Kail indicated that he concurred but “with reservations about 7a” in the conclusions. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.
2. Despatch 1268 is supra. Despatch 707 and CA–2641 have not been found.
3. Because of internal strife the MRR split. The dissident group includes such figures as Ricardo Lorie, “Nino” Diaz, Lucas Moran, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, Michel Yabur and Conte Aguero. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Reports are circulating that Sanchez Arango has pulled his Triple A out of the FRD because of differences over leadership. These reports are not confirmed. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Manuel Ray is at present in the United States. He left Cuba clandestinely and is expected to return via the same route in the near future. [Footnote in the source text.]