Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

254. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, February 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Short-Range Position toward Government of Cuba

(1) Principal Political Forces

Three main groupings appear to have come into being in the time since the new regime was established. These are:

(A) The “radical” element of the 26th of July Movement, apparently led by “Che” Guevara and Raul Castro. This group appears to contain both elements which are pro-Communist and elements which, without any discernible sympathy for the Communists are filled with revolutionary fervor for the overthrow of dictatorships in the area and carrying on the revolution within Cuba itself. The Communists apparently look primarily to this group for acceptance and support.

(B) Fidel Castro and what might be described as the elements within the 26th of July Movement and their allies who are oriented primarily towards moderation and the establishment of a prosperous democratic Cuba with honest government. This group has shown some signs of disassociating itself from the radical wing of the 26th of July Movement on both the Communist and anti-dictatorship issues (e.g. Castro’s moves in the labor field which have been directed at cutting down Communist influence). Whether Castro and his more moderate followers will eventually align themselves with the more mature, moderate group described below or with the “radical” element remains to be seen.

(C) A more mature, moderate group consisting of technicians and persons with political experience largely moderate in outlook who hope to stabilize the situation, the majority of whom realize that it is to Cuba’s advantage to work with the United States. In general, this group has the backing of the professional and middle classes of Cuba. It includes a number of influential, responsible Cubans who realize the dangers of Cuba’s going off under the leadership of Castro should he become fully aligned with the “radicals” on a Nasserist or neutralist tangent. These elements also reflect the anti-Communist attitude of the majority of Cubans.

Of these elements, Fidel Castro is by far the most important at the moment because of the general idolization which surrounds him in Cuba and the hemisphere and restrains criticism of his failures. This attitude is likely to continue for the immediate future since public opinion will probably be slow in blaming Castro directly for the economic and other troubles confronting Cuba which he and his associates will probably do their best to lay at the doors of the Batista regime and of the United States.

(2) Problems Confronting the New Cuban Government

Cuba faces a critical social, economic and political situation. Literally tens of thousands of Cubans are unemployed and many thousands have been conditioned to guerilla warfare and other forms of violence. Thousands of young Cubans have gone without university training for periods of up to four and more years. Business is generally at a standstill although there has been stirring of activity in the sugar centrals. These difficulties, just to cite a few of the problems, would tax the governing abilities of any of the best leaders, at least in this hemisphere. Should the new government fail to stabilize conditions in Cuba, there would appear to be serious danger of a radical social upheaval and a long period of political unrest in Cuba which once had the strongest Communist Party in the American republics.

(3) Guidelines for United States Policy

The above factors seem to indicate that our planning should be oriented towards:

(A) Strengthening the mature, moderate group in Cuba, giving sympathetic consideration to their requirements for short-term assistance to stabilize the situation.

(B) Seeking to influence Fidel Castro and his more moderate supporters to make common cause with the moderate group described above and to devote his energies primarily to stabilizing and improving the Cuban internal situation. This will require forebearance in the face of ill-considered statements and policies which Castro is likely to continue to make in the present euphoria which surrounds him, as well as persuading him by friendly and sympathetic contacts that the rancors which either events or anti-US persons have induced Castro to feel against the United States are no longer justified, if they ever were.

(C) Seeking to isolate and reduce the influence of the “radical” element of the 26th of July forces and the Communists. This will require maneuvering them into untenable anti-national positions and particularly maneuvering them into positions where they will be seen to be undercutting Castro’s program. It also would require getting the facts before Castro and the Cuban public of the disadvantages to Cuba of tolerating Communist activities, of insisting on withdrawal from the OAS and similar irresponsible acts in the field of diplomacy, and of becoming involved in Caribbean filibusters in association with various undesirable and anti-democratic elements.

With respect to the question of United States assistance to Cuba, we should follow a cautious and restrained policy. On the one hand, we should sympathetically and expeditiously consider requests directed at stabilizing the immediate situation, such as possible IMF and U.S. Treasury standby credits, etc., and requests for technical assistance in such sound programs as the new government may develop which are in accord with our general policies and outlook for economic development in Latin America. On the other hand, we should be extremely cautious about giving any impression that we are so anxious to help Castro in the face of his anti-American statements that we are willing to help subsidize programs and policies in Cuba which we are unwilling to do in countries which may need them more. We should avoid any impression likely to build up the feeling in Latin America as a whole that the way to obtain assistance from the United States is to take an anti-American position.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and Wieland.