Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 17, 1959—6 p.m.

986. Deptel 595.² While Castro’s assumption premiership removes one obstacle to effective government policy formulation and action, his speech last night at swearing-in ceremony gave no further clues on Cuban policy toward US. In absence of opportunity for further personal contact with him Embassy can add little to evaluation his attitudes previously reported. For views of other key Cabinet figures, which may or may not be influential in policy information, see Embdes 885, 895, and 897.³

Embassy inclined to believe Castro’s public pronouncements on economic policy and apparent personal anti-American bias likely to be tempered in action by cooler and better-informed Cabinet officers such as Boti and Cepero Bonilla, if latter remains. Felipe Pazos is also a moderating influence.

Embassy considers we have following alternatives in face Cuba’s request:

1. To withhold assistance pending clarification of Cuban policy toward US;

2. To provide exchange stabilization assistance but hold back on economic development credits;

3. To grant both exchange stabilization and economic development assistance, as requested.

Embassy favors second alternative for following reasons:

1. Although Embassy informed Cuba’s reserve position has improved slightly during past few weeks and adoption import controls gives strong weapon to prevent future exchange losses, internal economic situation may possibly deteriorate if exchange stabilization assistance is not promptly available. Withholding this assistance will be widely interpreted as “reactionary” attack on revolution and will strengthen anti-American sentiment and play into hands of Communists. Castro anti-Americanism not yet sufficiently proved to justify conclusion we should allow his regime to collapse under growing economic problems.

2. Longer range economic development assistance is not immediate necessity, and our withholding thereof would be salutary warning that GOC attitude toward US must take constructive turn before full cooperation will be forthcoming.

Embassy believes one condition for exchange stabilization assistance should be full public acknowledgement by key figures of help given.

Braddock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.10/2–1759. Confidential; Priority.
2. In telegram 595, February 16, the Department noted that three Cuban Government officials were in Washington requesting economic and financial assistance from certain U.S. Government agencies and the International Monetary Fund. The Department said that while it was inclined to regard such request favorably, it had told the Cuban delegation that U.S. assistance was “made difficult” by the anti-American statements of some Cuban political leaders and uncertainty as to the “near future trend of Cuban policy toward U.S.” The Department asked for the Embassy’s comments, particularly in light of Castro’s becoming Prime Minister, and its evaluation of the trend of Cuban policy toward the United States. (ibid., 033.3711/2–1059)
3. None printed. (ibid., 837.131/2–1159, 837.00/2–1359, 737.00/2–1359, respectively)