247. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chargé in Cuba (Braddock) and Carlos Piad, American Embassy, Havana, February 4, 19591
Dr. Piad came into the Embassy today to give me his views on the current situation in Cuba. He was pessimistic. He felt that the Government was not functioning well, largely because of the inability or unwillingness of President Urrutia to take any decisions without prior consultation with Castro, who was often unavailable.
Dr. Piad described the economy as paralyzed but did not offer any facts to support this statement other than the tight control of the banks over financial transactions. I suggested that labor disturbances were hampering production, to which he readily agreed.
Dr. Piad was particularly concerned over the situation in the Armed Forces. He said that nothing had been done with respect to the reorganization of the Army. He said that the officers of the old army who were not under arrest were continuing to draw their pay but were completely ignored by the revolutionary leaders, while the men were not even being paid and were becoming increasingly discontented. He added that the revolutionary soldiers were likewise not being paid and were becoming restive and critical. This situation was responsible for widespread dissatisfaction at Camp Columbia and nervousness on the part of the 26th of July Movement. At Camp Columbia, he said, there were 2,000 soldiers of the old army, unarmed, and 1200 revolutionary soldiers with arms. He was informed, he said, that a good many arms had been taken into Camp Columbia recently. Most of the tanks which are normally kept there, he said, had recently been transferred to San Antonio de los Baños. He said that Raul Castro was in charge at Camp Columbia and General Diaz Tamayo’s house there was being made ready for his occupancy. He said Raul Castro had no use for the regular army and was viewed with distrust by the latter.
Dr. Piad said that the situation in the Navy was somewhat similar. He said there were no Fidelistas among the naval officers except for the Chief of Staff, Commander Castañeras. He said the Navy was practically in a state of mutiny.
Many of the important persons who had contributed to and supported the revolution had been disregarded and brushed aside by the 26th of July, according to Dr. Piad. He mentioned particularly Antonio de Varona [Page 394] in this connection. He said that yesterday Comandante Aldo Vera, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, had been himself picked up by the police and taken away from his office. He could throw no light on the reason for this.2
The Communists were increasingly active, Mr. Piad thought, and he referred to the fact that Communist “bonds” of all denominations were being openly sold in the city. He felt that some progress was being made by the Communist newspaper Hoy. I remarked that the Communists were nevertheless encountering considerable difficulties on the labor front and in the Government, and he agreed that this was so.
With respect to the Minister of State, Dr. Piad said that Dr. Agramonte, for whom he appeared to have very little regard, was currying favor with Castro because he viewed himself as possibly a presidential candidate in the eventual elections. Agramonte, he added, had got Dr. Manuel Bisbe out of his way by appointing him as Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Dr. Piad indicated that Dr. Bisbe himself was aware of the motivation of this appointment and did not welcome the appointment but felt that under present circumstances he should accept it. The only two persons in the Ministry of State whom Dr. Piad believed had any real influence were Dr. D’Acosta, Chief of the Immigration Service, and Dr. Huete(?).
Above all Dr. Piad was deeply concerned over the actions and statements of Fidel Castro. He felt that Castro’s anti-American bias, as reflected in his public statements, was due mainly to the bad intelligence and bad advice he had been receiving over the past year or more, particularly from Felipe Pazos and Ernesto Betancourt. Piad believes that Pazos is not friendly to the United States and Betancourt is hostile.
I asked Dr. Piad whether in his judgment it would be desirable or not for Fidel Castro to be invited to the United States. I made clear that this was purely an exploratory question and that nothing concrete was under consideration. He replied that such a visit could be most beneficial in opening Castro’s eyes to the fact that the United States had no unfriendly feeling for him or for Cuba.
I ventured the observation that Cuba was still in a state of transition, with which he completely agreed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–459. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 839 from Havana, February 4, in which Braddock remarked: “While the Cuban situation certainly has many disturbing aspects, I feel that Dr. Piad’s appraisal is gloomier than warranted by the facts so far as we can see them. His view is probably influenced to some extent by the scant recognition accorded by the 26th of July Movement, the dominating element in the scene, to the faction or individuals with whom he personally is most closely associated.”↩
- When the Embassy checked this story on February 4, Commander Vera was still functioning as usual. [Footnote in the source text.]↩