175. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 7, 19591
SUBJECT
- Argentine Military Assistance Desires
PARTICIPANTS:
- Argentine Ambassador César Barros Hurtado
- Assistant Secretary Rubottom
- Mr. Clarence A. Boonstra, Director, Office of East Coast Affairs
- Mr. James F. O’Connor, Jr., Officer in Charge, Argentine Affairs
Mr. Rubottom began by saying that he thought some progress had been made toward clarification of military assistance situation. Mr. O’Connor had interviewed all three Argentine service attachés. This had revealed that the Argentine Navy remained consistent in its aspirations, but there was an indication that the Argentine Air Force was shifting its ground somewhat. The Argentine Army now had an expanded list of requirements. With regard to the reception of the special emissaries for Army assistance, the Ambassador would appreciate that President Frondizi had indicated an interest in his talk with the Secretary in Army assistance and that the Department consequently had no choice but to receive them. (Barros indicated his understanding on this point.) We wanted to be as helpful as possible in meeting Argentina’s military needs, but required help in turn from the Argentine Government. The fact was that at this point there were no funds potentially available beyond the Argentine armed forces in some measure, but the proposal of military assistance on top of the financial assistance given Argentina had posed distinct problems. Mr. Rubottom had had to go to Under Secretary Dillon to achieve what had been achieved, and Mr. Dillon was not now available in Washington for any further approach. What appeared to be needed was Argentine internal agreement on military needs, and we would hope to receive a note tying everything together.
Ambassador Barros indicated that he had been placed in a very difficult position. He had gone to Buenos Aires and told the President and Cabinet ministers that Mr. Rubottom had assured him that the meeting of Argentine military desires had been approved in principle. He took this to include the basic rehabilitation of two submarines available on loan to the Argentine Navy, and the sale of 28 jet planes with spare parts for five years to the Air Force, plus whatever program had been agreed upon between the special emissaries and US officials in the case of the Army, about which he was uninformed. In the case [Page 553] of the Navy and the Air Force, Barros continued, he could not support more or less than the programs which had formed the basis of discussions. This meant $1.2 million which was a reduction from a $2 million figure proposed to him by the Argentine Naval Attaché, in the case of the Navy; plus what was required to obtain the 28 planes with five years’ spare parts in the case of the Air Force. He did not support the current desire of the Argentine Air Force for other items [bombs and rockets],2 since these had not been included in previous discussions. All that he knew about the protective Army program was that the new Army Attaché, Col. Uriburu had brought an exhaustive list of desired equipment with him, which would cost approximately $10 million. The Colonel had shown him the list, but he had not had time to examine it in any detail. The Ambassador returned to the theme that Air Force desires had been couched in terms of 28 planes and spare parts for five years from the very outset.
Mr. Boonstra said that one difficulty was that the discussions between the Argentine Air Attaché and officials in the Pentagon had been left subject to further negotiations as to the quantity of spare parts involved. The Ambassador insisted that he was fully informed and that the Argentine desire for spare parts sufficient for five years’ operations had been clear and unvarying from the start. Mr. O’Connor pointed out that the Air Attaché had failed to state continuing interest in five years’ spare parts in making an attempted written acceptance of Defense’s offer of the planes with one year’s spare parts, subject to the establishment of satisfactory credit arrangements, and that this had contributed to the confusion.
Mr. Rubottom said that we had operated in good faith in attempting to meet Argentine military aspirations. We had worked out at considerable effort a program amounting to $10 million, broken down into $1.2 million for the Navy, $4.4 million for the Air Force, and approximately $5 million for the Army. The Ambassador insisted that no figure of $10 million had ever been specified to him. If it had, he could have used it in making his report in Buenos Aires and so discharged his responsibilities. As it was, he has been placed in the position of making an erroneous report to his Government. Mr. Rubottom explained that it had been impossible to give the Ambassador the specific figure of $10 million at that time, since the internal details as to availabilities of funds were still being worked out within the U.S. Government, and that he had had, therefore, to restrict himself to expressing the general approval in principle.
The Ambassador said that subtracting the clear Navy and Air Force aspirations from the $10 million figure left very little for the Army. He could not now go to the Army and tell them that there was [Page 554] not enough money left for them, because that would cause displeasure (disgusto). The solution to the problem might be, as he saw it, to provide assistance in the amount of $1.2 million for the Navy and $6.3 million [see Note below] for the Air Force, and then make available to the Army assistance in the amount of $6.3 million to match the Air Force figure.
Mr. Rubottom referred once again to US complete good faith in this matter and to the fact that there had obviously been an unfortunate misunderstanding. He asked Ambassador Barros if he thought the whole matter should consequently be dropped. The Ambassador replied that that was up to us. He went on to say that there appeared to be two alternatives. He could inform his Government that there had been a misunderstanding and that the matter of military assistance was therefore being dropped. Such a report would necessarily be accompanied by his irrevocable resignation as Argentine Ambassador to the United States. He would have no alternative, since this would be an admission of his having made a mistake in the conduct of this matter and he would have to pay the price by resigning. The alternative would be for Mr. Rubottom to re-explore the level of possible US assistance to Argentina with Under Secretary Dillon when the latter was available.
Mr. Rubottom expressed the hope that the Ambassador would not resign under such circumstances. He indicated that there would of course be profit in exploring this matter as thoroughly as possible and that he would continue to try to find some solution to the problem.
In a final exchange, Mr. Rubottom deplored the complications which were caused by approaches out of established channels. Barros agreed. Mr. O’Connor referred to the long history of individualized activities in the military assistance field by the several Argentine armed forces. In bidding the Ambassador good-bye, Mr. Rubottom urged him to relax and enjoy the brief trip to New York City which he was making the following day.
[Note: Ambassador Barros has not been consistent in his use of figures in discussing this military assistance matter. The Argentine Air Attaché, Col. McLoughlin, has added a personal estimate of $3.5 million for four additional years’ spare parts to the Defense offer of the 28 jet planes with one year’s spare parts for $4.4 million—for a total of approximately $8 million. While insisting on the necessity of having five years’ spare parts for operational planning, Col. McLoughlin has also referred to the possibility of trimming Argentine Air Force needs through the elimination of items not completely essential. It is believed that this $6.3 million figure represents the basic minimum to which the Argentine Air Force thinks its request might be reduced.]