Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

78. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

OD–NSC–58225–33

Washington, July 21, 1958

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5810/1
• B. NSC Actions Nos. 1903 and 1934

The enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, setting forth recommendations by the Department of Defense relative to the military elements of national strategy in NSC 5810/1, including paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903–b–(3), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, July 24, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From McElroy to the NSC

Washington, June 18, 1958

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5810/1
• B. NSC Action No. 1903–b–(3)
• C. NSC Action No. 1934

1. Transmitted herewith are Department of Defense comments and recommendations pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903–b–(3). In the formulation of these views, the conclusions and recommendations of the State-Defense study, “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961”, the memorandum signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense forwarding that study to the National Security Council, and the comments on that study developed by the Planning Board and forwarded by the Chairman of the Planning Board, have been seriously studied and taken into account.

2. As a result of the review by the Department of Defense of the military aspects of Basic Policy, it is concluded that there have been no recent developments which change fundamentally the major undertakings for which the military should be prepared. The major threat to the security of the United States continues, and will continue in the foreseeable future, to reside in the capability of the Soviet Union to precipitate and wage general nuclear war against the United States. Therefore, the highest priority in our military effort must continue to be given to the deterrent to all-out nuclear war.

3. In this connection, it is the intention of the Department of Defense to insure that this deterrent is adequate for its purpose but not excessive. It is believed that the conclusions of the Department of Defense study on Defensive and Offensive Weapons Systems, which will be presented to the NSC upon completion, will be pertinent in this regard.

4. The Department of Defense fully recognizes the need for flexibility in U.S. forces, to the maximum degree attainable within available resources, in order to deter or meet limited war. Both the limited war study and our recent thorough examination of our force structure have revealed a significant U.S. and allied capability to cope with a wide variety of limited war situations, and efforts are continuing toward the improvement of this capability.

5. Certain problem areas relating to limited military operations are raised by the study on this subject, and others are highlighted in the memorandum from the Chairman of the Planning Board. These problem areas have significant bearing on our capabilities for limited war and must receive continuing attention in our national planning—military, political, and economic—in order to insure the most effective use of available resources. The questions raised will receive continuing attention in our military planning.

6. In earlier NSC discussions a question was raised concerning the implications of increasing doubt on the part of our European allies that the United States would risk its own devastation by “massive retaliation” in response to aggression not directly involving U.S. territory. There was expressed the possible need for a modification of U.S. strategy in order to convince our allies that their security is not subject to an “all-or-nothing” decision by the United States. The problem raises the issue of whether limited war with the USSR is possible.

7. The Department of Defense has given careful consideration to this question. It is our considered opinion that war with the USSR cannot be held to limited operations and limited objectives. Moreover, to imply that we might seek to hold a war with the USSR to limited operations and limited objectives would involve a dangerous weakening of our deterrent position and certainly have a deleterious effect on the attitude of our allies.

8. Because of the almost certain adverse effect on our over-all deterrent inherent in any modification of strategy, the Department of Defense does not favor any such modification at this time for the purpose of reassuring our allies, nor does it favor any revision of the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1 which can be interpreted as a departure from current strategy. The Department of Defense does subscribe to any measures designed to allay doubts on the part of our allies as to the firmness of our purpose and intentions and to reinforce their confidence and determination, along the lines contemplated in paragraph 17 of NSC 5810/1, which states in part: “. . . In particular, to counter existing uncertainty, the United States should reaffirm that its nuclear weapons will be used, as necessary, to defend the Free World interests.”

9. In the light of the foregoing, the Department of Defense considers that the military section of NSC 5810/1 adequately sets forth the military role in national strategy and provides the necessary basic guidance for development of the U.S. and Free World force structure in the national security interest. Accordingly, the Department of Defense recommends no change in the military section of NSC 5810/1 and recommends adoption of paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, as already tentatively approved.

/s/ Neil McElroy

1. Source: Transmits McElroy’s memorandum on strategic concept (print Document 30). Top Secret; Limited Distribution, 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.