Office of the Historian

74. Memorandum of Conversation1

S/P–58203–3A
Washington, July 18, 1958
[Facsimile Page 1]

PARTICIPANTS

  • DOD/ISA
    • Mr. John N. Irwin II
    • Gen. Alonzo P. Fox
    • Mr. Robert H. B. Wade
  • State—S/P
    • Mr. Gerard C. Smith
    • Mr. Elbert G. Mathews

Mr. Smith told the DOD representatives that the Secretary of State would probably send the attached letter to the Secretary of Defense [Typeset Page 257] and informed them of its contents. He explained that the letter reflected growing State concern over our current strategic concept which seems in a very wide range of contingencies to face us with a choice between doing nothing and moving to general war which, according to the JCS, could result in the destruction of the US. Many people in State believe that we must develop doctrine and capabilities that would afford us some intermediate choices.

Mr. Irwin indicated that DOD would be reluctant to have NSC action on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 further postponed. DOD had submitted to Secretary McElroy for signature a memorandum to the NSC urging confirmation of the two paragraphs. A copy of this memorandum was displayed. Inter alia, it said that there were no “present developments” that changed the “military undertakings” required of the US, that the US and its allies had adequate limited war capabilities which were in any case being improved and that there could be no limited war between the US and the USSR.

[Facsimile Page 2]

Mr. Smith commented that State was less concerned with the formalities of NSC endorsement of the two paragraphs than with reaching an understanding with DOD that there would be a thorough review of our current strategic concept with recognition of its inevitable inacceptability in a few years time. We must begin to plan and prepare for an alternative strategic concept allowing us a wider range of responses to Communist aggression.

Mr. Mathews pointed out that the DOD memorandum perpetuated and strengthened the current, orthodox interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. If the NSC confirmed paragraphs 13 and 14 on the basis of this paper, there would be little room for the re-examination desired by State.

The DOD representatives stressed the budgetary difficulties of changing our strategic concept, our manpower deficiencies as compared with the Soviet bloc and the strong probability of any US–USSR clash, even if we desired and had the capability to deal with it in a limited way, developing into total war.

As the discussion ended, Mr. Smith again emphasized State’s conviction that we must begin a thorough re-examination of doctrine and capabilities.

  1. Source: New strategic concept. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.↩